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1. Introduction 
This year marks the 11th anniversary since the European Union (EU) mandated International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for all companies listed on the main European stock exchanges. 
Since its adoption by the EU, IFRS has had its share of supporters and critics. One of its greatest 
successes has been its global adoption, with tens of thousands of firms in over 100 countries currently 
reporting under, or at least closely linking their local accounting standards to, IFRS. The greatest 
criticisms leveled against IFRS have come from practitioners, who have argued against the fair value 
requirements and the transparency and governance structure of the board that issues the standards.1 In 
this paper, we review the academic literature related to IFRS adoption, with a primary focus on 
understanding its effects and consequences.  
Although the 2005 adoption of IFRS was a major regulatory transition affecting several tens 
of thousands of companies worldwide, its costs and benefits were initially unclear. The debates over 
the consequences of IFRS adoption at the time were largely constrained to conjectural statements due 
to lack of data (e.g., Ball 2006; Schipper 2003). Now, with the hindsight of over 10 years of IFRS 
reporting, we review the academic literature to compile and evaluate the available empirical evidence 
on the effects of IFRS adoption. 
The simultaneous mandatory adoption of IFRS by a large number of countries has provided 
empirical researchers with an unprecedented experiment to study the consequences of accounting 
standard setting and how these consequences vary across institutional and legal regimes.  However, its 
effects on academic research have gone beyond simply providing a useful context for researchers.  It 
has also kindled interest in cross-country accounting research and provided an opportunity for greater 
involvement of researchers from across the globe. Not surprisingly, a vast literature focusing on IFRS 
adoption has emerged. 
If we had to summarize the development of the IFRS literature, the majority of early studies 
paint IFRS as significantly benefiting adopting firms and countries in terms of (i) improved 
transparency, (ii) lower costs of capital, (iii) improved cross-country investments, (iv) better 
comparability of financial reports, and (v) increased following by foreign analysts. Although many of 
these studies include caveats about drawing strong inferences about the role of IFRS in causing the 
observed outcomes, these tend to be minimal and often ignored by subsequent research.2 These 
studies also typically do not clarify whether the terms “IFRS mandate” or “IFRS adoption” refer 
simply to the act of adopting new standards or include concurrent improvements in the enforcement of 
                                                            
1 Stojilkovic (2011) and Jarolim and Oppinger (2012) discuss these criticisms. See also Financial Director, 
“Long Road Ahead as IASB remedies governance concerns,” April 14, 2014. 
2 The initial evidence on IFRS effects could also be affected by the publication bias prevalent in social science 
research, whereby significant results tend to be published, as opposed to studies that fail to reject the null. 
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financial reports. More recent studies attempt to narrow down the sources of the observed benefits of 
IFRS adoption and conclude that at least some of the earlier documented benefits are not driven by the 
adoption of new accounting standards per se. Other recent studies examining the effects of IFRS on 
the inclusion of accounting numbers in formal contracts (which we refer to as the contracting role of 
accounting) point out that IFRS has lowered the contractibility of accounting numbers.3  
Given the rather limited evidence indicating that IFRS conveys unambiguous benefits to 
adopters and financial statement users, the widespread adoption by many countries over a short period 
is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation, identified by Ramanna and Sletten (2014), is that 
IFRS adoption is self-reinforcing. The perceived benefits, in terms of lowering cross-border 
transaction costs, increase for a given country as more jurisdictions with economic ties to that country 
adopt IFRS. Ramanna and Sletten (2014) empirically show that their hypothesis partly explains the 
prevalence of IFRS adoption. 
A variety of other reviews of IFRS-related research have been published. Soderstrom and Sun 
(2007) provide an early review of studies focusing mainly on the voluntary adoption of International 
Accounting Standards4 (IAS) or reconciliations between IAS and US generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki (2010) review IFRS studies to determine the 
implications of US firms potentially switching to IFRS. In particular, they study the effects of 
potential IFRS adoption by the US on reporting quality, costs, and the capital market. Pope and 
McLeay (2011) review the empirical IFRS studies emerging from the INTACCT research program 
and discuss implementation of IFRS in the EU. Bruggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn (2013) provide an 
overview of the various IFRS studies without considering the details of individual studies. A review 
by the financial reporting faculty at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) summarizes the empirical literature related to the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption from 
the perspective of EU countries (ICAEW 2015). This review also discusses the background of IFRS 
legislation. Ahmed, Chalmers, and Khlif (2013) conduct a meta-analysis of the IFRS literature, 
drawing from a wide range of journals and working papers. However, their analysis is limited to 
studies examining the effects of IFRS adoption on value relevance, discretionary accruals, and analyst 
forecasts. Their meta-analysis mainly focuses on quantifying the adoption effects documented in prior 
studies. More recently, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) review the financial reporting regulation literature, 
drawing on both US and international evidence. Although their focus is not on IFRS per se but more 
                                                            
3 Throughout this review, we distinguish between the contracting and valuation roles of accounting numbers, 
with the former referring to the use of accounting numbers within formal contracts (such as in debt covenants) 
and the latter referring to the use of accounting numbers for valuation decisions. We classify the effects of 
accounting on the initiation and terms of contracts under the valuation role. 
4 IAS were issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) until 2000. In 2001, the IASC 
was succeeded by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which adopted the earlier-issued IAS 
and started issuing new standards as IFRS. Throughout this review, we use the acronyms IFRS and IAS 
interchangeably to describe IFRS.  
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broadly on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, they provide a brief 
synthesis of the empirical findings associated with IFRS adoption. In particular, they discuss the 
empirical challenges that researchers face when employing the IFRS setting and highlight the 
limitations of drawing causal inferences in regulation research more generally. 
In contrast to the preceding reviews, our review is not directed at a specific IFRS-related 
question or issue or restricted to a specific geography. It is more comprehensive and provides a 
relatively broad coverage of IFRS research topics. We let the data dictate our selection of IFRS-
related topics. We cover all of the topics addressed by IFRS-adoption-related papers published in the 
following five accounting journals between 1999 and 2015: Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Review of Accounting 
Studies, and The Accounting Review.5 We identify IFRS articles published in these journals by 
searching for the keywords “International Accounting Standards,” “IAS,” or “IFRS” in each title and 
text. The topics identified from this process include the effects of IFRS adoption on (i) financial 
reporting, (ii) capital market outcomes, (iii) corporate decision-making, (iv) stewardship and 
governance, (v) debt contracting, and (vi) auditing. We exclude one study pertaining to taxes due to 
the limited expertise of authors in that area.6 The review covers all other papers published in the five 
aforementioned accounting journals. Although it also covers IFRS papers published in other journals, 
its coverage of these other journals is not intended to be complete. 
Although our primary focus is on studies based on mandatory adoption, we also review and 
incorporate evidence from early studies of voluntary adoption. In addition, we link findings from 
IFRS research to the theoretical and empirical findings reported in other contexts, typically in the US, 
to help readers appreciate the relevance of these studies and to provide insights into how inferences 
vary across contexts. In addition to published articles, we incorporate several working papers for 
certain topics that lack a large body of published works. 
Our objective is to provide a cohesive picture of the empirical archival literature related to 
IFRS adoption. With this in mind, we emphasize similarities and differences across the various 
studies in terms of not only their findings but also their hypothesis development, methodological 
choices, and samples.  In synthesizing the empirical findings, we outline the theoretical underpinnings 
and arguments linking IFRS adoption to the given economic or reporting outcomes or both. In 
addition, we discuss studies that focus on specific attributes of IFRS and provide a detailed discussion 
of the research design choices and empirical issues researchers face in the IFRS setting.  
                                                            
5 Our search period starts in 1999, as we find no published papers related to IAS in these journals before then.  
6 Chan, Lin, and Mo (2010) examine the effect of IFRS adoption on tax non-compliance. 
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In terms of structure, we divide the review into sections based on the topics covered and 
attempt to ensure that each section stands alone as much as possible. People working on specific 
IFRS-related topics should be able to benefit by reading even a limited part of this review. In line with 
this approach, each section also typically ends with a summary and suggestions for future research. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
historical perspective on IFRS adoption. It discusses the objectives and avowed benefits of IFRS 
adoption as presented around the large-scale adoption in 2005 in addition to the uncertainties and 
concerns expressed around that time. Our aim is not to track the chronological development of IFRS 
up to their eventual global adoption, but rather to provide a context for understanding the issues 
examined in the IFRS literature and to evaluate the contributions of that literature.7 The studies 
discussed in subsequent sections supply empirical evidence relevant to the debate over the benefits 
and limitations of IFRS adoption.  
Sections 3–9 present the documented effects of IFRS adoption along a variety of dimensions.  
Section 3 reviews the studies that examine the most direct effect of IFRS adoption, i.e., their effect on 
financial reporting quality. As several studies assume that IFRS improve reporting quality, the 
discussion in this section outlines the empirical evidence for this assumption. Section 4 examines 
studies that evaluate the stock market effects of IFRS, how IFRS adoption has affected information 
asymmetry in the stock markets, and the attendant consequences such as those on liquidity, cost of 
capital, analyst following, and cross-border capital flows. Section 5 considers papers that examine the 
real effects of IFRS adoption and how corporate decision-making has been influenced by IFRS 
reporting changes. Sections 6 and 7 examine the stewardship and debt-contracting roles of IFRS. 
These sections review studies that examine how the use of accounting numbers in executive 
compensation, managerial monitoring, and debt markets have changed with IFRS adoption. Section 8 
focuses on studies related to the auditing issues surrounding IFRS. Section 9 examines studies that 
focus on specific accounting attributes of IFRS. Section 10 reviews the empirical choices made by 
various studies and conducts meta-analysis of these choices in the context of IFRS research. Finally, 
we present our conclusions in Section 11. 
 
                                                            
7 For a detailed history of the IASC and its evolution into the IASB, we refer the reader to studies by 
Camffermann and Zeff (2007) and Zeff (2012). 
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2. Background to IFRS adoption 
2.1. History and development of IFRS 
The history of IFRS extends over 40 years. The first set of IAS was issued in 1971 by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was subsequently restructured to form 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The IASB has globally reshaped the map of 
financial reporting as evidenced by the large number of countries that have adopted IFRS. This holds 
true even when one excludes EU adoption, which provided the initial impetus for broader acceptance 
of IFRS.8 
In the EU, most companies with securities traded on regulated markets have been required to 
prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS (as endorsed by the European Commission 
[EC]) for financial years starting on or after Jan. 1, 2005.9 However, a delayed adoption was allowed 
for companies that had only debt securities traded publicly. Several other jurisdictions such as Hong 
Kong and Australia chose to adopt IFRS around the same period with several others later following 
suit. 
IFRS introduction seems to have had a substantial effect on the reported financial statements 
of firms. Even in the UK, where the local GAAP have been viewed as similar to IFRS, the financial 
reports of some firms have changed dramatically under IFRS. For instance, in its reconciliation of 
profits under IFRS and UK GAAP, Vodafone disclosed a net profit of £6.5 billion based on IFRS for 
fiscal 2005 and a net loss of £6.9 billion under UK GAAP, with the difference largely explained by 
goodwill amortization alone. British Airways similarly reported a decline of nearly two-thirds in its 
shareholders’ equity as a result of having to recognize pension liabilities on the balance sheet under 
IFRS. Under UK GAAP, the company disclosed the liabilities in its footnotes. These examples show 
how just one or two accounting items can substantially affect a company’s reported profits.10 This 
clearly indicates that IFRS adoption has had a major effect on the financial reports of firms, even in 
countries whose GAAP and IFRS are similar. 
2.2. Objectives and rational for IFRS adoption 
Two oft-stated objectives of IFRS adoption are to (i) enhance reporting quality and (ii) 
improve the comparability of ﬁnancial statements across countries. This view is enshrined even in the 
European Parliament’s Regulation 1606/2002, which required the EU to adopt IFRS. The regulation 
states that IFRS adoption is intended to achieve “a high degree of transparency and comparability of 
                                                            
8 This regulation (Regulation 1606/2002) was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the EU on June 7, 2002.  
9 This regulation was subsequently enacted into law by the European Parliament on Sept. 11, 2002. 
10 Barth, Landsman, Young, and Zhuang (2014), who analyze reconciliations of net income across IFRS and 
local GAAP, find that the effect of IFRS on net income tends to be larger for firms in the UK than in many other 
European countries.   
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financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the (EU) Community capital market and of 
the Internal Market.”  
Confirming these objectives, the IASB states that the main purpose of its work is: 
… to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, 
enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards based on clearly articulated 
principles.  These standards should require high quality, transparent and comparable 
information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help investors, other 
participants in the various capital markets of the world and other users of financial 
information make economic decisions. 
2.2.1. Enhance reporting quality 
The objective of IFRS to provide “a single set of high quality” accounting standards is often 
quoted and emphasized by its promoters. Although the goal of enhancing reporting quality should be 
welcomed, as it promotes business by ameliorating information asymmetry issues, translating it into 
practice is unlikely to be a smooth or straightforward process. First, this objective is silent as to what 
“high quality” means. Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) observe that accounting quality is conditional 
on the decision relevance of the financial information and so is better defined in the context of a 
specific decision model. For instance, although the liquidation values of assets are important inputs 
into decision-making by long-term debt holders, they are less useful for equity investment decisions. 
Dechow et al. (2010) conclude that “there is no measure of earnings quality that is superior to all 
decision models,” implying that an objective to prepare a single set of high quality standards for all 
identified users may not necessarily be achievable. Consistent with this concern, some recent studies 
point out that the emphasis of the role of IFRS in valuation has made accounting numbers less useful 
for inclusion in contracts (e.g., Ball, Li, and Shivakumar 2015). 
Second, the development of high quality accounting standards may not automatically translate 
into firms providing high quality financial reports. Reporting quality is determined partly by the 
quality of accounting rules, but it is also affected by the innate reporting incentives facing managers 
and incentives facing enforcers of the accounting rules, which include auditors, capital market and 
other financial regulators, courts, etc. There is little reason to expect that the incentives and economic 
forces faced by managers and regulators of listed companies in a large open economy like the UK are 
the same as those in a relatively closed economy like Qatar. In general, managerial reporting 
incentives and accounting enforcement are endogenous to a country’s economic, legal, and cultural 
environments.  For instance, managers’ reporting incentives are affected by how financial statement 
numbers are used in contracts, which in turn are likely to depend on legal dictates, by cultural values 
such as the religious beliefs of and trust between individuals, and by institutional factors such as 
firms’ ownership structures and corporate governance. The enforcement of accounting rules also 
depends on the extent to which business transactions are conducted at arm’s length. When companies 
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rely frequently on closed-door dealings that do not require reliance on publicly available financial 
reports, regulators’ incentives to enforce accounting rules are reduced. The reporting and enforcement 
incentives are also affected by governments’ decisions to tie accounting numbers to tax policies. 
Fox, Hannah, Helliar, and Veneziani (2013) illustrate the links between accounting numbers 
and legal, cultural, and institutional factors in relative detail through a comparison of Italy and the 
UK, which represent extremes within Europe along these dimensions. First, in terms of legal systems, 
Italy is a civil-law country; its accounting standards are subservient to its Civil Code, and its 
accounting regulations tend to be incorporated into its national laws. The authors also observe that 
accounting standards in Italy “are not compulsory but … have an integrative and interpretative 
function with respect to the provisions of the law.” In contrast, financial reporting in common-law 
countries like the UK tends to be less heavily regulated by statutes, and national laws tend to be less 
detailed and permit judgment, allowing accounting standards to play a more prominent role in UK 
financial reporting. Second, in terms of institutional factors and specifically corporate ownership, UK 
firms rely on capital markets to raise money, and so financial reporting is needed to ensure 
transparency and market efficiency. However, companies in Italy are often family owned and 
financed through banks, making creditors’ needs more dominant in financial statements. Finally, in 
terms of culture, the UK has traditionally relied on accrual accounting as a key concept, while 
prudence has traditionally dominated in Italy.   
The close link between financial reporting and legal, cultural, and institutional factors 
indicates that the cost-benefit trade-off of requiring firms to prepare high quality financial reports is 
not identical across countries. Accounting standards that may appear beneficial in the context of an 
open or developed economy may be less so elsewhere. A glaring example is the emphasis of IFRS on 
fair value accounting, which provides value-relevant information when fair values are obtained from 
deep and liquid markets but may permit manipulation in countries where capital markets are illiquid, 
opaque, underregulated or insufficiently representative of the economy (Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 
2015). 
Finally, in more recent mission statements, the IASB emphasizes the transparency of financial 
reports as part of the objectives of IFRS.11 However, it is unclear whether greater transparency 
translates to better quality financial statements, as mandating higher transparency requirements can 
lead firms to engage in costly real earnings management, i.e., structure their transactions to hide 
information or achieve specific reporting goals. Although most empirical evidence suggests that 
transparency in financial statements is useful to capital market participants, these studies are silent as 
                                                            
11 See http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-IASB.aspx. 
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to how much transparency is optimal and whether greater transparency necessarily promotes overall 
efficiency. 
2.3. Improve reporting comparability 
Even without necessarily improving reporting quality, IFRS may prove economically 
beneficial by merely narrowing cross-country differences in financial reports and promoting 
international trade. For instance, EU Regulation 1606/2002 states that: “This Regulation reinforces 
the freedom of movement of capital in the internal market and helps to enable Community companies 
to compete on an equal footing for financial resources available in the Community capital markets, as 
well as in world capital markets.” Along similar lines, emphasizing the need for global accounting 
standards to make cross-country transactions less costly and more efficient, former SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox observes the following: 
And markets are really just aggregations of people, all of whom communicate better 
if they speak the same language. … Breaking down barriers between nations and among 
social classes, which commerce does, has advanced the cause of civilization.  That has always 
been the idea behind the SEC’s cooperative initiatives with the International Accounting 
Standards Board, and with the authorities in over one hundred nations that today are using 
International Financial Reporting Standards. (Cox 2014) 
Confirming these benefits of improved comparability, Standard & Poor’s notes that “[g]lobal 
accounting and disclosure standards will be of great value to our analysts, by improving data 
consistency and enabling enhanced global peer comparisons.”12 
However, as discussed earlier, financial reporting quality is determined not only by 
accounting standards but also by a country’s legal system, culture, and institutions. As a result, 
researchers and practitioners have questioned the ability of a common accounting standard, even if 
mandated, to achieve convergence in the quality of reported financial statements (e.g., Ball, Kothari, 
and Robin 2000; Ball, Robin, and Wu 2003). Ball et al. (2000) provide empirical support for this 
concern by showing that reported accounting numbers in shareholder-model countries reflect 
economic losses in a timelier manner than in stakeholder-model countries.  
Even if IFRS achieve global convergence in the short term, observers have questioned 
whether these benefits are sustainable. By adopting IFRS, a country essentially allows a foreign entity 
with no local accountability to dictate reporting laws and thereby control the economic incentives and 
activities of its people and businesses. Cox (2014) points to this concern as a reason why a full-scale 
adoption of IFRS is unlikely to occur in the US. Several major IFRS-adopting economies have 
protected themselves from this concern by requiring a national standard setter to review and, if 
                                                            
12 Comment letter to SEC on allowing US issuers to prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS 
(August 7, 2007), 
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needed, modify IFRS before they become the law of the land.13 This approach to protecting legislative 
sovereignty may lead each national regulator to adopt certain standards while rejecting others and 
over time cause countries to diverge in their accounting standards.14  
Setting aside the achievability of global standardization, Dye and Sunder (2001) and Sunder 
(2011) question whether having a single global set of accounting standards is even desirable. They 
point to a variety of benefits to a world that allows firms to follow either IFRS or US GAAP, 
including the opportunity to empirically evaluate the effects of new accounting standards and to study 
the pros and cons of principles- and rules-based systems in practice. They contend that multiple 
reporting regimes would encourage positive innovations in financial reporting quality through the 
effects of competition. 
2.4. Initial fears and uncertainties about IFRS adoption 
The initial period of IFRS adoption was riddled with uncertainties. Reflecting this concern, 
former IASB Chairman Sir David Tweedie warned: “The first year will always be difficult. It’s the 
biggest change for Europe since the Euro was introduced. Of course, there are going to be a few blips; 
it’s to be expected.”15  
The frequency and speed with which new pronouncements were being introduced also 
concerned practitioners. The IASB issued 29 new standards and amendments to existing standards in 
the 13 months between December 2003 and December 2004. In December 2003 alone, the IASB 
issued 15 amendments to IAS.  Moreover, in 2005, after the firms had started reporting under IFRS, 
about 10 amendments were issued.  
The “100 Group of finance directors” and ICAEW critiqued the IASB approach as 
substituting clarity for complexity and complained that standards, particularly those related to fair 
value reporting, were developing in the wrong direction. There were also complaints that IFRS 
introduced too much subjectivity and compromised comparability.16 
Based on a survey of 149 finance professionals conducted in October 2004, KPMG global 
director Mark Vaessen noted that uncertainty over the final standards and those that would be 
applicable in the EU delayed the preparation of many EU companies for IFRS adoption.17 Based on a 
                                                            
13 Along these lines, publicly listed companies within the EU must comply only with IFRS endorsed by the 
European Commission (EC). The EC is not a national standard setter per se but a transnational EU committee.    
14 On Nov. 19, 2004, the EC endorsed IAS 39 with the exception of two “carve-outs”: one relating to the Full 
Fair Value Option and the other to hedge accounting. In July 2005, the EU adopted an amended version of the 
regulation for the fair value option. Some hedge accounting requirements under IAS 39 are still to be endorsed.  
15 “IASB chairman offers respite in big impact pronouncements” (http://www.cch.co.uk/, December 17, 2004). 
16  See “IFRS under attack,” Accountancy, Sept. 1, 2005. 
17 “Publication of the first quantified explanations of the impact of IFRS heralds the start of a very different 
phase in their implementation - communicating the findings,” Accountancy Live, January 2005. 
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survey of 60 managers from Australia’s top 200 corporations conducted by Jones and Higgins (2006), 
preparers felt unprepared for adoption and were skeptical about the claimed benefits. Surveyed buy- 
and sell-side analysts also expressed doubts about their abilities to distinguish between the effects of 
accounting changes from IFRS adoption and the effects of changes in underlying business 
performance. The biggest knowledge gaps seemed to involve the most effective reporting issues, with 
nearly two-thirds of the surveyed analysts stating that they knew little about the new standards for 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and financial instruments and more than half claiming ignorance as 
to the effects of accounting for share options.18 These findings led to concerns that share prices could 
be negatively affected or become more volatile after the introduction of IFRS: “IFRS won’t change 
the underlying performance of a business or cash flow, but the markets may not see it that way.”19 
Auditors also raised concerns around the lack of preparation for the introduction of IFRS. The 
ICAEW claimed that tardy preparation for IFRS adoption by some firms could cause them to receive 
qualified audit opinions upon IFRS adoption. The chairman of ICAEW’s Audit and Assurance 
Faculty, Andrew Ratcliffe, also pointed out that auditors had to be more alert about the potential for 
greater earnings management under IFRS.20 
IFRS adoption also left uncertainty in the minds of investors over surprises that could emerge 
during the transition. Peter Elwin, head of accounting and valuation at Cazenove, noted that “one is 
always slightly concerned about the unknown.” Morgan Stanley Vice-President Leon Michaelides 
expressed a similar sentiment.21 These concerns were exacerbated because only a minority of smaller 
UK companies had provided information about the effects of IFRS for their firms as of July 2005. 
Despite the preceding concerns, the adoption of IFRS was relatively smooth. A survey of 
about 200 fund managers conducted by PwC and Ipsos MORI in 2006 revealed that nearly 75% of 
respondents felt that IFRS did not adversely affect their perceptions of firm value. In addition, firms’ 
disclosures of the effects of IFRS seemed to alleviate transitional surprises. A review of 1,250 annual 
reports of required pre-transition disclosures conducted by the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission found that “all entities … had successfully provided the required disclosures of the 
impacts of AIFRS by explaining the key differences in accounting practices they expected under 
AIFRS.” 
However, the smooth transition of IFRS still leaves unanswered the questions of whether 
IFRS adoption brought tangible benefits and, if so at what cost. These important issues have been 
evaluated by empirical research papers, which we discuss as follows. 
                                                            
18 “Avoid nasty shocks: get to grips with IFRS,” Accounting, February 2005. 
19 “IFRS sparks share price fears,” Accountancy, December 2004. 
20 “Tardy IFRS prep will lead to audit qualifications,” Accountancy, September 2004. 
21 “Investors fear IFRS surprises,” Accountancy Age, July 2005. 
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3. IFRS and Financial Reporting Quality  
Many proponents believe that IFRS reporting is of a higher quality than previous local GAAP 
and that its adoption improves financial transparency, lowers information asymmetry in capital 
markets, promotes cross-border comparability, attracts foreign capital flows, and consequently lowers 
the cost of capital for firms in adopting countries (e.g., Levitt, 1998; IASB, 2002). Given these oft-
repeated benefits, it is of little surprise that the earliest IFRS studies typically focus on evaluating the 
quality of financial reports under IFRS following Europe’s mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Several studies have attempted to provide direct evidence of IFRS reporting quality by 
examining the properties of accounting numbers.  We begin this section by reviewing the evidence 
from voluntary adoptions and then discuss the evidence based on mandatory adoption.  In a separate 
subsection, we discuss the effects of IFRS adoption on comparability, a dimension of reporting 
quality given explicit importance in the IFRS conceptual framework. 
 
3.1. Evidence from voluntary IFRS adoption 
Although large-scale mandatory adoption of IFRS did not occur until 2005, a handful of 
European countries had allowed firms to voluntarily report under IAS since the early 1990s. Focusing 
on these voluntary adopters, researchers have attempted to provide initial insights into the potential 
economic consequences of IFRS adoption. 
Based on a sample of 80 German industrial firms that voluntarily adopted IAS from 1998 to 
2002, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) examine the effects on reported financial statement numbers.  
They take advantage of the requirement of IAS-adopting German firms to report financial statements 
under both local GAAP (“Handelsgesetzbuch”) and IAS in the adoption year. Analyzing the 
differences in reported numbers across these accounting standards, they find that total assets and book 
value of equity are significantly larger under IAS and that there is more cross-sectional variation in 
book value and net income under IAS relative to German GAAP. They also find that the adoption of 
IAS does not improve value relevance or timeliness of financial statement information. A notable 
feature of the study is its ability to control for underlying economic activities, as it focuses on data 
related to the same firm-year across two accounting standards. As with any evaluation of voluntary 
adoptions, self-selection bias is a concern, although the study attempts to mitigate this with the 
Heckman procedure.  
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Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) compare the value relevance (as a proxy for overall 
information related to quality of earnings) across a sample of 417 German firms that reported under 
IAS, US GAAP, or local German GAAP (HGB). In contrast to the findings of Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007), Bartov et al. (2005) find a higher value relevance for German firms reporting 
under either IAS or US GAAP than under local GAAP.22 As there are significant methodological and 
sample-related differences across the two studies, it is difficult to pinpoint why they reach different 
conclusions. For instance, Bartov et al. (2005) omit book value of equity from their value relevance 
regressions, which may bias their coefficient on earnings (Soderstrom and Sun 2007). By focusing on 
both pre- and post-adoption data, Bartov et al. (2005) may increase the power of their tests relative to 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007), who focus only on reported numbers in the year of adoption.  
However, by comparing financial statements for the same year for the same firms under two different 
accounting standards, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) mitigate the contamination errors and biases 
arising from omitted correlated variables.  
Switching from the German setting, Kinnunen, Niskanen, and Kasanen (2000) examine a 
sample of 19 Finnish firms reporting under both IAS and local Finnish GAAP from 1984 to 1991 to 
evaluate how the informativeness of IAS numbers varies across two different sets of investors, i.e., 
domestic and foreign investors. By comparing the earnings response coefficients for stocks that can be 
held by either domestic or foreign investors with those for restricted stocks (i.e., those that can be held 
by domestic investors only), they find that the information content of IAS reported numbers is higher 
for foreign investors. 
For a sample of 35 Swiss firms, Auer (1996) documents an increase in the variance of 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements for firms switching from local Swiss GAAP to IAS 
and concludes that IAS-compliant numbers are more informative to Swiss investors. However, these 
results and those of Kinnunen, Niskanen, and Kasanen (2000) should be interpreted with caution 
given the small sample sizes and self-selection issues inherent in voluntary adoption studies. 
Switching to US capital markets, Harris and Muller (1999) study a sample of 31 cross-listed 
foreign firms that voluntarily reported under IFRS between 1992 and 1996 and reported 
reconciliations of IAS earnings and book values of equity based on US GAAP via Form-20F filings.  
The authors examine the value relevance of the reconciliation items (i.e., their ability to explain stock 
prices and returns) and find modest evidence of the value relevance of earnings reconciliation 
adjustments based on market value and return tests. In additional tests, they find mixed evidence as to 
which accounting method produces amounts that are more highly associated with market values, i.e., 
                                                            
22 Bartov et al. (2005) do not find evidence to suggest that US GAAP are of a higher value relevance than IAS, 
suggesting that their results are driven by a higher value relevance of both US GAAP and IAS over local 
German GAAP.   
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IAS amounts are more highly associated with prices per share and US GAAP amounts are more 
highly associated with returns.23 Notably, the authors document little difference between IAS and US 
GAAP earnings and book values of equity, reporting average aggregate adjustments of just 0.27% and 
0.31% of IAS owners’ equity, respectively. However, these relatively small differences may result in 
part because firms cross-listing to the US are typically large, have better information environments, 
and tend to choose accounting policies that are more consistent with US GAAP (e.g., Ashbaugh and 
Olsson 2002). 
In a related study, Chen and Sami (2008) examine short-term trading volume reactions to 
information contained in Form 20-F reconciliations of IAS to US GAAP. Based on a sample of 48 
non-US firms cross-listed in the US and reporting under IAS, they find that the magnitude of 
reconciliation adjustments is significantly positively associated with abnormal volume in the two days 
around the Form 20-F filing date in both the local and US markets. They conclude that reconciliation 
adjustments provide information over and above those contained in IAS reports.  
Other studies also present country-specific evidence that shows little advantage of moving to 
IAS. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find that German firms that voluntarily apply IAS do not 
exhibit differences in earnings management attributes compared with those applying local German 
GAAP. Daske (2006) finds that the cost of equity capital is not significantly different across German 
firms adopting either IAS or US GAAP. 
The foregoing studies are based on country-specific settings, which offer the advantage of 
holding constant institutional factors (e.g., listing requirements, market microstructures, and 
enforcement). However, generalizations of evidence from these studies could be problematic.    
Expanding beyond country-specific analysis, Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) study a 
matched sample of 327 IAS adopters and non-adopters across 21 countries for 1994 through 2003 to 
examine whether voluntary IAS reporting is associated with better accounting quality. They define 
accounting quality along three dimensions: the extent of earnings management, timely loss 
recognition, and value relevance. Their arguments for an increase in quality stem from the assumption 
that IAS better reflects the economic reality and decreases managerial discretion in terms of 
accounting choices and that IAS adoption is accompanied by greater enforcement. Based on 
univariate analysis, they find little difference in accounting quality between adopters and non-adopters 
in the pre-adoption period. However, the difference turns significant in the post-adoption period, 
indicating that IAS adoption is associated with lower earnings management, more timely loss 
recognition, and greater value relevance. Their results support the notion that IAS adoption increases 
                                                            
23 Venkatachalam (1999) provides a nice discussion of alternative explanations for and interpretations of the 
mixed results of Harris and Muller (1999). 
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accounting quality relative to local GAAP. Although the authors are careful not to attribute their 
findings solely to changes in accounting standards and interpret “IAS adoption” as encompassing all 
relevant changes to the financial reporting system, including changes in enforcement, subsequent 
research has often loosely attributed the study’s findings exclusively to changes in accounting 
standards. 
Christensen, Lee, Walker, and Zeng (2015) revisit the evidence provided by Barth et al. 
(2008) in the context of a single country, i.e., Germany, where firms could voluntarily adopt IFRS 
between 1998 and 2005 but have been required to since 2005. The authors conjecture that voluntary 
adopters, but not mandatory adopters, are likely to represent firms that face net benefits from IFRS 
adoption. Replicating the methodology of Barth et al. (2008) separately for voluntary and mandatory 
adopters, they find that the subsample of voluntary adopters exhibit significantly lower earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, and greater value relevance, while mandatory adopters 
exhibit little improvement in accounting quality. They conclude that “the adoption of IFRS does not 
necessarily lead to higher quality accounting, at least not when the preparers have no incentives to 
become more transparent in their reporting.” Although their evidence speaks to the effects of 
IAS/IFRS adoption in only one country, it more broadly raises questions about the role of mandatory 
IFRS adoption in improving accounting quality. 
Overall, research based on large samples has documented that voluntary IFRS adoption leads 
to improved financial reporting quality. However, these results do not endure when underlying 
institutional details and economic activities are held constant, as in the study by Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007). Although these studies attempt to rule out self-selection biases, one should be 
aware that the potential for such biases remains in any voluntary adoption setting. 
3.2. Evidence from mandatory adoption 
Following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU and several other countries, several 
studies have revisited the effects of IFRS adoption on reporting quality. Based on a sample of firms 
from 20 countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005, Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) investigate 
whether IFRS adoption lowers income smoothing, decreases earnings aggressiveness (measured as 
positive excess accruals and less timely loss recognition), and decreases earnings management to 
meet/beat targets. Their research design allows them to compare the reporting quality of IFRS 
adopters to a matched sample of non-adopters, where the matching accounts for proxies for country-
level enforcement and firm-level characteristics. Their analyses reveal that mandatory adopters 
exhibit greater income smoothing, greater earnings aggressiveness, and a more delayed recognition of 
losses but are not statistically different from matched non-adopters in their earnings management to 
meet/beat targets. These results are particularly driven by firms in countries with relatively strong 
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enforcement standards. They conclude that accounting quality in general decreases after IFRS 
adoption, particularly for adopters in countries with strong enforcement regimes.  
In contrast to Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013), Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams (2012) 
find that the value relevance of net income and book value of equity following mandatory IFRS 
adoption increases under IFRS. However, Barth et al. (2012) do not primarily study value relevance; 
they focus more on evaluating the comparability of financial reports between IFRS adopters and US 
firms. In a related study, Barth, Landsman, Young, and Zhuang (2014) examine whether 
reconciliations of local GAAP numbers to IFRS numbers are value relevant to investors. Based on a 
sample of 1,201 firms in 15 European countries, they find that reconciliation adjustments for net 
income and book value of equity are value relevant in the sense that they are cross-sectionally related 
to stock prices. When the authors focus on the value relevance of adjustments that specifically relate 
to the application of IAS 39 (financial instruments), they find that these amounts are value relevant for 
financial firms but not for non-financials. The authors interpret this finding as an indication that 
financial firm investors consider fair value measurements under IAS 39 as more relevant than 
domestic GAAP measurements. Notwithstanding the preceding findings, the extent to which evidence 
of value relevance is helpful in assessing accounting standards has been debated (see Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001). 
Chen and Sami (2013) re-examine investor reactions to information contained in the Form 20-
F reconciliation of IFRS to US GAAP during the mandatory adoption period (2005–2006). Based on a 
sample of 195 firms cross-listed in the US and reporting under IFRS, they continue to find a positive 
association between the magnitude of reconciliation adjustments and abnormal volume in the two 
days surrounding the Form 20-F filing date, consistent with prior results of Chen and Sami (2008). 
However, the reaction is only evident for firms with low institutional ownership and first-time IFRS 
adopters. Their results suggest that 20-F reconciliations provide useful information to at least a subset 
of firms and that the elimination of these reconciliations may impose an information loss on less 
sophisticated investors. 
Kim, Li, and Li (2012) examine the stock market consequences of the SEC’s decision in 2007 
to eliminate 20-F reconciliations. Using a treatment sample of 78 foreign cross-listed firms that 
mandatorily report under IFRS and a control sample of 162 cross-listed firms that do not use IFRS, 
they fail to find empirical evidence to support the claims that eliminating 20-F reconciliations harms 
the information environment measured along a variety of dimensions, including market liquidity, 
probability of informed trading (PIN), cost of equity, analyst forecasts, institutional ownership, and 
stock price efficiency. They also partition their sample based on the magnitude of absolute differences 
between IFRS and US GAAP earnings (before the elimination of 20-F reconciliations) and still find 
no significant effects on liquidity, PIN, and cost of equity. 
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Similarly, Chen and Khurana (2015) examine stock market reactions to SEC announcements 
relating to the decision to eliminate 20-F reconciliations for IFRS reporters. This approach allows the 
authors to estimate the net cost or benefit of eliminating the reconciliations to investors. They 
document a positive stock market reaction for US cross-listed firms that report under IFRS relative to 
a benchmark sample of cross-listed non-IFRS and domestic US firms. In additional cross-section 
analysis, they find that this effect is positively associated with proxies for cost savings and negatively 
associated with the magnitude of IFRS reconciliation amounts. The authors conclude that the costs of 
preparing and auditing the 20-F reconciliations generally outweigh concerns about information loss 
from their elimination. 
Consistent with the mixed evidence presented by cross-country studies, country-specific 
studies also yield contradictory findings related to the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
reporting quality. For instance, based on a sample of 150 German high-tech firms that transitioned to 
IFRS from US GAAP in 2005, Lin, Riccardi, and Wang (2012) find that accounting quality worsened 
after the switch, with IFRS accounting numbers exhibiting more earnings management, less timely 
loss recognition, and less value relevance. Based on a sample of 297 large non-financial UK firms that 
adopted IFRS mandatorily, Horton and Serafeim (2010) find that the disclosure of IFRS reconciliation 
adjustments provides information when the reconciliations are negative, suggesting that IFRS allows 
for the credible communication of bad news. The authors also provide evidence of IFRS adjustments 
having incremental value relevance over and above UK GAAP numbers. Based on a sample of 91 
Finnish firms, Lantto and Sahlstrom (2009) find that the adoption of IFRS rules related to fair value, 
financial instruments, leases, and income taxes significantly affects key financial ratios. Comparing 
financial ratios based on accounting numbers reported under both IFRS and local GAAP in the 
transitional year, the authors find that profitability ratios increased by 9-19%, P/E ratios decreased by 
11%, and gearing increased by 2.9%. These mixed findings in country-specific studies may partly 
reflect the differences in local GAAP in place before the IFRS mandate. 
Focusing on another aspect of accounting quality, Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock (2012) 
examine the information content of earnings announcements in countries that mandate IFRS adoption 
relative to countries that retain domestic accounting standards. The authors measure information 
content as either abnormal return volatility or abnormal trading volume. These measures are 
predicated on the notion that the greater the information, the greater the revision of investors’ beliefs, 
leading to a higher return volatility around earnings announcements. Furthermore, greater information 
content increases the heterogeneity in investors’ responses to earnings news, leading to increased 
trading around earnings announcements. Adopting a difference-in-differences approach, the authors 
compare changes in information content for firms from 16 mandatory-IFRS-adopting countries 
against those for firms in 11 countries that retained local GAAP. The results from their sample of 
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21,703 earnings announcements over the 2002–2007 period reveal a positive association between 
mandatory adoption and the information content of earnings announcements, indicating that investors 
view IFRS earnings as being of higher quality than local GAAP. As the increases are persistent, the 
authors conclude that alternative explanations based on uncertainty around the initial adoption or lack 
of familiarity with IFRS are tenable.24 However, without knowing the identity of the traders inducing 
the greater trading and return volatility, it is difficult to attribute the observed changes unambiguously 
to improved transparency under IFRS. For instance, if IFRS leads to greater informed trading (as may 
happen if IFRS numbers are easier to manipulate, as argued by Ahmed et al. [2013]), then one would 
also observe higher volatility and trading around earnings announcements. 
The preceding findings based on stock market effects generally indicate that IFRS better 
meets the needs of stock market participants. However, this evidence is insufficient to attribute the 
stock market effects to the accounting standards alone, as mandatory adoption dates can be 
contaminated by other events or changes in the reporting incentives of firms. One explanation for the 
observed change, which may or may not be endogenous to the IFRS mandate, is the increased 
tendency of firms to provide management forecasts around IFRS adoption, as documented by Li and 
Yang (2015). If Li and Yang (2015) are correct in suggesting that the increased management forecasts 
arise from improved earnings quality under IFRS, then the forecasts provide a mechanism through 
which IFRS affect stock prices. However, if managers start to provide additional non-financial 
information along with earnings forecasts, then the preceding results may suffer from contamination 
bias.25  
Stock market investors are only one set of users of financial statements. As reporting must be 
judged in the context of a specific user, one should be careful not to extrapolate the preceding findings 
as indicative of the unconditional superiority of IFRS over domestic GAAP or of IFRS adoption 
benefitting the economy as a whole. Moreover, given the greater emphasis of IFRS on the valuation 
role of financial reports, the stock-market-based findings are to an extent expected for countries where 
the local GAAP were developed with users other than stock market investors in mind, such as in cases 
where the country’s economy is not capital market intensive. 
Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) go beyond the usual analysis of reported financial numbers 
and extend the IFRS literature to encompass qualitative disclosures in financial reports. Based on 
textual analysis of 87,608 annual reports of firms from 40 countries between 1998 and 2011, they find 
that IFRS reports tend to be significantly longer and contain less boilerplate language than non-IFRS 
                                                            
24 Truong (2012) provides corroborative evidence based on analysis of New Zealand firms. He documents a 
significant increase in information content over the 1994–2009 period, with a marked increase immediately 
following the adoption of IFRS.   
25 We discuss the contamination issues associated with mandatory IFRS adoption studies in detail in Section 10. 
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annual reports. In addition, they find greater comparability between textual disclosures of IFRS 
reports relative to that within non-IFRS annual reports. Based on these results, they conclude that 
mandatory IFRS adoption has probably increased the quality of textual disclosures.  
3.3. Financial reporting quality and comparability 
Comparability is an important characteristic of financial reporting quality.  It is defined as the 
quality of information that enables users to identify and understand similarities and differences 
between accounting items (IASB, 2010).  That is, financial reports are considered comparable if 
similar economic transactions yield similar accounting items and different economic events result in 
different reported items. The importance placed on this attribute by standard setters is evident given 
the following statement of the IFRS conceptual framework: “Information about a reporting entity is 
more useful if it can be compared with similar information about other entities and with similar 
information about the same entity for another period or another date.” The EU regulation for IFRS 
adoption (EC No. 1606/2002) also states comparability across markets as a reason for its adoption. 
As empirical analysis of comparability is relatively new in the accounting literature, we begin 
by providing a general discussion of the research methods employed to measure comparability before 
reviewing the comparability literature specific to IFRS adoption. 
3.3.1. Measures of reporting comparability 
Although the term “comparability” is widely used by practitioners, regulators, and 
researchers, little effort has gone into estimating comparability until recently. Comparability can refer 
to the similarity in inputs of a reporting system (i.e., accounting methods, transaction structures, 
business model), the similarity in recognized accounting numbers (reported earnings or assets and 
liabilities), or the similarity in reporting structures and disclosures. Early studies of comparability 
focus on either levels of financial or valuation ratios, such as returns on equity and price-earnings 
ratios, or stock market valuations of accounting data. For instance, Joos and Lang (1994) evaluate 
how profitability ratios and value relevance measures vary across France, Germany, and the UK and 
conclude that country-specific accounting practices affect accounting-based performance measures. 
Although the authors point out that variations in economic effects across countries are unlikely to 
explain their conclusions, their approach to estimating accounting comparability does not directly 
control for the differences in economic transactions across their sample firms. 
Subsequent studies develop input-based measures of comparability. For instance, Bae, Tan, 
and Welker (2008) construct a cross-country measure of comparability based on the degree to which 
local accounting standards deviate from IAS. This measure has been adopted by several studies, 
particularly in the examination of cross-country differences in the effects of IFRS adoption. Based on 
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a survey of partners in large accounting firms in 60 countries (see Nobes 2001), Bae et al. (2008) 
identify 21 key accounting rules and score them for each country based on their variations from IAS. 
By comparing the 21 country-specific scores across two countries, they calculate a country-pair 
measure of GAAP difference equal to the number of items for which the scores differ across the 
countries. This measure considers two accounting standards as similar (i.e., low accounting distance) 
when both sets of rules either comply with or deviate from IAS. Although this survey-based approach 
can help explain the cross-country differences in accounting standards, there are three specific 
drawbacks due to the way it is implemented. First, the survey data examined by Nobes (2001) are 
based on accounting standards in place as of Dec. 31, 2001 and ignore any subsequent revisions made 
to local GAAP in the lead-up to IFRS adoption. In addition, the data ignores any country-specific 
carve-outs or differences in the application of IFRS by national regulators. Second, this approach 
assumes that countries whose local GAAP differ significantly from IAS also differ significantly from 
one another, which may not be true. To overcome the issue presented by an absence of direct 
comparison between local GAAP, Yu and Wahid (2014) modify the measure by determining whether 
the countries share the same legal origin. That is, country pairs whose local GAAP differ from IAS 
are assumed to also differ from each other only if they do not share the same legal origin. Third, the 
measure captures differences in standards, which may or may not result in meaningful differences in 
the actual reported amounts or disclosures. 
De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011) provide an output-based measure of comparability that 
has been heavily adopted in recent studies. They characterize two firms’ accounting systems as 
comparable if they produce similar financial statements for a given set of economic events. Relying 
on stock returns as a proxy for the net effects of economic events relevant to financial reports, the 
authors calculate comparability based on the ability of stock returns to explain contemporaneous 
earnings. In the first step, for each firm quarter, they estimate an earnings-returns regression using 
earnings and stock returns in the previous 16 quarters to obtain model parameters. In the second step, 
for each firm quarter, they calculate the absolute difference between the earnings predicted using the 
firm’s own parameters and the earnings predicted using a peer firm’s parameters. The comparability 
measure for a firm quarter is the average absolute difference in predicted earnings over the previous 
16 quarters. 
The measure used by De Franco et al. (2011) focuses exclusively on earnings comparability, 
which, while important, does not capture all of the dimensions of reporting. Moreover, due to its 
reliance on stock returns as a proxy for economic events, the measure may be affected by cross-firm 
differences in stock liquidity, price efficiency, growth options, the pervasiveness of non-financial 
information, and other factors that influence earnings-returns relations. As the measure adopted by De 
Franco et al. (2011) relies on a linear regression of earnings on returns, it may be affected by 
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nonlinearity in the earnings-returns relationship. Nevertheless, this measure takes an important step 
forward by focusing on the outputs of financial reporting systems, which are determined not just by 
accounting rules but also by enforcement and reporting incentives.  
Barth et al. (2012) modify the measure used by De Franco et al. (2011) in several ways. First, 
they reverse the regression equation, and, rather than using stock returns as the only dependent 
variable in their analysis, they alternatively use stock returns, stock prices, or cash flows as dependent 
variables. Second, they extend the list of explanatory variables to include several accounting items 
such as earnings, book value of equity, earnings changes, and a loss dummy. Similar to the approach 
of De Franco et al. (2011), they calculate the absolute differences in stock returns (or stock prices or 
cash flows) predicted using IFRS and US firm parameters. Finally, they calculate the comparability 
measure by averaging the absolute differences in stock returns, stock prices, and cash flows. A clear 
advantage of this measure is that it does not rely on stock returns as a lone proxy for economic 
outcomes and allows a variety of accounting items to be considered simultaneously for comparability. 
However, this measure continues to rely on the assumption of a linear relationship between earnings 
and proxies for economic activities. 
Seeking to measure earnings comparability for a sample of private firms, Cascino and Gassen 
(2015) develop a reporting comparability model based on a model that uses contemporaneous cash 
flows to explain accruals. Following a logic similar to that of De Franco et al. (2011), they calculate 
comparability as the average absolute difference in predicted accrual values using a firm’s own 
parameters and the fitted values obtained using a peer firm’s parameters. As accruals distinguish 
accounting from mechanical cash counting, this model is more focused on the key role of accounting 
and can also take advantage of studies that attempt to develop theoretically motivated accrual models. 
In addition, the measure is not affected by specific aspects of stock market functioning and 
characteristics. 
Disclosure comparability receives the least attention in the literature, partly due to its inherent 
difficulty. The few studies addressing this issue tend to do so using small samples of hand-collected 
and manually coded data to compare the existence, type, and length of disclosures across different 
reporting regimes. For instance, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) construct three measures of the cross-
country comparability of accounting standards based on differences in disclosure requirements and 
measurement methods. Using data from 1993 based on an international sample of 80 firms that 
voluntarily adopted IAS, the authors compare the existence and length of disclosure requirements 
between the firms’ local GAAP and IAS.26 They score the differences in disclosure requirements for 
                                                            
26 The eight items are listed as follows: existence of statement of cash flow, disclosure of accounting policies, 
disclosure of a change in accounting policies, disclosure of the effect of a change in accounting estimates, 
disclosure of prior period adjustments, disclosure of post-balance-sheet events, disclosure of related party 
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eight accounting rules and convert these scores into a disclosure-comparability index (DISCLOSE). 
The authors also construct a comparability index of the available measurement methods (METHODS) 
for four accounting rules (depreciation, leases, pensions, and research and development). Finally, the 
authors combine these two indices to create an aggregate measure of reporting comparability 
(IASSET). Although these measures attempt to directly compare accounting standards in terms of 
their disclosure requirements and breadth of accounting choices, the few accounting items for which 
differences are analyzed and the subjectivity inherent in scoring the differences limit its appeal.  
Similar to the measure adopted in Bae et al. (2008), using IAS as a benchmark to compare accounting 
standards does not permit direct pair-wise comparisons of accounting standards. Moreover, relative to 
De Franco et al. (2011) and Barth et al. (2012), whose approaches can be applied to large samples, the 
manual coding required under this approach limits its applicability to large samples. It also cannot be 
easily adapted to capture time variations in disclosure or accounting standards, which matters 
especially for countries that have faced frequent changes in their accounting regulations. 
Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) evaluate the comparability of financial reports for a sample 
of non-US firms using the cosine similarity of words contained in the firms’ annual reports. This 
measure compares the relative word frequencies between two annual reports, with a score of 0 
indicating no overlapping words and a score of 1 indicating identical proportions of words. Although 
this approach has the advantage of comparing disclosures across a large sample of firms, its 
applicability is limited to firms that provide English-language reports, which would result in a 
selection bias in an international setting.  
3.3.2. IFRS adoption and comparability 
Proponents of IFRS have argued that globally mandating a uniform accounting standard 
should improve financial statement comparability and allow investors and firms to make better 
investment decisions. The argument rests on the notion that greater comparability increases the 
information available to decision-makers by allowing them to better understand competitors’ financial 
reports and thereby enhances information transfers across many firms and across countries. 
IFRS is in fact well placed to improve comparability due to its focus on principles rather than 
rules. By encouraging managers to prepare financial statements based on the essence of an economic 
transaction rather than a set of relatively inflexible rules, IFRS can ensure that managers account for 
like transactions in a like manner and dissimilar transactions differently (Schipper, 2003). However, 
for this strength to be realized, strong enforcement is required. Weak enforcement can worsen 
comparability under principles-based accounting standards, as the flexibility can lead managers to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
transactions, and disclosure of segment information. See Table A1 (p. 438) in a study by Ashbaugh and Pincus 
(2001) for specific details about their measures.     
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opportunistically select dissimilar accounting methods for the same set of transactions. A related 
concern is the larger set of accounting choices offered under IFRS. As standard setters observe, 
“permitting alternative accounting methods for the same economic phenomenon diminishes 
comparability” (IASB 2010).   
Some researchers have questioned the ability of IFRS to provide truly comparable financial 
reports based on the argument that reporting quality is not only determined by accounting standards, 
but also by firms’ reporting incentives. In their examination of reporting quality in four East Asian 
countries, Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) find that, although accounting standards in these countries are 
comparable with those in common-law countries (such as UK GAAP, US GAAP, and IAS), their 
financial statements are of a lower quality. They conclude that merely changing accounting standards 
in a country would be insufficient to improve reporting quality. Corroborative evidence for this view 
is provided by Jayaraman and Verdi (2013), who show that greater economic integration following 
the introduction of the euro is associated with increases in accounting comparability within the 
Eurozone. Their evidence points to the need for economic integration across countries to achieve 
better comparability of financial reports.  
Empirical studies attempt to illuminate the comparability-related effects of IFRS adoption in 
two broad ways: (i) by using direct measures of comparability (e.g., Barth et al. 2012) or (ii) by 
examining observable market outcomes of comparability (e.g., Wang 2014; Brochet, Jagolinzer, and 
Riedl 2013). The first set of studies is often limited in its ability to draw conclusions about overall 
comparability, as empirical proxies for comparability focus only on a specific reporting dimension 
(such as earnings or disclosures). However, it has the advantage of being able to identify the source of 
comparability. The second set infers changes in comparability based on observed changes in the 
information environment but cannot attribute the comparability changes to specific reporting 
dimensions. 
Motivated by the debate over US firms adopting IFRS and the 2007 SEC ruling allowing US 
cross-listed firms to file IFRS-compliant financial statements, Barth et al. (2012) evaluate the relative 
comparability of the two accounting regimes (i.e., IFRS and US GAAP). Adopting both a modified 
version of the measure of comparability used by De Franco et al. (2011) and a measure based on a 
comparison of value relevance, Barth et al. (2012) document that IFRS adoption is associated with a 
significant increase in the comparability of financial statements across IFRS firms and a size-and-
industry-matched sample of US firms. Moreover, the comparability across IFRS and US firms is 
generally higher when firms adopt IFRS mandatorily, are from common-law countries, or are from 
countries with higher enforcement. The researchers also find that economic integration arising from 
globalization has little effect on reporting comparability. Based on these factors, they conclude that 
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mandatory IFRS adoption and the international co-ordination of accounting regulations have 
improved the global comparability of accounting numbers. 
Some studies attempt to directly evaluate changes in cross-country comparability measures 
following IFRS adoption. Using the value relevance of earnings and book value of equity to assess the 
comparability of accounting numbers, Liao, Sellhorn, and Skaife (2012) show that French and 
German IFRS earnings and book values are comparably priced in the year after IFRS adoption but 
become less comparable in later years. While Lang, Maffett, and Owens (2010) provide a difference-
in-differences analysis of a sample of IFRS adopters and non-adopters, finding that adoption increases 
co-variation in the earnings of firms from different countries (measured as the adjusted R2 from the 
regressions of a firm’s earnings on a matched peer firm’s earnings) but decreases earnings 
comparability, as measured by De Franco et al. (2011).27 The findings of these two studies do not 
support the claim that IFRS adoption enhances the comparability of financial statements. 
Through a comparative study of the effects of IFRS adoption on earnings comparability 
across countries that adopted the euro (“euro adopters”) and those that did not (“non-adopters”), 
Jayaraman and Verdi (2013) investigate whether economic integration complements or substitutes 
accounting harmonization. Conducting difference-in-differences analysis across 15 countries (11 euro 
adopters and four non-adopters), they document that IFRS-induced improvements in accounting 
comparability are around three times larger within euro-adopter countries than in other EU countries. 
They conclude that IFRS adoption is better at improving reporting comparability when the underlying 
economic environments are similar. 
Cascino and Gassen (2015) focus on the institutional determinants of the link between IFRS 
adoption and comparability. Rather than using a simple time-series indicator variable to capture IFRS 
adoption, they examine whether changes in cross-country information transfers following IFRS 
adoption are associated with the magnitude of reporting effects from IFRS adoption. This slight 
modification to the research approach reveals only weak evidence of a link between mandatory IFRS 
adoption and improved reporting comparability. To test whether a lack of incentives to comply with 
accounting rules explains the initial marginal results, the authors hand-collect accounting 
measurement information and disclosure compliance data from the 2006 financial reports of a sample 
of German and Italian mandatory adopters. They find that firms that comply better with IFRS enjoy 
more comparability. When they repeat analysis for a broader sample of IFRS-adopting firms and 
countries using instruments to proxy for compliance incentives, they reach the same inference.   
                                                            
27
 For each firm, Lang et al. (2010) select matched peers from firms that are domiciled in a different 
country but have the same two-digit SIC classification as the first firm. 
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Cascino and Gassen (2015) also test the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption 
using a within-country matched sample of private firms as a control group. As pointed out by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), private firms have lower compliance incentives than public firms. This allows 
researchers to study the role of compliance while holding the institutional environment faced by the 
firms constant. Consistent with their earlier conclusions, Cascino and Gassen (2015) report that the 
comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is mainly observed for public firms. They also find 
that IFRS adoption causes public firms to become less comparable with local private firms that 
continue to report under domestic GAAP. Overall, their results show that, although cross-country 
comparability improvements require compliance with standards, within-country reporting 
comparability is affected by mandating IFRS adoption for some companies (i.e., listed firms) alone.  
In contrast to studies that evaluate comparability directly, Wang (2014) and Yip and Young 
(2012) study cross-border intra-industry information transfers and draw inferences about the 
comparability of financial statement information. These studies are predicated on the notion that a 
firm’s investors can extract more value-relevant information from a foreign peer’s report when the 
two firms employ more comparable measures in their reports. 
Wang (2014) investigates whether accounting standard harmonization enhances the 
comparability of financial information across countries by examining changes in cross-border 
information transfers upon IFRS adoption. She uses a pair-wise research design containing 26,349 
firm-pair-year observations for 4,467 unique firms from 46 countries, covering the period 2001–2008. 
To increase the chances of detecting transnational information transfers, she focuses on 575 earnings 
announcements made by global industry leaders, defined as the three largest firms in each year for 
each of the 30 Fama-French industry groups. For each earnings announcement, she examines the price 
reactions of all other non-announcing firms in the same industry that are domiciled in a country 
different from that of the announcing firm.28 Consistent with the importance of earnings comparability 
to information transfers, she reports that non-announcing firms react more strongly to the earnings 
announcements of a global leader when both firms report under IFRS than when they report under 
different accounting standards. Moreover, via difference-in-differences analysis, she finds that 
mandatory IFRS adopters react more strongly to the earnings announcements of voluntary adopters in 
the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period and that this effect is not observed for non-
adopters. Her findings are consistent with mandatory IFRS adoption along with contemporaneous 
regulatory changes improving earnings comparability. However, the larger transnational information 
transfer between firms using the same accounting standards is significant only for announcing firms 
domiciled in countries with stricter enforcement regimes and stronger reporting incentives, suggesting 
                                                            
28 To ensure that the transnational information is relevant for a domestic firm, Wang (2014) requires matched 
non-announcing firms to have foreign sales and to not have announced their own earnings before the earnings 
announcements by a global leader. 
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that the mere adoption of standards is insufficient to improve comparability. Furthermore, consistent 
with Jayaraman and Verdi (2013), Wang (2014) finds that these transnational information transfers 
are stronger when the firm-pairs are domiciled in countries with tighter economic integration. 
In a concurrent study, Yip and Young (2012) find more nuanced results by expanding the 
measures of comparability for a sample of 2,562 mandatory adopting firms within 17 EU countries.29 
They study both facets of comparability, i.e., similarities in accounting items between firms engaged 
in similar transactions and differences in accounting items between firms engaged in dissimilar 
economic activities and implement three measures of comparability: (i) similarity in accounting 
functions that translate economic events into accounting data (e.g., De Franco et al., 2011), (ii) the 
degree of information transfer, and (iii) similarity in the information content related to earnings and 
book value of equity. For firms in the same industry but domiciled in different countries, the authors 
document improvements in all three comparability measures following IFRS adoption. However, for 
firms in different industries and domiciled in different countries, they find that IFRS contributes little 
to the changes in comparability measures. The authors conclude that IFRS adoption improves the 
cross-country comparability of financial information by making reports of similar firms look more 
alike but does not make reports of firms with different economic activities appear any more 
dissimilar. However, they note that comparability improvements are primarily observed only in firm-
pairs from countries with the same legal origin (measured as either common- or code-law countries). 
This is consistent with the importance of financial reporting incentives and the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement in achieving comparability following IFRS adoption. 
However, when interpreting the evidence from the preceding information transfer studies, one 
should keep in mind that cross-border information transfers may increase even in the absence of 
improvements in reporting comparability. To understand this, consider two countries that have very 
similar local GAAP that are not oriented to meet the needs of stock-market investors. If one of these 
countries adopts the more valuation-oriented IFRS, causing financial reports to become more dis-
similar across the two countries, then we would still observe an increase in cross-border information 
transfers, as investors in the second country would react to the increased availability of value-relevant 
information. Such cross-border information transfers may be even higher when both countries rather 
than just one adopt IFRS, although the comparability of financial reports need not necessarily change 
relative to those based on their respective local GAAP. 
To isolate the capital market benefits arising from improvements in comparability (defined as 
the precision of information transferred across firms) as opposed to improvements in information 
quality (defined as the precision of firm-specific information), Brochet et al. (2013) exploit the UK 
                                                            
29 Wang (2014) and Yip and Young (2012) exclude financial firms from their samples. Wang (2014) also 
excludes utilities.  
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setting, in which the domestic GAAP are often viewed as similar to IFRS. They surmise that any 
capital market benefits associated with IFRS adoption in the UK are likely to be due to improvements 
in comparability rather than improvements in firm-specific information quality. The capital market 
benefits from improved comparability arise through greater transnational information transfers 
engendered by EU-wide IFRS adoption. Examining a sample of 663 large and relatively more 
profitable UK firms, Brochet et al. (2013) find a significant reduction in abnormal returns associated 
with insider purchases in the post-IFRS-adoption period. This finding supports the view that IFRS 
adoption improves reporting comparability for outside investors and thereby lowers the degree of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, limiting the ability of insiders to exploit their 
private information. They further support this finding with cross-sectional tests that show that the 
greatest reductions in profitability of insider trades occur in firms that experience larger improvements 
in comparability following IFRS adoption. Finally, they report weak evidence of changes in the 
profitability of insider trading for stocks listed on the AIM, whose operations tend to be more 
domestically focused, making transnational information less relevant. Although their results support 
their predictions, the study is unclear about which types of private information are lost to insiders 
through cross-country information transfers that are above and beyond any pre-existing intra-industry 
information transfers from domestic companies. 
Turning to the effect of comparability on investors’ decisions, DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li 
(2011) test whether improved financial statement comparability across countries following IFRS 
adoption leads to greater cross-border investment. Their predictions are based on the notion that 
improved financial statement comparability decreases the information acquisition costs of global 
investors, thus removing barriers to foreign investment (e.g., Kang and Stulz 1997; Covrig, DeFond, 
and Hung 2007).30 However, they note that the cross-border investment benefits of IFRS adoption are 
likely to be realized only when IFRS is credibly implemented, although they do not discuss which 
enforcement mechanisms lead to that. They empirically test their predictions for a sample of 
mandatory IFRS adopters in 14 EU countries and firms reporting under domestic GAAP in 10 non-
adopting countries for the 2003–2004 and 2006–2007 periods.31 They find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption results in greater investments by foreign mutual funds in countries with strong 
implementation credibility and specifically among firms that experience relatively large increases in 
accounting uniformity. Uniformity is measured for each industry in each country as the number of 
firms in that industry reporting based on the same GAAP after IFRS adoption relative to the number 
                                                            
30 We discuss these arguments in greater detail in Section 4.3. 
31 DeFond et al. (2011) omit the year of mandatory adoption (i.e., 2005), arguing that investors may not fully 
understand IFRS-compliant financial statements or that preparers might not have applied new rules consistently 
in this transition year.  
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of firms in that industry before IFRS adoption. These results support the view that harmonization 
through IFRS increases demand from foreign investors by improving comparability.32 
Young and Zeng (2015) investigate another consequence of improved comparability 
following IFRS adoption for multiples-based valuation. Based on a sample of firms from 15 EU 
countries over the 1997–2011 period, the authors document that multiples-based valuations using 
foreign peers’ multiples significantly improves following the mandatory adoption of IFRS.33 
Specifically, they find that pricing accuracy improves by 2% per year on average over the sample 
1997–2008 period. To ensure their results are not driven by the general effects of increased economic 
integration over the sample period, they partition their sample based on the magnitude of IFRS 
adjustments made to opening shareholders’ equity upon transition. They find that the firms that had 
the greatest reporting differences relative to IFRS experienced the largest gains in pricing accuracy, 
relative to the firms that experienced greater alignment between local reporting practices and IFRS. 
They conclude that improved accounting comparability under IFRS has allowed investors to better 
value stocks through improved peer selection. 
In conclusion, although studies focusing on direct measures of comparability yield only weak 
evidence, studies focusing on the capital market effects of comparability generally show a stronger 
increase in comparability following IFRS adoption. Taken together, the empirical results for 
comparability provide a general picture that comparability matters to investors and that improvements 
in comparability enhance the information environment, particularly for foreign investors. However, 
the data do not support the notion that simply harmonizing accounting standards can achieve full 
comparability in financial reporting. The evidence provided by most studies suggests that reporting 
comparability is affected by a variety of factors in addition to accounting standards, such as reporting 
incentives, underlying economic integration, and institutional factors. 
In spite of advances in our understanding of comparability, much remains to be considered.  
The research still lacks detailed analysis of why and how accounting comparability arises. Are certain 
accounting attributes more important in achieving comparability than others? Do greater managerial 
subjectivity and accounting choices help or hamper comparability? Are the documented effects of 
comparability improvements around IFRS adoption sustainable in the long run? 
                                                            
32 Given that IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in the issuance of annual reports in English (Jeanjean, 
Stolowy, Erkens, and Yohn 2015), the evidence related to cross-border capital flow around IFRS adoption may 
also reflect the benefits of lowering language barriers rather than those of IFRS reporting.  
33 Young and Zeng (2015) assess the performance of multiples-based valuation using three criteria: pricing 
accuracy (defined as the difference between the actual stock price and valuation implied by foreign peers), the 
ability of the implied values to explain cross-sectional variations in observed stock prices, and the ability of 
foreign peers’ valuation multiples to predict firms’ future market-to-book multiples.    
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4. Effects of IFRS on stock markets  
Regulators and standard setters alike have expressed the view that the adoption of IFRS will 
“reduce the cost of capital and open new opportunities for diversification and improved investment 
returns” (Tweedie 2006). Proponents have pointed to an increase in transparency, greater accounting 
quality, and enhanced comparability as paving the way for an increase in liquidity and reductions in 
cost of equity capital. The EC regulation mandating IFRS (EC 1606/2002) itself cites capital market 
benefits as a primary reason behind the switch, observing that they contribute “to the efficient and 
cost-effective functioning of the capital markets.” 
Previous theoretical predictions and empirical evidence related to the link between financial 
reporting quality and capital market consequences have been mixed. In general, these theories find 
that increasing firms’ commitment to transparency and disclosure can lower information asymmetry 
in capital markets and thus increase investors’ willingness to trade, thereby boosting the stock price 
(e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007; Botosan and Plumlee 
2002). Moreover, better quality corporate reporting can reduce estimation risk and improve risk 
sharing in the economy, thus decreasing firms’ cost of capital (e.g., Barry and Brown 1985).   
In the context of IFRS adoption, a number of studies attempt to quantify the effect of IFRS 
adoption on stock markets by studying changes in information asymmetry, liquidity, cost of capital, 
valuation, and cross-border capital flows between the pre- and post-IFRS-adoption periods. These 
studies are motivated by the conjecture that “principles-based” IFRS improve transparency as a 
consequence of their greater reliance on fair-value accounting, increased disclosures, better cross-
country comparability, and more economically motivated reporting and that this improved 
transparency leads to lower information asymmetry and attendant stock market effects. Further 
justifications for the link between IFRS and improved financial transparency are also often provided 
based on initial empirical evidence linking IFRS adoption to improved reporting quality, although as 
discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, recent studies provide mixed evidence of this link. 
Furthermore, for IFRS adoption to noticeably affect capital markets, reporting practices must 
vary significantly from previously established local GAAP. As some countries’ domestic GAAP are 
more similar to IFRS than others, researchers exploit this cross-country difference in the effects of 
IFRS to better link observed stock market effects to IFRS adoption.  
The rest of this section is organized as follows.  Section 4.1 reviews studies that investigate 
investors’ responses to IFRS adoption.  Section 4.2 discusses evidence pertaining to the effects of 
IFRS adoption on analyst following and forecasts.  Section 4.3 reviews IFRS-related studies of cross-
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border capital flows.  The final section reviews studies focusing on market liquidity and the cost of 
capital. 
4.1. Investor perception of IFRS  
Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, and Riedl (2010) provide early large-sample evidence of 
investors’ perceptions of IFRS adoption by examining the short-window market reactions surrounding 
16 events between 2002 and 2005 that increased the likelihood of the EU adopting IFRS to evaluate 
whether stock investors perceived adoption as value enhancing or destroying. Based on a sample of 
firms with equity traded on European stock exchanges and therefore affected by the IFRS mandate, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) document an incrementally positive three-day market reaction to events that 
increased the likelihood of IFRS adoption, beginning with the decision of the EU in 2002 to adopt 
IFRS. 
The authors find positive market reactions for analyses based on market-adjusted returns, 
where the choice of market returns becomes important. The average raw market responses to the 
events examined are negative. Some of the announcement dates examined in their study have world-
market returns as large in magnitude as −4.4%. A quick review of Dow Jones News Wire for the 
reasons behind the large drops in a few IFRS announcement dates reveals that some announcement 
dates were affected by contaminated events, such as world markets being rocked by profit warnings 
from the US tech sector on June 19, 2002, and February 3, 2004. To the extent that contaminated 
events affect the DJ Stoxx 1800 (excluding Europe) index more than European stocks, market-
adjusted returns for Europe (measured as European stock returns adjusted for returns on the DJ Stoxx 
1800 excluding Europe) may be noisy.  
To better link European stock market reactions to IFRS news, Armstrong et al. (2010) 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis of announcement returns on firm-specific characteristics and find 
that the positive market reactions are larger for firms that are more likely to benefit from adoption, 
such as those with lower information quality and higher information asymmetry. The positive stock 
price reaction is also observed for firms with high quality information in the pre-adoption period, 
suggesting that IFRS benefits are not simply associated with improving firms’ reporting quality but 
are at least partly attributable to the benefits from accounting standard harmonization. Finally, 
consistent with investors’ concerns over the enforcement of IFRS, the authors find an incrementally 
negative reaction for firms domiciled in code-law countries (i.e., less investor protection). Although 
focusing on a narrow (three-day) event window mitigates the effects of confounding events that occur 
outside the IFRS announcement window, it still leaves open the possibility that investors’ responses to 
the anticipated changes in enforcement and regulation accompany the passage of IFRS adoption.   
 30 
 
Although the US has not adopted IFRS reporting, a few studies evaluate the potential benefits 
of IFRS adoption from the perspective of US investors. Joos and Leung (2013) study the market 
reactions to 13 events between 2007 and 2012 pertaining to the SEC’s contemplation of mandatory 
IFRS adoption for US firms. They find that investors’ reactions to announcements that increase the 
likelihood of IFRS adoption are more positive for firms that are likely to benefit from convergence 
but less so for firms with a higher litigation risk. Prather-Kinsey and Tanyi (2014) use a similar 
setting but focus on the price reactions of firms with American depositary receipts (ADR) that report 
under IFRS. They also observe a positive market reaction to SEC announcements pertaining to 
potential IFRS adoption for these ADR firms. 
4.2. Effects of IFRS adoption on analyst following and forecast properties 
Although they do not focus primarily on IFRS adoption, Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008) provide 
evidence that is directly relevant to understanding the effects of IFRS on analyst following and 
forecast properties. The authors explore whether GAAP differences across countries are associated 
with the number of foreign analysts following the firms and their forecast accuracy.34 Their sample 
consists of 6,888 foreign analysts covering 6,169 firms from 49 different countries (1,176 country-
pairs) between 1988 and 2004. Using two novel measures of pairwise GAAP differences between 
countries (i.e., the extent of the difference between the GAAP the firm follows and the prevalent 
GAAP in the analyst’s home country), they find that foreign analyst following is negatively related to 
GAAP differences and weakly associated with forecast accuracy. These results indicate the costs 
associated with differences in accounting standards across countries and speak of the potential benefit 
of accounting harmonization. That even sophisticated users of financial information like analysts 
benefit from accounting harmonization reveals the potential gains for other types of capital-market 
participants. 
Several studies directly evaluate the effects of voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption on 
analyst following and forecast properties. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) examine an international 
sample of 80 non-US firms that voluntarily adopted IAS from 1990 to 1993. They contend that IAS 
adoption improves the predictability of earnings by restricting the choice of accounting measurement 
methods that managers can adopt. Consistent with this, they find that the absolute values of analysts’ 
forecast errors declined after adoption and that this decrease related cross-sectionally to the effect of 
adoption on a firm’s accounting standards. Although they attempt to control for the variety of 
observed factors driving voluntary adoption, their analyses remain open to the self-selection concerns 
usually seen in studies of voluntary adoption. 
                                                            
34 Although Bae et al. (2008) do not focus on IFRS adoption, in a supplementary analysis, they document that 
analysts familiar with IAS are more likely to start following a firm after its voluntary IAS adoption. 
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Comparing mandatory IFRS adopters to firms that had earlier voluntarily adopted IFRS, 
Byard, Li, and Yu (2011) examine how the IFRS mandate affects analysts’ forecast errors. They find 
that the absolute value of forecast errors and dispersion decreases after mandatory IFRS adoption but 
only for firms domiciled in countries with strong enforcement and where IFRS adoption significantly 
changed accounting standards. Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker (2013) find that the improved 
analyst performance following IFRS adoption can also be extended to analysts’ predictions of target 
prices. Tan, Wang, and Welker (2011) extend this line of thinking to study the pervasiveness of the 
improvements in analyst coverage and forecast accuracy across analyst groups. They find that, 
although IFRS adoption increases coverage from both foreign and local analysts, it improves the 
forecast accuracy of foreign analysts only. They find IFRS has little effect on the forecasting ability of 
local analysts.   
Examining why IFRS adoption may improve analysts’ forecast accuracy for adopting firms, 
Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim (2013) test whether the improvement arises from (i) a higher quality 
of IFRS, (ii) a greater comparability after IFRS adoption, or (iii) the additional opportunities available 
to managers under IFRS to manipulate earnings to meet the forecasts. To this end, the authors classify 
analysts into three categories: (i) those who focus on only a single set of local GAAP in the pre-IFRS 
period but analyze reports under both local GAAP and IFRS in the post-IFRS period, (ii) those who 
focus on a single set of local GAAP in the pre-IFRS period and switch entirely to IFRS reports in the 
post-IFRS period, and (iii) those who focus on multiple sets of local GAAP in the pre-IFRS period but 
switch entirely to IFRS reports in the post-IFRS period. Horton et al. (2013) predict that IFRS 
adoption decreases comparability for the first category of analysts, leaves comparability unaffected 
for the second category, and improves comparability for the third category. In contrast, they predict 
that all three categories of analysts benefit from IFRS adoption if IFRS-related benefits arise through 
improved reporting quality. Their analysis supports the view that IFRS helps analyst forecasting 
mainly through the improvement of reporting quality and comparability. They find no evidence that 
managers engage in greater earnings management to meet analysts’ forecasts under IFRS. 
One simple explanation for the observed improvements in analysts’ forecast accuracy is that 
managers provide more earnings guidance following IFRS adoption. This view emerges from the 
findings of Li and Yang (2015), who show that IFRS adoption is associated with an increased 
tendency of managers to provide earnings guidance. However, as Li and Yang (2015) attribute the 
increases in management forecasts to improved reporting quality under IFRS and increased demand 
for such information from analysts following IFRS adoption, the causal relationship between the 
effects of analyst and management forecasts remains unknown. 
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4.3. Effects of IFRS adoption on cross-border capital flows 
Proponents of IFRS have consistently claimed that greater financial reporting quality and 
improved comparability of financial reports under IFRS lead to more cross-border flow of capital and 
better integration of capital markets (e.g., European Council 2002). These claims are based on the 
premise that foreign investors must devote significant resources to interpret the domestic GAAP of 
other countries and that cross-country discrepancies in accounting rules and practices create 
significant information barriers, leaving foreign investors at an informational disadvantage relative to 
local ones. 
Along these lines, Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) suggest that US institutional 
investors prefer non-US firms whose accounting methods conform more closely to US GAAP. They 
find that foreign firms exhibiting higher levels (changes) of US GAAP conformity have higher levels 
of US institutional ownership. They notably find that increases in US GAAP conformity precede 
increases in US investment, indicating that accounting choice affects investor capital allocation 
decisions and that diversity in accounting choices decreases international investment. However, the 
recent findings by Fang, Maffett, and Zhang (2015) suggest the opposite causality: US institutional 
investors drive convergence in accounting practices; i.e., an increase in US institutional ownership 
precedes an increase in accounting comparability between foreign firms and their US industry peers. 
Studies focusing directly on IFRS adoption and cross-border capital flows offer three major 
arguments for why IFRS adoption may matter to foreign investors. First, by replacing unfamiliar 
country-specific reporting standards with a single set of standards with which investors can 
familiarize themselves at a lower cost, IFRS can decrease the information disadvantages of foreign 
investors relative to local ones (e.g., Yu and Wahid 2014) and help foreign investors assess foreign 
firms and markets (Amiram, 2012). Second, as IFRS is often perceived as being of a higher quality 
than many local GAAP, its adoption can decrease the degree of information asymmetry between local 
and foreign investors. Finally, the use of harmonized accounting standards may increase the visibility 
of remote investments, putting these stocks on investors’ radars.  
Covrig, DeFond, and Hung (2007) provide early evidence of the role of IAS adoption in 
investor allocation decisions. Focusing on a sample of holdings in non-US stocks by 25,000 mutual 
funds around the world, Covrig et al. (2007) show that stock ownership by foreign mutual funds 
increases with the voluntary adoption of IAS. After controlling for many standard determinants of 
institutional ownership such as size, analyst following, inclusion in the market index, cross-listings, 
choice of auditor, and an array of financial characteristics, the authors find an almost 50% increase in 
foreign mutual fund ownership for IAS adopters relative to non-IAS adopters. When they partition the 
sample into two groups based on firms’ information environment or visibility, they find IAS-adoption 
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induced changes in foreign mutual fund ownership to be pronounced for voluntary adopters located in 
poorer information environments and with lower visibility, indicating heterogeneity in the adoption 
effects. As a firm’s information environment and visibility are likely to be correlated with its decision 
to adopt IAS, the last result could also be driven by differences in firms’ incentives to adopt IAS. 
Khurana and Michas (2011) extend the preceding analyses to the context of mandatory IFRS 
adoption and find that IFRS adoption decreases US investors’ home bias, which is the extent to which 
investors overweight US stocks in their portfolios relative to stocks in the country mandating IFRS. 
Based on a sample of 85 countries, 33 of which mandated IFRS from 2003 through 2007, the authors 
find that US home bias decreased for investments in firms domiciled in IFRS-adopting countries 
relative to those in firms in countries that did not change their accounting standards. These results are 
stronger for IFRS-adopting countries that exhibit larger differences between IFRS and domestic 
accounting standards, a stricter rule of law, and greater incentives to report high quality financial 
information.   
Shima and Gordon (2011) also examine the effect of IFRS adoption on the investment 
decisions of US investors but scale their main variable of interest (i.e., the dollar investments by US 
investors in a foreign market) by the GDP of the foreign country rather than by the weight of the 
foreign country’s stocks in world-market capitalization, an approach taken by Khurana and Michas 
(2011). In contrast to Khurana and Michas (2011), they find no evidence to suggest that IFRS 
adoption decreased home bias from 2003 through 2006, unless such adoption occurred in a country 
with a strong regulatory environment.  
Florou and Pope (2012) examine how IFRS adoption affects institutional ownership by 
studying the investment allocation decisions of a large sample of international institutional investors 
over the 2003-2006 period. They show that the percentage of institutional ownership and number of 
institutional investors increased in countries mandatorily adopting IFRS relative to a control sample of 
countries that did not mandate IFRS. Using firm-level data in a difference-in-differences analysis, 
they report an average increase in institutional ownership of 1.4% in the period immediately following 
the IFRS transition quarter. These changes in institutional ownership are also more marked for active 
investors, whose investment decisions rely on financial statement data relative to passive investors, 
corroborating the claim that ownership changes are caused by IFRS. As the authors do not distinguish 
between domestic and foreign institutional investors, it is unclear whether the documented ownership 
changes are due to IFRS improving reporting quality and thereby inducing domestic institutions to 
increase their ownership or to the harmonization of accounting standards attracting foreign investors.  
Yu and Wahid (2014) extend preceding analyses by focusing specifically on foreign mutual 
fund holdings around IFRS adoption.  They show that foreign mutual funds also increase their 
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ownership stakes in firms domiciled in IFRS-adopting countries. They relate these ownership changes 
to changes in accounting distance (i.e., differences in accounting standards) between the investee and 
investor’s countries. To give a sense of the economic magnitude of this effect, they point out that, if 
the differences in accounting standards across the US and South Africa were eliminated, then the US 
mutual funds would decrease their underweighting of South African stocks by approximately 14%. In 
an additional analysis, the authors examine changes in accounting distance driven only by IFRS 
adoption in the investor fund’s country, i.e., there are no changes in the accounting standards of the 
investee firm. Even in this setting, the authors continue to find that mutual funds increase their 
investment weights in the investee firms, indicating that an investor’s increased familiarity with an 
investee’s accounting standards encourages cross-border investments.  
DeFond, Hu, Hung, and Li (2011) attempt to more directly identify the specific accounting 
attributes that explain the increased attention of international institutional investors following IFRS 
adoption. They contend that increases in cross-border investment following IFRS adoption are driven 
by improvements in comparability, which lowers information acquisition costs for global investors.  
Testing this assertion on a sample of 14 IFRS-mandating EU countries and 10 non-IFRS countries for 
the 2003–2007 period (excluding the IFRS transition year), they find that IFRS adoption results in 
greater investment by foreign mutual funds for firms experiencing larger increases in accounting 
uniformity.35 
Although progress has been made in understanding the effects of IFRS adoption for 
institutional investors, very little research has explored the effects of adoption on the trading patterns 
of retail investors. This is at least partly due to a lack of comprehensive data related to retail trades. 
Bruggemann, Daske, Homburg, and Pope (2012) attempt to circumvent this problem by analyzing 
trading volume in the Open Market of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, a trading venue primarily 
designed to attract small German investors interested in foreign stocks. Based on difference-in-
differences analysis, they document an increase in trading volume following the EU’s mandatory 
IFRS adoption in 2005, suggesting that retail investors benefit from IFRS reports. However, cross-
sectional analysis reveals that these effects are more pronounced for trading in stocks that have 
increased media coverage following IFRS adoption, which raises the possibility that the observed 
trading effects may not be directly attributable to IFRS adoption but may reflect investors’ responses 
to the greater media coverage.  
Although the preceding studies focus on specific subsamples of foreign investors, such as 
mutual funds, US investors, institutional investors, and retail investors, Amiram (2012) shows that the 
                                                            
35 For each industry-country, Defond et al. (2011) measure accounting uniformity as the number of firms in that 
industry and country using IFRS in the post-IFRS-adoption period, divided by the number of firms in that 
industry and country using local accounting standards in the pre-IFRS-adoption period. 
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evidence in these studies can be generalized to country-level foreign portfolio investments (FPI).  
That is, the tendency of investors to invest in IFRS countries is observable even when one analyzes 
data related to all of the non-controlling equity stakes in a country purchased by foreign entities. He 
also finds that it is primarily investors from countries that use IFRS who increase their investments in 
other IFRS-adopting countries rather than investors from countries that do not use IFRS, which 
implies that the increased cross-border investments are mainly attributable to investors’ familiarity 
with IFRS, rather than to IFRS improving reporting quality or appealing to all foreign investors. 
Although most studies of cross-border investments around IFRS adoption focus exclusively 
on equity investments, Beneish, Miller, and Yohn (2014) study both equity and debt investments.  
They find that post-IFRS increases in cross-border investments of equity, as reflected in country-level 
FPI data, are mainly driven by US investors. More interestingly, they find that the effects of IFRS on 
cross-border debt investments are stronger and that IFRS adoption attracts new debt investors from a 
wider set of countries, including the US and other non-IFRS countries. The authors conclude that 
IFRS adoption benefits debt investors more than equity investors.  
Overall, there appears to be a consensus in the empirical evidence that IFRS adoption is 
associated with increases in cross-border capital flows. Although initial studies attribute these 
increases to both improved transparency and comparability under IFRS, more recent studies point 
toward greater familiarity of investors with IFRS as the source of improvement. However, these 
findings leave some unanswered questions. What is the causal relationship, following IFRS adoption, 
between changes in stock liquidity (discussed in the next subsection) and cross-border capital flows?  
What are the effects of larger cross-border capital flows on the size of equity markets and the 
economy of IFRS-adopting countries relative to those of the countries from where the investments 
flow out? How does IFRS adoption affect investment risks and returns on cross-border capital flows?  
4.4. Effects of IFRS adoption on market liquidity and cost of capital 
Several theoretical models have been developed to understand the link between information 
quality and liquidity in addition to cost of capital. Although the literature is not specifically directed at 
IFRS adoption, these models provide a basis for empirical tests of the effects of IFRS adoption on 
stock liquidity and cost of capital.  Hence, we review the literature in Section 4.4.1.  Section 4.4.2 
then presents the empirical evidence for voluntary IFRS adopters, and Section 4.4.3 discusses the 
evidence for mandatory adopters. 
4.4.1. Theoretical predictions of the effects of reporting quality on liquidity and cost of capital 
 Two mechanisms are generally employed to link quality of accounting information with 
liquidity and cost of capital: estimation risk and information asymmetry, both of which are often 
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referred to as “information risk.” Estimation risk refers to the uncertainty associated with investors’ 
assessments of the parameters of an asset’s return or payoff distribution, and information asymmetry 
relates to the risk facing liquidity traders from potentially trading with better informed investors. 
Increasing information (i.e., greater and more precise accounting disclosures) allows for both a lower 
estimation risk and convergent opinions on the part of all investors, which improves risk sharing and 
thus decreases the cost of capital (e.g., Barry and Brown 1985; Coles and Lowenstein 1988). Barry 
and Brown (1985) show in a Bayesian framework that risk-averse investors prefer securities in which 
more information is available, as these securities present a lower estimation risk for investors. They 
point out that, when such investor preferences are consistent across the market, equilibrium prices are 
higher for firms with better information and such a firm’s cost of capital is lower. This study and 
subsequent studies conducted along this line (e.g., Coles and Lowenstein 1988) show that parameter 
uncertainty affects investors’ estimations of beta and so are not diversifiable.36 
On a related note, information asymmetry between potential buyers and sellers of shares can 
introduce adverse selection into the share markets and decrease market liquidity. In response to the 
lower liquidity, stock prices decrease to compensate investors for holding illiquid stocks and lead to 
an increased cost of capital for the firm. However, firms can decrease this cost by improving the level 
or precision of disclosures, which lowers the degree of information asymmetry between investors and 
eventually the cost of capital (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Easley and O’Hara 2004). In addition, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) provide an alternative path for 
relating disclosure levels to cost of capital: greater disclosures decrease the adverse price effect of the 
trade, mitigating investor concerns about taking large stakes in a firm. This increases demand for 
securities, which, through improved liquidity, decreases the cost of capital. 
The preceding models generally derive their results from a single-asset economy (or multiple 
assets where the cash flows of firms are uncorrelated). In contrast, Lambert et al. (2007) develop a 
model in which the quality of accounting information can affect the cost of equity capital in an 
economy with multiple assets whose payoffs are correlated. Under a CAPM framework with perfect 
competition, they show that accounting information quality affects the cost of capital through a firm’s 
beta and that, once an appropriately measured beta is controlled for, accounting quality should not 
relate to expected returns.37 Studying the interplay between information asymmetry and cost of capital 
                                                            
36 In an economy where the level of disclosure is the same for all firms, estimation risk can be diversified away. 
However, Barry and Brown (1985) show that differential information (i.e., cross-firm differences in the amount 
of available information about the firm) affects pricing. 
37 Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop a model in which firms with less public and more private information face 
a greater information risk and higher expected returns. They argue that, due to their information disadvantage 
relative to informed investors, uninformed investors end up holding suboptimal portfolios with too many stocks 
with pending bad news and too few with pending good news. As this risk cannot be diversified away by holding 
more stocks, the risk gets priced in equilibrium. However, Lambert et al. (2007, pp. 396–397) point out that the 
information effect on stock prices is diversified away when the number of traders becomes large. 
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in a large economy, Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) similarly show that private information signals 
affect either market risk premium or factor loadings, depending on whether the private signal relates 
to systematic risk factors or idiosyncratic shocks. However, the information asymmetry arising from 
private signals about idiosyncratic shocks does not matter directly to cost of capital. That is, after 
accounting for betas, the information asymmetry has no effect on cost of capital. 
Armstrong, Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia (2011) attempt to reconcile the contradictory 
theoretical predictions for the effect of information asymmetry on cost of capital by proposing that 
information asymmetry matters for pricing stocks only when markets are imperfect. They conjecture 
that, in perfectly competitive markets where individual traders’ demands do not affect stock prices, 
information asymmetry is irrelevant for stock pricing. However, in imperfect security markets, 
information asymmetry has a separate effect on cost of capital, beyond any effect through other risk 
factors. Using the number of shareholders a firm has as a proxy for the level of competition 
surrounding the firm’s shares, the authors provide evidence consistent with their conjecture related to 
US stocks. 
In one of the very few theoretical studies to directly evaluate the effect of global 
harmonization on stock market performance, Barth, Clinch, and Shibano (1999) present a model that 
shows that the effect of accounting harmonization on price information and trading volume in a 
market depends on the interaction of two forces: (i) whether the harmonization improves or worsens 
the information revealed through financial statements and (ii) the extent of the net benefits accrued to 
foreign investors by becoming more familiar with a firm’s financial reporting standards. The latter 
force is assumed to depend on the former, as poorer information quality increases returns to informed 
trading. Based on the interaction of these two forces, Barth et al. (1999) show that the harmonization 
of better quality accounting standards may not necessarily improve stock market performance and 
vice versa. 
The preceding theoretical predictions suggest that IFRS adoption will improve stock liquidity 
provided it improves reporting quality for stock investors. However, its effect on cost of capital is 
ambiguous, especially after controlling for firms’ betas. We now turn our attention to empirical 
evidence of the linkage between financial reporting quality, stock market liquidity, and cost of capital.   
4.4.2. Empirical evidence based on voluntary IFRS adoption 
Early studies of the effects of IFRS adoption on stock markets typically rely on firms from a 
handful of European countries that allowed voluntary adoption of IAS. In fact, many of the studies 
focus specifically on German firms, as voluntary adoption was more common among them.  
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Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) compare proxies for stock liquidity, namely, bid-ask spread, 
trading volume, and return volatility, across German firms voluntarily reporting under either IAS or 
US GAAP versus those reporting under local German GAAP. Arguing that IAS and US GAAP have 
higher quality disclosure requirements, they predict that firms committing to report under IAS or US 
GAAP should have lower information asymmetry and better stock liquidity than those reporting under 
German GAAP. Consistent with this prediction, they find that firms reporting their 1997 financial 
reports under IAS or US GAAP exhibit lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnovers but not 
different share price volatilities. Although their analysis is based on the greater disclosure levels 
required under IAS or US GAAP, it does not distinguish between the effects of disclosure quality and 
those of the quality of recognized financial numbers. Moreover, as it relies on a very small sample of 
14 IAS adopters and seven US GAAP adopters, its generalizability presents a problem. 
In a related study, Leuz (2003) compares the stock liquidity of firms in Germany’s former 
New Market that report under IAS with firms from the same market that adopt US GAAP. The author 
argues that, except for differences in accounting regulations, these two groups of firms face identical 
regulations and therefore any differences in the information asymmetry or stock liquidity proxies 
across these groups should reflect the relative reporting quality of the two accounting standards. Leuz 
(2003) finds insignificant differences in the bid-ask spreads and share turnover between the two 
groups, indicating that the mere adoption of either IAS or US GAAP is not sufficient to improve these 
firms’ reporting quality relative to each other. In a closely related work, Bartov et al. (2005) study 
how the value relevance of accounting numbers varies across German firms reporting under IAS, US 
GAAP, or German GAAP. Although they find that firms reporting under US GAAP or IAS have 
better value relevance, they do not find any significant difference in value relevance between firms 
reporting under US GAAP and IAS. Their findings, along with those of Leuz (2003), indicate 
minimal stock market benefits from adopting IFRS relative to US GAAP. 
Daske (2006) provides some of the earliest evidence of the link between choice of accounting 
standards and cost of capital estimates. Using analyst consensus forecasts from IBES, Daske (2006) 
estimates the implied cost of equity capital for a sample of German firms between 1993 and 2002 and 
finds no evidence to suggest that it is lower for firms reporting under IAS or US GAAP than for firms 
reporting under German GAAP. In fact, he finds that the cost of equity increases when firms switch 
from local GAAP to IAS or US GAAP, which he speculates may reflect the effects of the decreased 
comparability of these firms’ financial reports relative to those of other German firms. Although this 
study takes an important step by connecting accounting standards to cost of capital, its implied cost of 
capital estimates are based on analysts’ forecasts, whose properties are affected by choice of 
accounting standards (see the discussion in Section 4.2). These may add noise to the analyses 
surrounding the accounting standard changes. 
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Recognizing that firms have discretion in how they implement new accounting standards, 
Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2013) re-examine the observed liquidity and cost of capital effects 
around voluntary (and mandatory) adoption. Their analysis incorporates changes in firm-level 
reporting incentives and behavior around the time of adoption to classify firms as either “serious” or 
“label” adopters.38 “Serious” adopters are firms that experienced significant changes in incentives 
around IAS adoption and for whom adoption forms part of a broader commitment to transparency.  
“Label” adopters are firms that experienced little or no change in observable incentives around the 
time of adoption and thus did not make significant changes to their reporting policies. Based on an 
international sample (spanning 30 countries) of voluntary IAS adopters between 1990 and 2005, the 
authors fail to find any noticeable effects on liquidity (measured as the effects of trades and bid-ask 
spreads on price) or implied cost of capital estimates for voluntary adopters, relative to local-GAAP 
firms and a firm’s own pre-IAS history. However, once they use concurrent changes in reporting 
incentives as a condition, they find that “serious” adopters experience improvements in liquidity and 
declines in cost of capital relative to “label” adopters. In addition, they find that serious adopters 
experience a net increase in Tobin’s Q. They find the same pattern of results surrounding mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Daske et al. (2013) provide evidence that simply adopting IAS/IFRS does not 
necessarily lead to the purported stock market benefits unless firm-level reporting incentives are also 
aligned. Their evidence corroborates the findings of Ball et al. (2003) and also provides some insight 
into the nature of the heterogeneous outcomes previously observed around IAS/IFRS adoption. 
Overall, the evidence related to voluntary adoption is mixed. Although some studies find 
evidence of reductions in information asymmetry and stock liquidity (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 
2000), other studies document little support for the claim that voluntary IFRS adoption by itself 
improves liquidity or decreases cost of capital (Daske 2006; Daske et al. 2013). Although studies of 
voluntary adoption typically attempt to control for self-selection using traditional econometric 
approaches, one cannot be entirely confident that self-selection biases do not affect these results. 
4.4.3. Empirical evidence based on mandatory IFRS adoption 
Using firm-year panel data for mandatory IFRS adopters from 26 countries and covering 2001 
through 2005, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on stock liquidity, cost of capital, and Tobin’s Q. Relying on a benchmark of firms that do not report 
under IFRS (due to either being domiciled in a non-adopting country or not being required to 
                                                            
38 Daske et al. (2013) use three proxies to identify major changes in ﬁrm-level reporting incentives related to 
voluntary (and mandatory) IAS adoption. The ﬁrst is the primary factor drawn from factor analysis of a variety 
of firm attributes, such as size, leverage, profitability, book-to-market ratio, percentage of closely held shares, 
and percentage of foreign sales to total sales. The second is the negative of the ratio of absolute value of accruals 
to the absolute value of cash ﬂow from operations. The final proxy is the number of analysts following a ﬁrm. 
The authors then use the changes in these proxies over six years around IAS to sort firms into “serious” and 
“label” adopters based on whether the changes are above or below the median change.     
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mandatorily adopt IFRS in 2005) as control firms, they find a significant improvement in liquidity for 
mandatory IFRS adopters. They also find a significant increase in cost of capital and a significant 
decrease in Tobin’s Q.  However, when the authors examine the stock market effects in the one year 
before IFRS adoption, they find that cost of capital decreases by 26 basis points and Tobin’s Q 
increases by 7%. They conclude that the IFRS benefits may be reflected in stock prices as soon as 
IFRS adoption is anticipated. However, from a theoretical perspective, it is unclear why investors 
decrease the premium for information risk even before the risk is attenuated and despite the 
significant uncertainty around IFRS implementation and its effect on reporting quality (as discussed in 
Section 2.4) in the year before IFRS adoption. It is also unclear why cost of capital actually increases 
if information risk decreases upon the IFRS adoption date. The authors’ findings also leave 
unanswered the question of why the effects on cost of capital and Tobin’s Q precede mandatory 
adoption when uncertainty about the reporting effects of IFRS remained high (see discussion in 
Section 2.4). 
Based on cross-sectional analyses, Daske et al. (2008) document that the observed stock 
market benefits occur only in countries with strict enforcement regimes and in countries where firms 
have incentives to be transparent. They are careful to point out that some or all of their results may 
reflect the effects of a variety of regulatory and enforcement changes that are instituted along with 
IFRS adoption and that mandatory adoption itself may play a limited role in causing the observed 
outcomes. 
Like Daske et al. (2008), Li (2010) investigates whether mandatory adoption of IFRS affects 
cost of equity capital. Based on difference-in-differences analysis of a set of 1,084 EU firms, she 
concludes that mandatory adopters enjoy a significant reduction of 47 basis points in their cost of 
equity, but that no such change occurs around the IFRS mandate date for a control sample of 
voluntary adopters.39 A possible reason for these differences in the main results is that, unlike Daske 
et al. (2008), she does not control for time trends. Notwithstanding these differences, she finds that 
only firms in countries with strong legal enforcement benefit from reductions in cost of equity capital. 
This suggests that the differences in the countries covered in the sample may explain the differences 
in main results across the two studies.  
Rather than limiting their focus to IFRS adoption indicators, Platikanova and Perramon 
(2012) study how new information revealed through IFRS adoption (contained in the reconciliation of 
IFRS to local GAAP) relates to stock liquidity. They find that, although the reconciliation numbers 
(relative to industry peers) for shareholders’ equity are not unambiguously related to stock liquidity, 
those for net income are significantly negatively related to it. The authors suggest that larger net 
                                                            
39 Li (2010) measures cost of equity capital as the average implied cost of capital measures estimated from the 
four different valuation models.  
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income differences reflect greater uncertainty about IFRS adjustments in the transition year and that 
this uncertainty lowers stock liquidity.  
Christensen et al. (2013) re-evaluate the evidence provided by Daske et al. (2008) after 
accounting for enforcement and regulatory changes concurrent with mandatory IFRS adoption in 
some EU countries. Based on a survey of regulators, practitioners, and academics and information 
from public sources, they classify five European countries (Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
and the UK) as undergoing substantive enforcement changes concurrent with mandatory IFRS 
adoption. They also compare the liquidity changes surrounding IFRS adoption across four groups of 
countries: (i) EU countries with concurrent enforcement changes, (ii) EU countries without concurrent 
enforcement changes, (iii) non-EU countries adopting IFRS, and (iv) countries not adopting IFRS. 
They document that the effects of IFRS introduction on stock liquidity are limited to the five 
European countries undergoing concurrent changes in enforcement. Moreover, they find similar 
liquidity improvements for firms that are experiencing changes in enforcement regimes but are not 
concurrently changing their accounting standards. Based on these findings, they conclude that 
changes in reporting enforcement or other correlated omitted factors help explain the liquidity 
changes observed around IFRS adoption and that changes in accounting standards have had little 
direct effect on market liquidity. However, Barth and Israeli (2013) contend that the evidence 
provided by Christensen et al. (2013) is insufficient to attribute the liquidity changes to enforcement 
changes alone and that both IFRS adoption and enforcement changes may be required for firms to 
benefit from improved stock liquidity. 
In contrast to the preceding studies’ focus on the effects of IFRS adoption on stock liquidity 
and cost of capital, Hong, Hung, and Lobo (2014) illuminate another capital market consequence by 
evaluating the effect of IFRS adoption on the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). As IPO 
underpricing is at least partly caused by information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors, IFRS adoption can help decrease IPO underpricing by decreasing information asymmetry. 
In addition, the authors point out that IFRS adoption can lower IPO underpricing by attracting more 
foreign investors’ attention to the stock. To test their prediction, they adopt a difference-in-differences 
research design involving a treatment sample of 1,540 IPO firms from mandatory-IFRS-adopting 
countries and a propensity-scored matched sample of IPO firms from non-IFRS-adopting countries. 
Their findings suggest that IPO underpricing decreases significantly (38%–82%) for IFRS-adopting 
firms. Moreover, they show that IPO firms attract significantly more foreign proceeds (49%–76%) 
after mandatory IFRS adoption. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the results are limited to 
countries with strong enforcement regimes and those that were significantly affected by IFRS 
adoption (i.e., with large differences between IFRS and prior local GAAP). 
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In summary, empirical analyses of stock market benefits generally reveal that voluntary and 
mandatory IFRS adoption have increased market liquidity and decreased the cost of equity capital. 
However, these benefits have not been experienced by all firms or within all countries. Rather, they 
have been concentrated in firms that have undergone concurrent changes in firm-level reporting 
incentives and in countries that have undergone concurrent changes to enforcement. As we discuss in 
detail in Section 10, studies focusing on mandatory IFRS adoption are susceptible to a confounding-
events problem, raising concerns about the precise cause of the observed effects of the IFRS mandate. 
To address such concerns, more research is required to obtain a clearer understanding of the links 
between IFRS adoption and its effects on stock markets. For instance, current IFRS studies do not 
closely tie their empirical analysis of cost of capital to predictions derived from specific theoretical 
models. It is necessary to do so, as theoretical predictions of the effect of information quality on cost 
of capital are model-dependent (as discussed in Section 4.4.1). Future research should also delve 
deeper into the precise properties of IFRS and enforcement that underpin the observed benefits related 
to liquidity and cost of capital. Which types of enforcement or which specific IFRS attributes yield 
greater stock market benefits? 
 
5. IFRS and corporate decision-making   
5.1. Empirical predictions and US-based evidence  
There are several reasons to expect changes in accounting standards and the attendant effect 
on reporting quality to influence corporate decision-making. Several studies show that better reporting 
quality decreases information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, which in turn attracts capital 
to positive net-present-value projects and increases investment opportunities by lowering investors’ 
required returns (e.g., Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi 2009; Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo 2012; 
Goodman, Neamtiu, Shroff, and White 2014). Better financial reporting quality also enhances the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and thus mitigates managerial excesses, including 
under- and overinvestments. Reported accounting numbers are often used in debt covenants, and so 
changes to accounting standards can tighten or loosen covenant slack and affect the funds available 
for investments and other corporate purposes (Shroff 2015). Furthermore, new accounting standards 
often require managers to gather additional information, which can affect managerial decision-
making.  
Changes in accounting standards can also affect the decision-making of firms through 
spillover effects from other firms’ financial reports. For instance, more transparent reporting by all of 
the firms in an economy can benefit a firm by decreasing its uncertainty over the strategies of peer 
firms. Durnev and Mangen (2009) posit and show that a competitor’s accounting restatements transfer 
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information about the general profitability of investment projects to other firms. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2000) also suggest that, in a world where firm values are correlated, mandating higher 
disclosure quality enhances welfare, as higher quality disclosures allow investors to arrive at more 
accurate valuations for not only the disclosing firm but also its peers. This is also likely to affect 
corporate decisions by influencing capital allocation across firms. A number of US-based studies 
provide empirical evidence in support of these spillover effects of reporting quality (e.g., Foster 1981; 
Freeman and Tse 1992; Durnev and Mangen 2009; Badertscher at al. 2013; Shroff et al. 2014).  
5.2. IFRS and corporate investment efficiency  
One of the first studies to consider investment efficiency in the IFRS adoption context is that 
by Schleicher, Tahoun, and Walker (2010), who investigate how IFRS adoption affects investment 
efficiency in an international setting. They argue that improved reporting quality under IFRS should 
improve investment efficiency and that this improvement should be more pronounced in inside 
economies (i.e., economies with small stock markets, highly concentrated ownership, weak outside 
investor rights, poor disclosure levels, and weak legal enforcement) than in outside economies, as the 
former are more prone to agency problems and financial constraints. Along similar lines, they suggest 
that the effects of IFRS should be more noticeable for smaller firms, which are generally more 
financially constrained. Measuring investment efficiency based on the sensitivity of investments to 
cash flows, the authors report results that are consistent with these predictions, i.e., reductions in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity following IFRS adoption are greater for insider economies and for 
smaller firms. Biddle, Callahan, Hong, and Knowles (2013) extend these findings to a larger sample 
and adopt a difference-in-differences approach that encompasses both IFRS-adopting and non-IFRS-
adopting countries and show that the conclusions of Schleicher et al. (2010) are robust. 
Chen, Young, and Zhuang (2013) examine the effect of IFRS adoption on the cross-border 
spillover of investment-related information. They specifically investigate how IFRS adoption affects 
the relationship between the investment efficiency of a firm and the investment performance of its 
foreign peers based on a sample of over 1,000 IFRS-adopting firms from 17 European countries 
between 2000 and 2009. They show that IFRS adoption increases the sensitivity of a firm’s 
investment efficiency to performance-related information about its foreign peers but not to 
information about its domestic peers. Based on this, they conclude that enhanced cross-border 
comparability following IFRS adoption drives the documented results. 
Louis and Urcan (2014) examine how mandatory IFRS adoption affects managerial decisions 
pertaining to M&A. As accounting reports play a crucial role in the initial screening and identification 
of target firms, they argue that acquirers should be able to better screen targets from other countries 
with comparable accounting standards, suggesting that widespread IFRS adoption should increase 
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cross-border acquisitions. They also point out that the use of identical accounting standards by both 
acquirer and target should simplify post-acquisition integrations. This should also increase the 
likelihood of IFRS-reporting entities merging. Consistent with these predictions, they find that the 
odds of cross-border acquisitions of listed firms from IFRS-adopting countries significantly increase 
in the post-IFRS period relative to corresponding increases for either unlisted firms in IFRS-adopting 
countries or listed firms from non-IFRS countries. This effect is not driven by countries that change 
their enforcements or regulations concurrently with IFRS adoption. Rather, it primarily occurs when 
the acquiring firm is also from an IFRS-adopting country. Based on these findings, the authors 
conclude that improved comparability rather than changes in reporting quality resulting from IFRS 
adoption causes an increase in cross-border M&A. 
Francis, Huang, and Khurana (2015) also investigate whether differences in accounting 
standards across countries affect cross-border M&A. Using cross-border M&A data from 32 countries 
over 1998 through 2004, they show that the volume of cross-border transactions is larger between 
countries with similar accounting standards. They also report that mandatory IFRS adoption has 
increased cross-border M&A across countries that exhibited larger differences in their domestic 
GAAP in the pre-IFRS period. However, neither Francis et al. (2015) nor Louis and Urcan (2014) 
identify the specific costs that are so large as to dissuade the acquisition of targets reporting under an 
alternative accounting standard. 
Shroff et al. (2014) examine whether the information environment in which a subsidiary 
operates affects its investment decisions using IFRS adoption as an exogenous shock to firms’ 
information environment. The authors hypothesize that more transparent information, such as that 
presented under IFRS, allows multinational companies to better monitor the investment decisions of 
their foreign subsidiaries. Consistent with this, they show that the investment decisions of foreign 
subsidiaries in country industries with more transparent information environments are more 
responsive to local growth opportunities than foreign subsidiaries in country industries with less 
transparent information environments.  
Relatedly, Loureiro and Taboada (2015) examine whether and how IFRS adoption affects the 
sensitivity of managerial decisions to stock price information, i.e., whether insiders can “learn” from 
outsiders. They argue that an improved information environment such as that under IFRS adoption 
allows managers to learn more from investors’ information sets, as reflected in the stock prices. They 
test this prediction by following a difference-in-differences approach using both non-adopters and 
voluntary adopters as control groups. Based on a sample of over 32,000 firms from 50 countries over 
1990 through 2012, they show that relative to the control sample, IFRS adopters experience an 
increase in investment-to-price sensitivity, a stronger relationship between market reactions to M&A 
announcements and the likelihood of deal completion, and an improvement in post-acquisition 
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operating and return performance following adoption. The authors attribute their results to increases 
in information provided by new foreign investors, rather than current investors providing more 
information post adoption.  
5.3. IFRS and other corporate decisions  
Hail, Tahoun, and Wang (2014) examine how changes in a firm’s information environment 
affect its dividend payout policies. They point out that an improved information environment such as 
that under IFRS adoption can either increase or decrease dividend payouts by improving managerial 
monitoring and mitigating agency problems. Although improved monitoring decreases the need for 
managers to signal their quality by paying out excess cash, causing lower dividend payouts, it can also 
decrease overinvestment and lead managers to distribute excess cash through higher dividend payouts.  
The authors test these contradicting predictions based on difference-in-differences analysis of an 
international sample of firms covering 49 countries over 1993 through 2008. Their logit analysis 
reveals that the propensity to pay dividends decreases by about 9% after IFRS adoption, relative to a 
benchmark sample of non-adopting firms. 
Wang and Welker (2011) examine whether firms strategically time equity issuances during 
the transition period leading up to IFRS, when information asymmetry between management and 
investors was temporarily high. They suggest that managers, who had inside knowledge of the 
negative effects of IFRS on reported numbers, strategically issued equity before the information was 
publicly released. Based on a sample of 2,900 non-financial firms from Australia and Europe, they 
initially provide evidence of greater information asymmetry between managers and investors of 
equity-issuing firms by documenting a stronger association between abnormal stock returns after 
IFRS adoption (when the effects of IFRS were revealed publicly) and the difference in net incomes 
reported under local GAAP and IFRS relative to non-issuing firms. They then document a 
significantly negative relationship between the earnings differences across IFRS and local GAAP, the 
probability of issuing equity, and the amount issued in the three years leading up to IFRS adoption. 
Chen, Ng, and Tsang (2015) examine whether mandatory IFRS adoption affects cross-listing 
decisions. They point out that IFRS adoption may increase incentives to cross-list by lowering the 
costs associated with financial reporting across multiple jurisdictions and lowering investors’ costs of 
processing financial reports prepared under unfamiliar accounting standards. However, IFRS adoption 
may also decrease a firm’s need to cross-list by attracting foreign investors and analysts to local 
markets.  Based on a sample of 1,181 cross-listed firms (including 608 from IFRS-adopting 
countries), Chen et al. (2015) find that firms in IFRS-adopting countries are more likely to cross-list 
after mandatory adoption than firms reporting under non-IFRS standards or firms that had voluntarily 
adopted IFRS earlier. They also find that adopters tend to cross-list in more countries, in other IFRS-
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adopting jurisdictions, and in countries with larger and more liquid security markets. Cross-sectional 
tests reveal that the cross-listing effect of mandatory IFRS adoption is greater for firms domiciled in 
countries exhibiting larger differences between local GAAP and IFRS, lower disclosure levels, and 
less access to external capital before adoption. 
Overall, although initial efforts have been made to better understand the effects of the IFRS 
mandate on corporate decisions, this topic offers opportunities for future research. Have improved 
cross-border comparability and increased cross-border information transfers led to the better 
economic integration of countries? Have they increased competition in IFRS-adopting countries, 
especially from foreign firms? By improving monitoring and efficiency of decisions and lowering 
costs of capital, has IFRS adoption increased the economic profitability of firms? Or has it hurt 
economic profitability by attracting greater competition, particularly from foreign firms? Future 
studies should strive to explain the mechanisms through which these real effects occur.  
 
6. IFRS and debt markets 
Few studies evaluate the effects of IFRS on debt markets. The arguments related to the effects 
of IFRS in the context of equity markets cannot always be directly extended to debt markets due to 
the asymmetric payoff function of debtholders. For instance, although shareholders may care more 
about the current market value of a borrower’s assets, debtholders also care about the liquidation 
value of the assets. Furthermore, debt is an agreement to repay the principal and interest, not the fair 
value. Thus debtholders may not find the fair value reporting of liabilities helpful.  
Accounting plays two major roles in debt markets: valuation and contracting. The valuation 
role of accounting helps borrowers and lenders to mitigate information asymmetry by sharing 
information directly relevant to pricing debt. This role requires accounting numbers to reflect 
managers’ private and forward-looking information, even if it is not immediately verifiable. In 
contrast, under the contracting role, financial reports supply auditable financial outcome variables for 
use in efficient contracts with the firm. This role requires accounting numbers to be independently 
verifiable and enforceable in a court of law.  The next two subsections examine evidence in the 
literature related to each of these aspects. 
6.1. Valuation-related effects of IFRS on the debt market 
6.1.1. Effects of IFRS on firms’ capital structure  
Based on Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse-selection theory, Naranjo, Saavedra, and Verdi 
(2014) conjecture that, by reducing information asymmetry and the attendant adverse selection costs, 
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mandatory IFRS adoption enables firms to easily raise external funds. Based on Myers’ (1984) 
pecking order theory, they surmise that IFRS adopters with high debt capacities choose debt as their 
primary source of external financing. Based on a sample of firms covering 41 countries from 2003 
through 2012, they find that mandatory IFRS adopters raise more external financing after adoption 
and that firms with higher debt capacities issue incrementally more debt than equity and have higher 
leverage ratios in the post-adoption than firms with lower debt capacities. Consistent with the notion 
that IFRS helps lower information asymmetry problems, the observed effects are more pronounced 
for firms with higher ex-ante levels of information asymmetry.  
Florou and Kosi (2015) investigate how IFRS adoption affects a firm’s choice of the type of 
debt financing, i.e., public versus private. Compared with public bondholders, private lenders, such as 
banks, have access to borrowers’ private information and superior information-processing abilities 
and therefore face less of an adverse selection problem (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder, 2008). This 
implies that firms with better reporting quality should have better access to public debt relative to 
private debt. Testing this prediction on a sample of public bond and private loan issuances made 
between 2000 and 2007, Florou and Kosi (2015) provide corroborative evidence. They find that 
mandatory IFRS adopters are more likely than non-adopters to issue public bonds rather than private 
loans. Like the evidence provided by Naranjo et al. (2015), their findings support the prediction of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) that better information quality increases firms’ reliance on external sources 
of financing. Naranjo et al. (2015) and Florou and Kosi (2015) rely on the argument that IFRS 
improve reporting quality and lower information asymmetry. However, as discussed earlier in 
Sections 3 and 4, the evidence for this argument is mixed. 
IFRS-related studies of external financing patterns raise several questions for future research. 
If firms raise more financing through public debt issues following IFRS adoption, then where does the 
increased availability of funds come from? Are the funds from non-IFRS-reporting firms reallocated? 
Are there changes in the money supply or multiplier effects at the macroeconomic level? Do the 
documented effects of IFRS on external funding differ when the supply of capital is limited? 
Although we recognize that efforts to understand the broader macro-level effects of accounting shocks 
are not straightforward, these are issues worth pursuing. 
6.1.2. Effects of IFRS on the credit relevance of accounting numbers 
IFRS studies generally find that the accounting information produced by IFRS is more value 
relevant for stock market participants (see Section 3). This raises the natural question of whether the 
same holds true for debtholders. In other words, do IFRS numbers better predict a firm’s credit risk 
than local GAAP numbers? One may argue that IFRS numbers are more credit relevant, as IFRS 
require recognition of more liabilities, such as pension obligations and employee stock options, which 
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under local GAAP tend to be either optional or not required. Furthermore, the increased emphasis on 
the fair value measurement for financial instruments and fixed assets may result in IFRS numbers 
reflecting losses in a timelier manner than historical cost accounting. However, the increased 
flexibility and managerial discretion required under a principles-based IFRS regime can compromise 
the verifiability and reliability of accounting numbers and therefore make financial statements less 
useful for creditors. 
Several studies empirically investigate the effects of IFRS on credit relevance. However, the 
results tend to be mixed. Florou, Kosi, and Pope (2015) and Wu and Zhang (2014) find that IFRS 
adoption increases the credit relevance of accounting numbers, and Kraft and Landsman (2014) find 
that IFRS decrease credit relevance. Furthermore, Bhat, Callen, and Segal (2014) find that IFRS 
adoption has no effect on credit relevance. These differing conclusions are likely driven by the 
differences in the researchers’ definitions of credit relevance and their proxies for credit risk. For 
example, Florou et al. (2015) measure credit relevance using R2 values from regressing S&P credit 
ratings on accounting variables, and Wu and Zhang (2014) measure it using the sensitivity of Moody’s 
credit ratings to the accounting ratios. Bhat et al. (2014) follow a similar approach to that of Florou et 
al. (2015) but replace credit ratings with credit default swap (CDS) spreads in their credit-relevance 
regressions. Kraft and Landsman (2014) also rely on CDS spreads to proxy for credit risk but focus on 
the residuals from regressing CDS spreads on accounting ratios rather than on the R2 values, as done 
by Bhat et al. (2014). 
The preceding studies vary in terms of not only their methodological choices but also their 
samples. Wu and Zhang (2014) examine both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters from 19 
countries between 1990 and 2007 and include all of the countries that did not mandate IFRS in their 
control sample. They find a significant increase in the credit relevance of accounting numbers for both 
voluntary and mandatory adopters but only for firms domiciled in countries with strong rules of law. 
In contrast, Florou et al. (2015), Bhat et al. (2014), and Kraft and Landsman (2014) consider only 
firms from countries that mandated IFRS in 2005 as their treatment group and use US firms as their 
control group. However, even within these three studies, the number of countries covered by their 
treatment samples vary: Florou et al. (2015) include 17 countries from 2000 through 2009, Bhat et al. 
(2014) consider 12 from 2003 through 2008, and Kraft and Landsman (2014) include 12 from 2000 
through 2012.  
Bhat, Callen, and Segal (2015) provide indirect evidence of the credit relevance of IFRS 
numbers by testing how mandatory adoption affects the relationship between the spread and maturity 
of CDS instruments. Predicated on the term structure model of Duffie and Lando (2001), they argue 
that, if IFRS adoption increases transparency, then the intercept in the relationship between CDS 
spread and maturity should decrease and the slope and concavity should increase. They test this 
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prediction on a treatment sample of 5,943 CDS contracts from IFRS-adopting countries and a control 
sample of 20,658 CDS contracts from non-IFRS-adopting firms from 2003 through 2009.40 Their 
empirical analysis reveals that the treatment firms’ CDS spreads decrease, especially among CDS 
contracts with short-term maturities, and the slope and concavity in the CDS-maturity relationship 
increase following the mandatory adoption of IFRS. However, no such changes are observed in the 
control sample, suggesting that IFRS adoption increases transparency within the debt markets. 
Overall, the mixed results obtained from these studies preclude drawing strong inferences 
about the effects of IFRS on credit assessment. More research is needed to reconcile them. Future 
research should also attempt to highlight the precise mechanisms and pinpoint the specific accounting 
rules that affect the credit relevance of IFRS numbers. 
6.1.3. Effects of IFRS on the cost of debt 
Borrowers’ financial reporting quality can affect their costs of debt in several ways. First, 
Sengupta (1998) argues that lenders and underwriters demand lower risk premiums associated with 
the potential withholding of adverse private information for firms with better disclosure quality. 
Second, as discussed in Section 4.4.1, several theories predict that poor reporting quality increases 
priced information risk and thus a firm’s cost of capital, including the cost of debt.41 Finally, Zhang 
(2008) argues that timely loss recognition (or conditional conservatism) in financial reports better 
protects lenders’ interests by triggering debt covenants early upon signs of financial distress and thus 
effectively restricts borrowers’ ability to distribute assets as dividends or otherwise squander assets. 
Consequently, she conjectures that investors are willing to accept a lower rate of return for lending to 
firms that report losses in a timelier manner.   
Based on the assumption that, from a debt holder’s perspective, financial reports under IFRS 
are of a higher quality than those prepared under local GAAP, Kim, Tsui, and Yi (2011) suggest that 
IFRS adoption decreases the ex-ante information risk faced by lenders and ex-post monitoring and re-
contracting costs. They also note that IFRS adoption can improve the coordination between lenders 
and borrowers in relation to capital investment decisions. Based on these potential benefits, Kim et al. 
(2011) contend that voluntary IFRS adopters should face a lower cost of debt and test this prediction 
on a sample of syndicated loans issued between 1997 and 2005 across 40 countries. They find that 
IFRS adopters pay lower interest rates, have loans with longer maturities, raise larger loan amounts, 
are less likely to have restrictive covenants, and attract more foreign lenders than non-IFRS adopters. 
                                                            
40 In Duffie and Lando’s (2001) model, the transparency of the accounting system is specifically characterized 
as the variance of the noise in asset values, which directly affects creditors’ ability to estimate the probability of 
default. Bhat et al. (2015) empirically measure transparency using analyst forecast dispersion and error. 
41 For US stocks, Francis et al. (2005) and Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) provide evidence of a negative 
relationship between reporting quality and the cost of debt using accrual quality as a proxy for reporting quality.   
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However, only the results for lower interest rates and larger loan amounts are robust to controls for 
the endogeneity biases arising from firms self-selecting to adopt IFRS. 
In contrast to the preceding findings for voluntary adopters, Chen, Chin, Wang, and Yao 
(2015) study the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on the properties of syndicated loans. They 
argue that mandating IFRS can either increase or decrease information asymmetry between lenders 
and borrowers, depending on whether debtholders view the IFRS as being of better quality than the 
local GAAP. Based on analysis of syndicated bank loans issued between 2000 and 2011 by firms 
from 31 countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS, they find that interest rates increased by 24 basis 
points and loan maturities decreased by one month for IFRS adopters relative to the corresponding 
changes for non-adopters. They also find that the borrowers experiencing greater effects from IFRS 
adoption (measured as a score of the total number of restated financial statement items in the 
transition year or as the inverse of the change in variance of abnormal accruals from the pre- to post-
adoption periods) faced higher interest rates and larger declines in loan maturity. These results help 
better link their findings to IFRS adoption.  
Extending the analysis to compare the effects of IFRS on public bond terms with those on 
private loan terms, Florou and Kosi (2015) find that interest rates are lower for public bonds issued 
after mandatory IFRS adoption but not for private loans. They attribute this finding to IFRS adoption 
improving the quality of the public information, which bondholders rely on more, as, unlike banks 
and other private lenders, they do not have private channels of communication with borrowers.  
Overall, like the evidence for the effects of IFRS on the credit relevance of accounting 
numbers, the evidence for the effects of IFRS on debt contract terms is mixed. There are several 
potential explanations for the differences in the conclusions derived by these studies. First, analysis of 
voluntary adopters is open to endogeneity concerns and the effects on mandatory adopters may be 
affected by contaminating events. Second, even within the studies focusing on mandatory IFRS 
adoption, there are differences across the sample selection choices. Although both Florou and Kosi 
(2015) and Chen et al. (2015) use DealScan as their data source for the private loan sample, the 
former have a shorter sample period and a more restricted sample selection process.42 As a result, 
Florou and Kosi (2015) may have less powerful tests to explain the lack of significant increases in 
interest rates observed for private loan contracts. It is equally possible that the more homogenous 
sample of firms and greater number of control variables used by Florou and Kosi (2015) yield cleaner 
results.43 Finally, the average effects observed in the various studies may be affected by specific 
                                                            
42 Florou and Kosi (2015) limit their sample period to years before 2008 to avoid the financial crisis period. 
Chen et al. (2015) end their sample period in 2011. In addition, Florou and Kosi (2015) limit their sample to 
senior term loans, revolvers, and 364-day facilities.  
43 In Florou and Kosi’s (2015) study, the indicator variable for mandatory IFRS adoption has a positive but 
insignificant coefficient in most of their regressions on the cost of private loans. Florou and Kosi’s (2015) 
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countries included in the samples. Although no evidence exists in the debt markets, it is not 
unreasonable to expect enforcement and adoption incentives to cause cross-country variations in IFRS 
effects.  
By focusing on firms that issue debt to measure the cost of debt, the preceding studies are 
implicitly conditioned on the decision to issue debt. However, as we discuss in Section 6.1.1, IFRS 
may affect firms’ decisions to issue debt and to issue public versus private debt. Thus, ideally 
speaking, the decision to issue debt, the type of debt (public or private), and the debt features should 
be modeled together and simultaneously estimated. That task poses significant econometric 
challenges. 
Following an argument similar to that seen in the preceding studies, i.e., that IFRS improve 
the transparency and creditworthiness of borrowers, Chan, Hsu, and Lee (2013) predict that IFRS 
adoption should yield higher credit ratings, as investors and credit analysts account for improved 
reporting quality when forming their credit ratings. Using a sample of foreign firms cross-listed in the 
US that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005, Chan et al. (2013) find a significant increase in the sample 
firms’ credit ratings after adoption relative to their US-domiciled counterparts and relative to a control 
sample of foreign firms cross-listed in the US but not subject to the IFRS mandate. Although their 
findings corroborate those of Kim et al. (2011), focusing on firms that voluntarily cross-list in the US 
introduces its own self-selection biases, as these firms face unique incentives and are unlikely to 
represent the population. 
Donelson, Jennings, and McInnis (2015) survey a sample of commercial banks in terms of 
their use of accounting information in making lending decisions. Although their survey mainly relates 
to US banks lending to private companies, their findings may illuminate how accounting choices and 
standards affect debt market decisions more generally. Their evidence indicates that lenders are much 
more likely to require more collateral and guarantees from borrowers with poor reporting quality 
rather than increasing interest rates. This finding contradicts the effects of interest rates documented in 
relation to IFRS adoption. Similar surveys conducted in countries that have adopted IFRS may 
provide further insights into the relevance of IFRS for lending decisions. 
Lamoreaux, Michas, and Schultz (2015) provide evidence of the role of IFRS in lending by 
the World Bank to developing economies in the form of international development aid. The authors 
point out that the World Bank relies on audited financial statements to monitor the projects funded 
through its loans and claim that higher accounting quality in a country can help decrease monitoring 
costs. Using a sample of 258 country-year observations from 42 countries between 1999 and 2008, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
sample has 8,628 observations versus the 11,238 observations included by Chen et al. (2015) for the same 
period, i.e., 2000–2007. In addition, Florou and Kosi’s (2015) regression models include variables measuring 
default risk, such as O-score and distance to default, which load significantly. 
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authors find that the World Bank lends more to countries where fewer differences exist between local 
GAAP and IAS (e.g., Bae et al., 2008) and those that mandate IFRS, indicating that accounting 
quality plays a role in the allocation of international aid loans. However, accounting quality fails to 
play a role in the allocation decision for countries that are more closely aligned with US geopolitical 
interests.   
6.2. Effects of IFRS on contractibility in the debt markets 
As an accounting system provides timely and verifiable performance measures that indicate 
the underlying creditworthiness of borrowers, accounting numbers are often used in debt covenants to 
restrict managerial actions that harm debtholders and act as tripwires that give lenders an option to 
renegotiate debt terms following a decline in a borrowers’ economic performance (Smith and Warner 
1979). In fact, based on the finding that little new information is released upon earnings 
announcements to market participants, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) conclude that a major role of 
accounting numbers must be their use in contracts, such as debt settlement and compensation 
contracts (Watts and Zimmerman 1986) and in disciplining prior information released by managers 
(Gigler and Hemmer 1998; Ball 2001; Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar 2012). However, the extent 
to which accounting numbers matter for inclusion in debt covenants ultimately depends on the ability 
of accounting numbers to accurately predict changes in a borrower’s credit risks, particularly before 
the material deterioration of its creditworthiness.   
The literature provides good reasons to expect IFRS adoption to either increase or decrease 
the use of accounting numbers in debt covenants. Ball et al. (2015) argue that the increased 
managerial flexibility available under principles-based IFRS as well as greater emphasis on fair-value 
accounting decreases the relevance of IFRS numbers for use in debt contracts.44 In contrast, 
Demerjian (2012) presents a model that suggests that IFRS adoption, by improving financial 
transparency, would lower the need for all types (both accounting and non-accounting-based) of debt 
covenants. In his model, covenants are tripwires for renegotiations and are needed for borrowers and 
lenders to initially contract on limited and potentially asymmetric information. 
Kim et al. (2011) study changes in covenant usage around voluntary IFRS adoptions and 
document that IFRS adopters are less likely to have restrictive covenants. They attribute this to the 
greater transparency accorded by IFRS reporting, as implied by Demerjian (2012), and conclude that 
                                                            
44 Ball et al. (2015) provide the following reasons for why fair value emphasis lowers the relevance of IFRS 
numbers for inclusion in debt contracts. First, fair value gains and losses from shocks to the cash flows of assets 
are transitory, making current-period earnings a poorer predictor of future debt service capacity. Second, fair 
value gains and losses include shocks to the expected returns of assets. To the extent that these shocks are 
expected to reverse before debt maturity, they are irrelevant for debt contracting. Third, as debt contracts require 
repayment of the principal and interest and not the fair value of the debt, the IFRS option to fair value certain 
financial liabilities lowers the contracting value.  
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a lower likelihood of restrictive covenants is an important benefit of IFRS adoption. Chen et al. 
(2015) study covenant usage changes after mandatory IFRS adoption and, like Kim et al. (2011), 
document declines in covenant usage after adoption. However, in contrast to Kim et al. (2011), they 
attribute the decline in covenant usage to IFRS worsening the accounting quality of at least some 
firms. 
The studies by Kim et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2015) are subject to a common data 
problem: they treat debt contracts without covenant information as having zero covenants. However, 
as covenant-free loans are rare, particularly in Europe before 2010, the covenant-free observations are 
more likely to represent cases where data vendors have not collected pertinent information (Ball et al., 
2015). Therefore it is probably inappropriate to treat observations with missing covenant information 
as covenant-free, as done in these studies. 
Ball et al. (2015) also study the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on covenant usage in debt 
contracts. However, in contrast to Kim et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2015), they consider accounting- 
and non-accounting-based covenants separately and study whether IFRS adoption leads to a 
substitution effect between the two. Moreover, they study the effects of IFRS on covenants for both 
public bonds and private loans. Using a sample of new loans and bonds issued between 2001 and 
2010 in 22 IFRS-adopting countries and 21 non-IFRS-adopting countries, Ball et al. (2015) document 
a significant decline in the usage of accounting covenants in both loan and bond contracts following 
IFRS adoption. At the same time, they find that firms increase their reliance on non-accounting 
covenants. This latter result is not consistent with the argument that IFRS improve financial 
transparency. The authors conclude that their results support IFRS decreasing the contractibility of 
accounting.  
Although the findings of Ball et al. (2015) provide evidence of how IFRS adoption may affect 
covenant usage, it is unclear whether their results identify permanent changes in borrowers and 
lenders’ use of accounting numbers for debt contracts or whether these are temporary effects observed 
while borrowers and lenders adapt to new accounting standards. Moreover, as IFRS adoption changes 
financial reporting in many ways simultaneously, the authors cannot trace the decline in accounting 
covenant usage to individual IFRS attributes, although their cross-sectional results for banks are 
consistent with the observation that fair-value accounting plays a role in the decreased reliance on 
accounting covenants. 
Christensen, Lee, and Walker (2009) study the consequences of IFRS adoption for debt 
covenant violations. They argue that IFRS adoption can mechanically trip debt covenants by changing 
how earnings are calculated. Relying on the magnitude of IFRS reconciliations as a proxy for 
mechanical covenant violations and assuming that these covenant violations transfer wealth from 
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shareholders to debt holders, they predict that stock market reactions relate positively to IFRS 
reconciliation numbers, i.e., the difference between net income based on IFRS and that based on 
domestic GAAP. They test this prediction on a sample of 137 UK firms by analyzing the stock market 
reactions to announcements of IFRS reconciliation numbers in the year before mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the UK. Consistent with their predictions, they document a significantly positive 
relationship between IFRS reconciliation numbers and earnings announcement returns. This 
relationship is also pronounced for firms that are more likely to violate covenants or face greater costs 
of covenant violation, such as small firms, firms with lower interest coverage ratios, and firms with 
longer asset maturities. Horton and Serafeim (2010) also report a positive association between IFRS 
reconciliation numbers and earnings announcement returns and document that this relationship is 
primarily driven by adjustments pertaining to goodwill and deferred taxes. 
Research related to the effects of IFRS on accounting contractibility is nascent. The 
relationship between IFRS accounting attributes and the use of IFRS numbers in debt contracts and 
other contracts (such as supplier or customer contracts) requires more research. The lack of 
comprehensive and detailed contract data, including covenant data, in a cross-country setting is an 
obstacle for such research. Although companies in the US are required to file their debt contracts with 
the SEC, such requirements are not common elsewhere, especially for private contracts and loans. As 
a result, data vendors must rely on private sources or surveys to gather contractual information in an 
international context. Consistent with this, Ball et al. (2015) note that only 10% of international debt 
issues have at least one (accounting or non-accounting) recorded covenant and that this probably 
represents the failure or inability of vendors to collect covenant information rather than the debt being 
covenant free. Language barriers also make it harder for researchers to compile a meaningfully sized 
international dataset with detailed contract information. Such data limitations restrict researchers’ 
ability to address basic contracting issues, such as the ability to contract around specific attributes of 
IFRS.  
Further research is also needed to explore several other issues surrounding the use of IFRS 
numbers in debt contracting, including whether and how public bond and syndicated loan contracts 
differ in their use of IFRS numbers, whether lenders use more credit-rating-based performance-
pricing provisions when accounting systems are weak, and how the use of IFRS numbers in debt 
contracts is affected by the quality of enforcement in a country. However, the effect of reporting 
enforcement for contractibility in debt markets may not be straightforward. Strong enforcement may 
mitigate the opportunistic use of flexibility in reporting and thus increase the usefulness of 
accounting. However, it may also require borrowers to implement fair value accounting, and to the 
extent that fair values are less relevant for debt contracting, stronger enforcement may actually 
decrease the use of accounting-based covenants. 
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Another promising area for research is to examine how debt market characteristics affect 
firms’ choice of accounting policies under IFRS. IFRS is often considered as a principles-based 
standard that give managers discretion over both their accounting choices and implementation of 
specific standards. This increased flexibility may allow managers to opportunistically manage 
earnings to obtain better debt contracting terms or avoid covenant violations. Several studies 
document such behavior in the US (e.g., Beatty and Weber 2003; Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber 2005).  
However, similar evidence in the IFRS context is largely unavailable. One exception is a study by 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2013), who examine how firms’ reliance on debt financing affects their 
choice between historical cost accounting and fair value accounting under IFRS, i.e., the cost or 
revaluation model under IAS 16. They argue that debtholders may prefer either the historical cost model 
(due to its greater degree of verifiability) or the revaluation model (for the purpose of obtaining the 
current values of collateral assets) and document the very limited use of the revaluation model for long-
term assets by UK and German firms.  
 
7. Effects of IFRS on stewardship and corporate governance 
Many view the stewardship role in mitigating agency-principal conflicts as a key objective of 
financial reporting, in addition to the objective of providing information useful for decision making. A 
notable change in the IFRS framework is its exclusion of the stewardship role as an explicit goal of 
financial reporting, along with the claim that decision usefulness subsumes the stewardship role. 
Although decision usefulness could be broadly defined to include stewardship, a number of 
authors argue that the overlap between these objectives is incomplete and that the investment-related 
roles and stewardship roles for financial statements differ in terms of their needs for specific reporting 
attributes (Gjesdal, 1981). For example, Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) demonstrate that, when 
managers must be provided with different incentives for different activities, the inability to contract 
on activity-level outcomes makes biased aggregate accounting information desirable for 
compensation contracts. The bias enables varying weightings across individual activities in the 
compensation contracts. Further focusing on timely recognition of gains and losses, Shivakumar 
(2013) reviews a variety of reasons why the timely recognition of losses, but not gains, is more 
beneficial from the contracting and stewardship perspectives, even though timely recognition of both 
gains and losses is useful from a valuation perspective.45 
                                                            
45 Timely loss recognition removes incentives for managers to continue loss-making projects and invest in new 
unprofitable projects, particularly when the negative consequences of such projects will be unknown to outsiders 
for long periods. However, such concerns do not arise for managers continuing profit-making projects. 
Furthermore, conditionally conservative reporting can aid outside directors by attenuating managerial biases to 
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We discuss several studies that investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on stewardship and 
compensation.  In the following subsection, we discuss studies that focus on how IFRS adoption 
influences the use of accounting numbers in compensation contracts that are aimed at mitigating 
manager-shareholder incentive conflicts.  Section 7.2 discusses studies pertaining to the influence of 
IFRS on the effectiveness of managerial monitoring.  As there are significant gaps in the IFRS 
literature pertaining to the stewardship role of financial numbers, we dedicate a separate subsection 
(Section 7.3) to discussing these gaps, which future research must fill. 
7.1. Effects of IFRS on executive compensation 
7.1.1. Empirical predictions of the effect of reporting quality on executive compensation 
A large literature examines the role of accounting in aligning the incentives of managers and 
shareholders by studying the use of accounting numbers in executive compensation plans.46 There are 
a variety of ways that IFRS matter for compensation plans.  
First, as IFRS improve earnings comparability across peer firms, as discussed in Section 3.3, 
IFRS adoption makes accounting-based relative performance evaluation (RPE) more efficient. 
Second, as IFRS earnings are more value relevant and reflect economic gains and losses in a timelier 
manner than local GAAP earnings due to their fair value emphasis, IFRS may induce firms to increase 
their reliance on earnings for compensation purposes. If compensation committees consider 
accounting earnings under IFRS as a better measure of underlying economic performance, then we 
would expect them to optimally increase the weight placed on accounting earnings in determining 
executive compensation and turnover. Such a finding would be consistent with the arguments of 
Holmstrom (1979) and Banker and Datar (1989), who suggest that the weight placed on a 
performance signal should increase with its precision and sensitivity to an agent’s effort. This view 
has found empirical support in the US, where Banker, Huang, and Natarajan (2009) show that 
compensation contracts place more weight on earnings when earnings are more value relevant. 
Furthermore, Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) find that executive compensation packages in 
the US include a higher proportion of equity-based incentives when the timeliness of the earnings is 
lower.  
However, several features of IFRS also make accounting-based performance measures less 
efficient to address stewardship issues. First, the greater discretion afforded to managers under 
principles-based IFRS can raise concerns about the independent verifiability of the reported numbers, 
an important attribute of accounting numbers for their use in stewardship and contracting. On a 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
report favorably. Finally, timely recognition of gains involves greater managerial subjectivity and lower 
verifiability, which lowers demand for contracting and stewardship purposes. 
46 See studies by Bushman and Smith (2001), Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010), and Shivakumar (2013) for 
reviews. 
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related point, IFRS offer a greater choice of accounting policies, which increases the potential for 
manipulation of reported numbers. These concerns can lead boards to rely less on accounting numbers 
in compensation contracts.47 Such concerns may also affect equity-based executive compensation, as 
stock prices may also be affected by such manipulation. Studies document evidence consistent with 
opportunistic earnings management to enhance equity compensation in the US context (e.g., 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006). 
Second, the greater use of fair values under IFRS lowers the distinction between the role of 
earnings and that of share prices in compensation contracts. Although stock price has many 
advantages as an incentive measure, it does not provide a sufficiently precise signal of managerial 
effort and ability. For instance, Paul (1992) analytically shows that stock-based compensation 
contracts assign the greatest weight to projects that are the noisiest indicators of managerial effort, if 
stock market investors observe information about all of the projects in a firm with equal precision. 
This occurs because the projects most affected by noise are likely to produce extreme values and 
affect share prices the most. Moreover, share prices are affected by a variety of factors that are beyond 
a manager’s control, such as investor sentiment and macroeconomic factors.48 Sloan (1993) 
emphasizes this point by noting that accounting data can be incrementally useful to stock price in 
compensation contracts, as it can identify the component of stock price that is under a manager’s 
control. Supporting these points, Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) analytically show that the 
information content of earnings influences the optimal design of contracts that compensate managers 
based on earnings and share prices. The findings of these studies, when combined with the effect of 
IFRS on earnings (making them closer to stock price measures of performance), suggest that earnings 
numbers under IFRS lose some of their advantage relative to stock prices for use in compensation 
contracts. 
7.1.2. Empirical evidence of the effects of IFRS on compensation contracts  
Ozkan, Singer, and You (2012) examine the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the usage 
of accounting-based performance measures in executive compensation contracts. They focus on two 
aspects: pay performance sensitivity (PPS) and RPE. They base their study on a sample of 892 public 
firms covering 15 continental European countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005. They 
restrict their focus to these countries, arguing that firms in these countries are more comparable and 
thus more likely to use RPE in compensation contracts. They conjecture that, if compensation 
committees consider earnings as higher quality after IFRS adoption, then one should observe an 
                                                            
47 For example, Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) find a decrease in the reliance of CFO bonus contracts on 
financial performance after SOX and attribute this finding to firms’ wanting to decrease CFOs’ incentives to 
misreport.  
48
 Although Paul (1992) predicts that the valuation role of earnings is independent of the managerial-incentive 
contracting role of earnings, Bushman, Engel, and Smith (2006) and Banker et al. (2009) extend the analysis and 
show empirically that earnings can play a role in both valuation and compensation contracts simultaneously. 
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increase in the weight placed on accounting earnings in compensation contracts, as reflected in PPS.  
In addition, if mandatory IFRS adoption increases the cross-country comparability of earnings, there 
should be an increase in the use of foreign peers as benchmarks in accounting-based RPE. Analyzing 
the cash compensation received by top executives from these firms from 2002 through 2008, Ozkan et 
al. (2012) document a weak increase in the use of accounting-based PPS and a significant increase in 
the use of accounting-based performance of foreign peers for RPE after IFRS adoption. At the same 
time, they find no change in the use of stock-return-based PPS or RPE for stock-based compensation. 
They also link the increase in accounting-based RPE to greater earnings comparability by 
documenting that the effect is stronger among firms with greater foreign sales and those with fewer 
comparable domestic peers. 
Although Ozkan et al. (2012) infer the effects of IFRS by evaluating the sensitivity of 
executive compensation to accounting numbers, Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and Walker (2014) directly 
examine contractual terms to identify whether long-term incentive-based executive pay is based on 
accounting targets, stock return targets, or both. Thus, although prior studies can comment only on the 
informational relevance of accounting numbers from a compensation perspective, Voulgaris et al. 
(2014) can clearly identify the changes caused by IFRS to the use of accounting numbers to measure 
managerial performance. However, this approach is limited; the authors do not observe the levels at 
which performance targets are set or how compensation committees combine various performance 
measures in arriving at executive compensation, so they cannot evaluate how IFRS adoption affects 
the amount of compensation. For instance, although they can identify the use of earnings numbers in a 
compensation contract, they cannot distinguish between a contract in which most of a CEO’s bonus is 
tied to earnings and one in which very little of the bonus is tied to earnings. 
In contrast to Ozkan et al. (2012), Voulgaris et al. (2014) find a decrease in the usage of 
earnings-based performance measures after mandatory IFRS adoption for a sample of UK CEO 
compensation contracts. In line with our earlier discussions, they attribute these findings to the greater 
fair value orientation of IFRS relative to local UK GAAP. Consistent with this, they show that the 
post-IFRS decline in the use of accounting numbers is greater in financial industries, where fair value 
accounting typically has a larger effect on reported earnings numbers.  
Although the difference in research methodologies between Ozkan et al. (2012) and Voulgaris 
et al. (2014) is one reason for the differences in their results, there are indications that sample 
difference may partly reconcile the findings. Based on cross-country analysis, Ozkan et al. (2012) find 
that their results hold only for countries whose prior domestic GAAP differed substantially from 
IFRS. In contrast, for countries such as the UK where the differences between local GAAP and IFRS 
are relatively small, the relationship is negative, though insignificant. The focus of Voulgaris et al. 
(2014) on a more homogenous sample may explain the significantly negative effects of IFRS on the 
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use of accounting-based performance measures observed in UK compensation contracts. However, 
one limitation of the latter study is that it does not have a control sample. Hence its results may be 
driven by contaminated events, such as the more equity-intensive pay structures adopted by European 
firms in the 2000s (Fernandes, Ferreria, Matos, and Murphy 2012).  
 
7.2. Effects of IFRS on the role of accounting in managerial monitoring 
A relatively large number of US-based studies evaluate the role of accounting numbers in the 
efficient monitoring of managers. For instance, Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003) show that boards of 
directors rely on both earnings and stock prices to monitor managerial performance, suggesting a role 
for reporting quality in effective corporate governance. To the extent that IFRS adoption has 
improved corporate transparency and information asymmetry, one may expect managerial monitoring 
practices to use accounting numbers to become more effective and corporate governance mechanisms 
to increase their reliance on financial reports in the post-IFRS-adoption period.  
Marra and Mazzola (2014) and Marra, Mazzola, and Prencipe (2011) study the effect of IFRS 
adoption on boards’ effectiveness in constraining earnings management. Marra et al. (2011) examine 
a sample of 222 Italian firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005 and find that the relationship 
between board characteristics—such as, board independence and the presence of an audit 
committee—and earnings management became more negative in the post-adoption (2005–2006) 
period relative to the pre-adoption period (2003–2004). They interpret their findings to indicate that 
IFRS facilitate board monitoring. However, in a follow-up study, Marra and Mazzola (2014) point out 
that the findings of Marra et al. (2011) are driven by a temporarily higher level of attention that boards 
paid to accounting issues at the time of transitioning to IFRS. Consistent with this argument, they 
show that the negative association between board independence and earnings management was 
strongest in 2005, the adoption year, and then gradually decreased in later years (2006 and 2007).  
Using the voting premium associated with dual-class shares as a proxy for the effectiveness of 
managerial monitoring, Hong (2013) examines whether mandatory IFRS adoption changes the voting 
premium. She argues that the voting premium is lowered when corporate transparency is improved, as 
greater transparency improves managerial monitoring and lowers the benefits of voting control.  
Comparing a sample of 133 firms in IFRS-adopting countries that have dual-class shares with firms 
from non-adopting countries that have dual-class shares, she documents a significant decrease in 
voting premiums for firms in IFRS-adopting countries after mandatory adoption. The study’s reliance 
on a difference-in-differences methodology helps it to more clearly attribute the observed changes to 
the IFRS adoption date. However, the study’s small sample limits it from conducting more focused 
 60 
 
analysis to rule out alternative explanations based on concurrent corporate governance reforms within 
the EU.  
Managerial monitoring also occurs through the market for external takeovers. Reporting 
quality affects the effectiveness of this corporate governance mechanism, as financial statements are a 
key source of information for making takeover-related decisions (Raman et al. 2012). Consistent with 
this view, Francis, Huang, and Khurana (2012) and Louis and Urcan (2014) show that the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS has increased cross-border M&A between countries with lower degrees of similarity 
in their domestic GAAP during the pre-IFRS period.  
Focusing on CEO turnover as an outcome variable of managerial monitoring, Wu and Zhang 
(2009) examine how the voluntary adoption of IAS and US GAAP affects the use of accounting-based 
measures in turnover. Based on the assertion that earnings informativeness is higher under US GAAP 
and IAS than under domestic GAAP in EU countries, they argue that IAS/US GAAP adoption should 
increase the reliance of internal performance evaluation on accounting earnings and consequently 
increase the sensitivity of CEO turnover to earnings. Using a sample of continental European firms 
that voluntarily adopted either IAS or US GAAP between 1988 and 2004, in addition to hand-
collected data related to CEO turnover, they find evidence consistent with the preceding prediction.49  
Due to the endogenous feature of firms’ voluntary adoption decision, the authors are careful not to 
make any causal claim about the relationship between IAS/US GAAP adoption and changes in 
earnings performance sensitivity. As the study pools voluntary IAS and US GAAP adopters together, 
it is difficult to judge whether the results are mainly driven by IAS adoption, US GAAP adoption, or 
both. 
Wu and Zhang (2011) study the relevance of accounting earnings in RPE for CEO turnover 
decisions after mandatory IFRS adoption. They find that mandatory IFRS adoption in continental 
Europe has led to an increased reliance on foreign peers’ earnings for CEO turnover decisions. This 
evidence corroborates the argument of Ozkan et al. (2012) that IFRS improve cross-country 
comparisons of accounting earnings for relative performance evaluation. 
In contrast to the preceding studies, which focus on how IFRS adoption affects corporate 
governance, Verriest, Gaeremynck, and Thornton (2013) take the opposite tack and examine the 
effect of corporate governance on the firm-level enforcement of IFRS adoption. They find that firms 
with stronger governance provide more transparent restatements from local GAAP to IFRS, achieve 
better compliance, and are less likely to opportunistically delay the adoption of IAS 39. This study’s 
findings of firm-level heterogeneity in the enforcement of IFRS adoption are useful for researchers to 
                                                            
49 In addition, Wu and Zhang (2009) examine the sensitivity of employee layoffs to accounting earnings after 
voluntary IAS adoption and find results consistent with those for CEO turnover. 
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extend their reporting enforcement proxies to the firm level, rather than rely only on country-level 
enforcement indices. Along similar lines, focusing on the audit committee as a corporate governance 
mechanism, Chen and Zhang (2010) examine how the incentives of audit committee members affect 
reported IFRS numbers. Based on a sample of 103 Chinese B-share companies from 1999 to 2004, 
they document that the incentives of audit committees, along with regulatory enforcement, are the key 
drivers narrowing the differences between financial numbers reported under Chinese GAAP and those 
reported under Chinese equivalents of IFRS.  
7.3. Limitations and suggestions for future research 
A major limitation of IFRS studies focusing on stewardship is that they do not pinpoint the 
mechanisms through which IFRS adoption affects stewardship or identify the specific accounting 
attributes that drive these changes. Another common problem associated with IFRS studies focused 
on stewardship is their inability to find a substitution effect among accounting- and non-accounting-
based performance measures. Theories suggest that an improvement in the “signal-to-noise” ratio of 
earnings after IFRS adoption should lead to a greater relative weighting of earnings in managerial 
monitoring and compensation. If so, one should equally observe a corresponding shift away from 
other performance measures, such as market-based performance measures, emphasized in the pre-
IFRS period. Such a shift has been documented by empirical studies conducted in the US. For 
example, Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Engel et al. (2003) document a substitution between 
accounting- and market-based performance measures. The lack of such evidence surrounding IFRS 
adoption raises questions about whether the observed effects can be attributed to the adoption of IFRS 
themselves. 
Several interesting questions remain unanswered as to the effects of IFRS on compensation 
contracts and corporate governance. Do firms modify compensation contracts to undo any effects of 
IFRS? If so, which IFRS attributes are often adjusted? How do frequent changes to standards under 
IFRS affect the stewardship role of accounting numbers? 
Studies must evaluate whether and how optimal governance structures have been affected by 
IFRS adoption. Bushman et al. (2004) argue that, when a firm’s accounting system fails to capture 
economic transactions in a timely manner, the firm opts for costlier monitoring mechanisms, such as 
hiring more outside and reputed directors. Bushman et al. (2004) also surmise that the optimal level of 
ownership concentration and stock ownership by inside directors is higher and the timeliness of 
earnings is lower when the decreased transparency of financial reports exacerbates agency problems. 
The need to mitigate the agency problems shifts the optimal ownership structure toward greater stock 
holdings by owner-managers. These issues remain unexplored in the IFRS context. 
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Finally, firms in different legal regimes rely on different corporate governance models. Those 
in common-law countries such as the US and UK use a shareholder governance model and rely on 
public disclosure to resolve agency problems. In contrast, firms in code-law countries such as 
Germany and Italy use a stakeholder governance model, and information asymmetry is often resolved 
through private communications. To the extent that IAS/IFRS can be viewed as having a stronger 
common-law orientation or a stronger shareholder focus, it would be interesting to explore whether 
mandating IFRS rules within code-law countries leads to shifts in firms’ corporate governance 
structure toward a shareholder-governance model. 
 
8. Effects of IFRS on audit verification 
Recognizing the importance of enforcement, the “IAS Regulation” introducing mandatory 
IFRS reporting in the EU (EC Regulation 1606/2002) explicitly states that “a proper and rigorous 
enforcement regime is key to underpinning investors’ confidence in financial markets” and requires 
that countries take appropriate measures to ensure compliance. To facilitate a uniform enforcement of 
IFRS in the EU member states, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) issued a 
standard addressing a common approach to the enforcement of standards of financial information in 
Europe (CESR, 2003a). The standard contains 21 high-level principles of enforcement that member 
states should adopt in enforcing IFRS. In response, many EU countries implemented significant 
changes to their enforcement regimes and regulatory institutions.50 Turning specifically to the audit 
function, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued additional 
guidance for the auditing of IFRS financial statements (IAASB, 2003). In this section, we review the 
evidence related to the effectiveness of these regulations with a particular focus on the audit function 
in mandatory IFRS adoption.   
8.1. Empirical predictions of the effects of IFRS on audit verification 
Researchers suggest that a decreased emphasis on verifiability as a key concept in the 
development of IFRS has led to less specific and less prescriptive guidance and hence increased 
subjectivity in accounting measurement (Jamal et al. 2010), which consequently increase audit risks. 
Furthermore, studies point out that principles-based IFRS standards can exacerbate litigation risks for 
auditors, as they are no longer able to rely on compliance with specific guidelines or established rules 
as a valid defense (Diehl, 2010). The reliance on fair value measurement under IFRS also increases 
the effort required of auditors, especially in the verification of fair values of assets that do not have 
active markets, such as specialized receivables or privately placed loans. Finally, the greater 
                                                            
50 Christensen et al. (2013, Appendix A) provide a detailed discussion of enforcement changes within the EU. 
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discretion available to managers under IFRS also increases the effort required on behalf of auditors to 
verify IFRS-based financial statements. 
The increased disclosure requirements of IFRS relative to many domestic GAAP also 
significantly affect the audit function, as auditors must now sign off on more financial information 
including management’s subjective forecasts and assessments of assets and liabilities. For instance, 
the increased reporting requirements for transactions designated as accounting hedges call for 
companies to undertake and document detailed tests of hedge effectiveness. Furthermore, the IFRS 
provisions relating to share-based payments require substantial disclosure as to the nature and method 
of executive compensation plans, along with detailed information about the inputs of fair value 
calculations. As a result of these additional disclosures, IFRS adoption has increased the length of 
annual reports by up to 60% (Webb 2006; Ernst & Young 2005). 
The general uncertainty around the introduction of IFRS may also play a contributing role in 
the increased compliance and audit costs faced by firms. Uncertainty about the implementation and 
effects of IFRS is likely to increase investor scrutiny of financial statements following IFRS adoption, 
resulting in an increase in the likelihood of costly litigation and regulatory interventions. Such 
concerns lead auditors to protect their reputation capital by increasing their auditing effort, reassessing 
client risk, or both (e.g., Clarkson, Ferguson, and Hall 2003; Francis and Krishnan 1999), which are 
likely to manifest through increased audit fees.  
8.2. Empirical evidence of the effects of IFRS on audit function 
Based on a survey of 60 managers from Australia’s top 200 corporations, Jones and Higgins 
(2006) report that companies viewed their external auditors as the most involved party in the IFRS 
adoption process. Some of the respondents noted that auditors “would be instrumental—we don’t 
have a big team, so they’ll be pretty heavily involved” (Jones and Higgins 2006, p. 640). Other 
managers exhibited skepticism at the role of the external auditor in the process, saying that their 
external auditors would not be used extensively in the transition. The expected involvement of 
external auditors was greater among larger firms (top 25% of the market capitalization), although 
empirical analysis of the audit fees under IFRS adoption, which we discuss later, suggests otherwise 
(e.g., De George, Ferguson, and Spear 2013). 
Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) examine the effect of the IFRS mandate on audit pricing. They 
argue that because IFRS is comprehensive, fair value oriented, and principles based, it requires more 
complex estimates and judgments by preparers and auditors, increasing the level of uncertainty and 
risk of misstatement. Accordingly, they predict that IFRS increase audit fees and that, all else 
remaining equal, this effect should be stronger in countries with more robust legal regimes, as auditors 
face higher legal liabilities in these countries. The authors empirically test these predictions using a 
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broad sample of EU firms from 11 IFRS-adopting countries as treatment firms and firms in three non-
adopting OECD countries (Japan, Canada, and the US) as a control group. They report evidence of an 
IFRS-related audit fee premium that rises in reporting complexity and decreases in reporting quality 
and in strength of a country’s legal regime. However, their use of Japan, the US, and Canada as a 
control sample may affect their findings, as these countries have different enforcement structures and 
firms with significantly different reporting incentives compared with EU countries. They also do not 
consider changes in regulations and enforcements that have concurrently occurred with IFRS adoption 
in some EU countries. Although they attempt to overcome this contamination concern by using 
information from a survey capturing the adequacy of firms’ implementation of audit and accounting 
practices, their analysis does not account for concurrent regulatory changes.51 Thus any observed fee 
increases may simply be in response to increased regulatory and investor scrutiny, rather than auditing 
IFRS numbers per se. 
Focusing on a single country, De George et al. (2013) examine the costs of audit verification 
for a sample of 907 listed Australian firms, which cover approximately 80% of the total market 
capitalization on the Australian Stock Exchange. Using a traditional audit-fee determinants model, the 
authors find an economy-wide increase in the mean level of audit costs of approximately 23% in the 
IFRS transition year, relative to pre-IFRS years, that declines to an increase of 8% in later years. In 
addition, when they examine annual fee changes, they estimate an abnormal IFRS-related increase in 
audit fees in excess of 8% that is incremental to the normal yearly fee increases observed in the pre-
IFRS period. They also find that smaller client firms incur disproportionately more IFRS-related audit 
costs relative to larger client firms. Finally, using a self-constructed measure of IFRS audit 
complexity based on a survey of senior audit managers and partners, they document that audit fees are 
increasing along with the complexity of IFRS audits. As in any study of mandatory IFRS adoption, 
confounding events remain a concern. 
Based on a sample of New Zealand firms, Griffin, Lont, and Sun (2009) examine the effect of 
the transition to IFRS on audit verification costs. They implement a standard audit-fee determinants 
model augmented with temporal indicator variables corresponding to the IFRS mandate for 653 firm-
year observations over 2002 through 2007. After controlling for company size, complexity, and risk, 
they find a reliable increase in audit fees around the transition to IFRS (2004–2006). They also find a 
                                                            
51 They specifically calculate a country-level measure of concurrent reforms using data from the Annual 
Executive Opinion Survey conducted by the Institute for Management Development. Although the primary 
purpose of the survey is to provide quantifiable measurements of management practices, labor relations, and 
corruption, the survey explicitly asks respondents to evaluate the extent to which auditing and accounting 
practices are implemented in their firms adequately and the extent to which corporate boards supervise company 
management effectively. The authors measure the changes in these scores from the pre-IFRS to post-IFRS 
periods.  
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general decrease in non-audit fees over their sample period, although they do not find that this change 
is related to the IFRS mandate. 
Shifting away from audit fees, Nobes and Zeff (2008) explore the heterogeneity of auditors’ 
statements related to IFRS compliance. Examining the audit reports of all companies in the main 
stock indices of Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK for the 2005–2006 fiscal period, they 
find a “widespread failure to assert compliance with IFRS when compliance has probably been 
achieved.” In particular, the audit reports of firms domiciled in France and Spain uniformly refer to 
compliance with EU IFRS only, i.e., “IFRS as adopted by the EU.” However, for some firms in the 
UK and Germany, audit reports assert dual compliance to both local standards and “IFRS as issued by 
the IASB.” Even more dissimilar, audit reports of Australian firms refer only to compliance with 
“Accounting Standards in Australia,” even though these standards are based closely and in some 
instances exactly on IFRS. Nobes and Zeff (2008) argue that these differences in auditors’ statements 
about firm-level IFRS compliance may create problems for investor confidence and comparability. 
They call for uniformity in audit report language to assert compliance with IFRS. 
Loyeung, Matolcsy, Weber, and Wells (2011) attempt to link IFRS adoption errors to audit 
quality for a sample of 184 Australian firms (from S&P/ASX 500) for which IFRS-compliant 
earnings turned out to be either overstated or understated. They report that these accounting errors 
were caused by 19 different accounting standards, indicating a broad difficulty in implementing IFRS.  
They also find that these transition errors were positively associated with IFRS-related changes in 
audit fees and bid-ask spreads but negatively related to the tenure of CEOs and CFOs who were 
qualified accountants. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that IFRS adoption has generally increased the audit fees of 
firms. But, at the same time, there is need for more research on how auditors affect IFRS reports. 
Future research must also focus on linking the audit literature better to the other observed effects of 
IFRS. To what extent does the greater auditor effort, as observed in the IFRS-related audit premium, 
translate into higher reporting quality and help attain benefits for capital market participants? Future 
research can also examine whether the integration of capital markets increases after IFRS adoption 
and whether greater arm’s length transactions are changing the nature of the audit function. What are 
the implications of increased comparability of financial reporting for auditor judgments and 
decisions? 
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9. Specific attributes of IFRS 
This section is devoted to studies that focus on a single or small number of specific attributes 
of the IFRS reporting requirements. Focusing on specific attributes of IFRS permits a more detailed 
understanding of the potential mechanisms through which IFRS matter and a better understanding of 
the measurement and implementation of a specific standard. However, the difficulty in isolating 
economic consequences attributable to specific standards when the entire accounting regime has 
shifted presents a major limitation of this setting. Moreover, the small samples typically examined in 
these studies limit the generalizability of their results to a broader set of companies and countries.  
Section 9.1 reviews the studies that investigate the effects of fair value accounting.  Section 9.2 
discusses studies of other attributes of IFRS. 
9.1. Studies of the fair value attribute of IFRS 
The recent financial crisis has pulled fair value accounting into the spotlight. Under US 
GAAP, fair value accounting is mainly limited to the measurement of financial assets and liabilities 
with unrealized gains and losses reflected in that period’s earnings or other comprehensive income 
(FAS 115) and fair values disclosed in footnotes (FAS 117). Proponents of fair value accounting 
argue that the fair values of assets and liabilities improve transparency by reflecting current market 
conditions and providing timely information for decision-making. Opponents argue that in many cases 
fair value provides noisy information, especially for assets and liabilities that are held to maturity or in 
thinly traded markets.52 
Relative to US GAAP, IAS/IFRS allow a greater use of fair value accounting. In particular, 
fair value measurements are incorporated into valuing various assets other than financial assets and 
liabilities. For example, under IFRS, firms may choose to measure their property, plant, and 
equipment (PP&E) (IAS 16), intangibles (IAS 38), and investment property assets (IAS 40) at fair 
value. Although biological assets must be recognized at fair value (IAS 41), firms are required to 
recognize the cost of employee stock options using fair values as at the grant date (IFRS 2).53 In 
addition, IAS 36 (Impairment of Assets) allows firms to reverse previous impairment losses. The 
equivalent accounting treatments allowable under US GAAP are much more restrictive in their use of 
fair value accounting, if they are permitted at all. To this end, IAS/IFRS-adopting jurisdictions 
provide researchers with a better opportunity to examine the implications and consequences of fair 
value accounting. 
                                                            
52 See Barth (2006), Laux and Leuz (2009), and Ball et al. (2015) for detailed discussions about fair value 
accounting. 
53 Elad (2004) provides a discussion of the implementation of IAS 41 and offers a detailed comparison of US 
GAAP and IFRS in terms of the measurement of agricultural assets. Giner and Arce (2012) and McAnally, 
McGuire, and Weaver (2010) provide useful background information about the adoption of IFRS 2 and its 
comparison with SFAS 123 under US GAAP. 
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To provide evidence of the effects of the fair value accounting rules mandated by IFRS, 
researchers rely on two alternative approaches. Under the first approach, studies evaluate cross-
sectional differences in the effects of IFRS across banks and non-banks to infer the role of fair value 
accounting in causing the observed effects. This approach is justified because, although IFRS require 
fair value accounting for a variety of asset classes, they tend to be most relevant for the recognition of 
financial assets and liabilities (Laux and Leuz, 2009), and banks tend to recognize significant amounts 
of financial assets and liabilities. The second approach directly relies on the extent of firms’ fair value 
measurements, typically for a small hand-collected sample, through a review of financial statements 
and policy notes. We discuss the specific findings from these two empirical strategies below. 
Studies by Armstrong et al. (2010) and Ball et al. (2015) are two of the many that evaluate 
differences in IFRS effects across banks and non-banks. However, they reach different conclusions 
about the effects of fair value for different sets of investors. From the stock market investors’ 
perspective, Armstrong et al. (2010) conjecture that the emphasis of IFRS on fair value accounting 
leads to an improvement in information quality. Consistent with this premise, they document more 
positive stock market reactions to IFRS adoption announcements for banks than nonbanks. However, 
turning to debt markets, Ball et al. (2015) examine the relevance of accounting numbers for use in 
debt contracts and argue that fair values are not useful for contracting. (See footnote 42 for further 
discussion.) Consistent with their arguments, they find an incrementally lower usage of accounting-
based covenants among debt issued by banks relative to non-banks in the post-IFRS period.  
DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li (2015) examine how the fair value consequences of IAS 39 affect 
the stock price crash risk for financial firms. They observe that, on the one hand, fair value may allow 
firms to better reflect their underlying economics in financial reports, improving their reporting 
transparency and thus lowering their crash risk. While, on the other, fair value may increase 
measurement errors in reported values of risky assets or encourage managers to invest more in risky 
projects (by amplifying the upside) and thus increase the crash risk. Analyzing financial and non-
financial firms separately, the authors find an increase in crash risk only among financial firms in 
countries with weak banking regulations and a decline in crash risk among non-financial firms. Their 
results highlight the importance of regulatory quality in determining IFRS outcomes. 
Given the cross-sectional nature of these studies, inferences can only be summarized as 
documenting evidence consistent with an increased use of fair value accounting after IFRS adoption 
rather than a direct inference that fair value accounting affects information quality, contractibility of 
accounting numbers, or crash risk.  
An alternative approach that partly mitigates this problem involves relying on exposures to 
fair value rules by directly measuring them from financial reports. One prominent example is the fair 
value measurements of investment property assets in the real estate industry, where firms’ operating 
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assets are mainly investment properties. IAS 40 (Investment Property) allows firms to choose between 
historical cost and fair value models to account for investment properties.54 However, if a firm 
chooses the historical cost model, it must disclose the fair values of its investment properties in 
footnotes. This setting has two advantages. First, there is a large cross-country variation in the 
valuation models for investment property assets allowable under domestic GAAP. This allows 
researchers to explore cross-sectional variations in the adoption effect. For example, only the 
historical cost model is allowed under domestic GAAP in France and Germany, only the fair value 
model is allowed under domestic GAAP in the UK and Denmark, and both models are allowed under 
domestic GAAP in Belgium and the Netherlands.55 As firms in all of these countries have converged 
to IFRS, one can exploit the heterogeneity in the fair value changes that occur as a result of IFRS 
adoption.  Second, as the amount of fair value information is the same whether firms choose the fair 
value or historical cost model under the IFRS regime, this allows researchers to analyze firms’ 
accounting choices between recognition and disclosure while holding the information environment 
constant. 
Goncharov, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2014) examine the effect of fair value reporting (through 
both recognition and disclosure) on audit fees. Using a sample of 172 European real estate firms 
during 2001–2008, they adopt a difference-in-differences design and find that the firms that 
previously used the amortized cost model under local GAAP exhibited greater declines in audit fees 
when forced to adopt fair value accounting under IFRS relative to the firms that were already using 
the fair value model under local GAAP. The authors interview real estate audit partners, who suggest 
that the higher audit fees initially observed for firms using an amortized cost model stemmed from the 
greater audit effort required for impairments. They empirically corroborate these interview responses 
in the data. In addition, cross-sectional analyses reveal that audit fees under IFRS reporting are (1) 
negatively associated with firms’ exposure to fair valued assets, (2) positively associated with the 
complexity of the fair value measurement, and (3) higher for fair value recognition than for fair value 
disclosure.  
Muller, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2011) evaluate the effects of the increased disclosure of fair 
values required under IFRS on the degree of information asymmetry faced by investors. Using a 
sample of 121 European real estate firms during 2003–2007, they find that firms that did not 
voluntarily disclose fair values before mandatory IFRS adoption experienced larger improvements in 
information asymmetry, i.e., larger declines in their bid-ask spreads, upon IFRS adoption.  
                                                            
54 See a study by Quagli and Avallone (2010) for a detailed discussion of IAS 40. The authors also provide 
empirical evidence that a firm’s decision to adopt fair value accounting for investment properties under IAS 40 
is a function of information asymmetry, contractual efficiency, and managerial opportunism.      
55 See Appendix 1 of a study by Goncharaov, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2014) for a full list of countries in relation to 
this issue. 
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Turning to the recognition of fair values, Liang and Riedl (2014) contrast real estate firms in 
the UK with those in the US. Before IFRS adoption, UK GAAP required firms to recognize their 
investment property assets at fair value on their balance sheets and report unrealized fair value 
changes in a revaluation reserve. However, under IFRS, these firms recognize unrealized fair value 
changes in net income while continuing to recognize investment property assets at fair value on the 
balance sheets.56 In contrast, US firms can use only the historical cost model to account for investment 
property assets. Liang and Riedl (2014) exploit this difference in accounting standards between the 
UK and US to investigate the effect of fair value accounting on analysts’ forecasts. Liang and Riedl 
(2014) conjecture that the recognition of fair value in balance sheets aids analysts by revealing 
managers’ private information about underlying asset values and that the recognition of fair value 
changes in net income makes earnings more difficult for analysts to predict. Consistent with this 
conjecture, they find that analysts’ forecast accuracy for net asset value (balance sheet based) is 
higher for UK firms (over a period combining both the pre- and post-IFRS-adoption periods) than for 
US firms and that the forecast accuracy for earnings is higher for US firms than for UK firms 
reporting under IFRS. They also find that the former result is attenuated during the financial crisis 
period when asset values are impaired, causing the numbers reported under the fair value model to 
converge toward those reported under the historical cost model. Their analysis reveals that analysts’ 
forecast accuracy for earnings is lower for UK firms than for US firms in pre-IFRS-adoption period, 
although this is not predicted by their conjectures. This result indicates that omitted correlated 
variables may affect analysis.   
Israeli (2015) uses a sample of 86 real estate firms from France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, 
where the fair value model for investment property assets was not permitted in pre-IFRS domestic 
GAAP, and examines their choices between fair value disclosure and recognition of investment 
property assets under IFRS during 2005–2010. The author conjectures that managers opportunistically 
chose fair value recognition to extract contractual benefits, i.e., to avoid debt covenant violations by 
reporting higher book values of equity and assets and to receive higher earnings-based compensation 
by reporting a higher net income. Consistent with this conjecture, he finds that firms with higher 
leverage (used as a measure for firms’ proximity to debt covenant violation) and more ownership 
dispersion (used as an inverse measure for shareholder monitoring) were more likely to adopt the 
recognition regime. However, this conjecture is based on the assumption that fair value recognition 
leads to higher asset values and earnings, which need not be the case in practice. 
Muller, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2015) study the stock market implications of fair value 
disclosure versus fair value recognition of investment property assets for a sample of 245 EU real 
                                                            
56 In theory, firms can choose between the fair value and historical cost model under IFRS. However, in 
practice, all of Liang and Riedl’s (2014) sample firms use the fair value model. They attribute this to the UK’s 
legacy of using the fair value model for investment property assets under domestic UK GAAP.  
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estate firms over the 2003–2010 period. They document that equity prices have a lower association 
with disclosed fair values than they do with recognized fair values and conclude based on additional 
analyses that the discount for disclosures arises partly from the lower reliability of disclosed numbers 
and partly from the greater costs involved in processing disclosed numbers relative to recognized 
amounts. The authors also evaluate the role of external appraisals in minimizing the stock price 
discount associated with disclosed fair values and finds that fair values based on external appraisals 
help to decrease the discount. Their findings contrast with those of Goncharov et al. (2014), who find 
that the effect of fair values on audit fees is unaffected by the use of external appraisals. 
Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) also examine firms’ accounting choices but expand on prior 
studies by including analyses of IAS 16 and IAS 38, which allow firms to choose between the 
historical cost and fair value models when measuring their PP&E and intangible assets, respectively.57 
They argue that firms choose fair value accounting only when reliable fair value estimates are 
available at a low cost and when the estimates convey information about operating performance. 
Consistent with their argument, they find that few firms opt to use the fair value model to measure 
their PP&E and intangible assets and that real estate firms especially tend to choose the fair value 
model to measure their investment property much more frequently. Their results do not rule out the 
possibility that firms’ choice of fair value accounting is driven by factors related to overall IFRS 
adoption, rather than exclusively by the benefits and costs of fair value accounting on its own.  
Consistent with this concern, Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) observe in their sample that 44% of 
UK firms switched to the historical cost model from the fair value model for PP&E upon mandatory 
IFRS adoption, although these firms had the option to report under the historical cost model, even in 
the pre-IFRS period. If firms’ choice of fair value reporting was independent of IFRS adoption, then 
these firms should have chosen the historical cost model, even in the pre-IFRS period. 
In the midst of the financial crisis, the EU called on the IASB to achieve a “level playing 
field” with US GAAP and allow entities to reclassify financial assets. This would have allowed banks 
to use reclassification to switch away from fair value accounting for assets that decreased in value 
during the financial crisis and avoid recognizing unrealized losses. The IASB responded by 
introducing an amendment to IAS 39 in 2008 that allowed firms to retrospectively use a non-fair-
value method for non-derivative financial assets, provided the firm had the ability and intention to 
hold such assets for the foreseeable future and had not yet issued its financial statements at the time of 
the amendment. Lim, Lim, and Lobo (2013) evaluate the effects of this reclassification option for a 
sample of 98 banks covering 21 IFRS-adopting countries and find that the reclassification choice 
decreased analysts’ ability to forecast earnings in the initial year of amendment adoption (2008–2009) 
but not in subsequent years when the economic environment was less volatile. 
                                                            
57 Stolowy, Haller, and Klockhaus (2001) provide a detailed comparison of IAS 38 and French and German 
GAAP. 
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Panaretou, Shackleton, and Taylor (2013) examine the effect of using hedge accounting under 
IFRS on information asymmetry. They observe that UK GAAP has less strict requirements for hedge 
designation than IFRS and that, unlike IFRS, UK GAAP permits historical cost accounting for certain 
hedging instruments. Based on these differences, they predict that IFRS adoption enhances the quality 
of information provided by firms as to their derivative instruments and corporate risk management 
practices, which should lower information asymmetry. Using a sample of UK non-financial firms for 
the 2003–2008 period, they provide evidence consistent with their predictions. They show that firms 
that applied hedge accounting under IFRS had lower analyst forecast errors and dispersion relative to 
firms without hedge accounting.  
He, Wong, and Young (2012) use a Chinese setting to examine the unintended consequences 
of implementing fair-value accounting in an emerging economy. Although China has not officially 
adopted IFRS, Chinese public firms switched accounting standards in 2007 to standards substantially 
similar to IFRS. He et al. (2012) study earnings management around the switch in accounting 
standards and report that Chinese firms manage earnings more to offset losses reported under fair 
value accounting or through strategic reporting of fair value gains and losses in the post-adoption 
period. They point to specific institutional details in China, such as close relationships between 
debtors and creditors and political connections, that make such manipulations feasible. However, one 
limitation of their study involves the generalizability of their results to other countries, as Chinese 
firms face ownership structures, regulation forces, and capital and business environments that are 
drastically different from those of firms elsewhere. 
One significant departure of IFRS from almost all domestic GAAP is the requirement of fair 
value biological assets (IAS 41). IAS 41 requires firms to recognize changes in the fair values of 
biological assets as revenues or expenses in income statements each year. Although this was a 
substantial change in accounting for biological assets, its effects receive little attention from 
researchers. Very few studies directly evaluate the effects of this standard. Huffman (2014) studies the 
value relevance of fair value accounting for biological assets and concludes that book value of equity 
and earnings are more value relevant for consumable biological assets (i.e., agricultural products such 
as crops or timber that realize value on a standalone basis and whose value to the firm is linked to 
what may be exchanged for the asset in the marketplace) measured at fair value and bearer biological 
assets (i.e., self-regenerating assets such as orchards or oil palm plantations that are used in 
combination with other assets in the ongoing operations of the firm) measured based on historical 
costs.58 However, using a larger sample, Goncalves and Lopes (2015) find that fair values are value 
relevant for both consumable and bearer biological assets but do not reconcile their results with those 
                                                            
58 Effective January 1, 2016, IFRS require firms to account for bearer biological assets such as property, plant, 
and equipment. 
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of Huffman (2014). Focusing on Australia, South Africa, and France, Elad (2004) provides a 
commentary related to the fair value rules for agricultural assets embodied in IAS 41. 
9.2. Studies focusing on the non-fair-value attributes of IFRS 
Hamberg, Paananen, and Novak (2011) examine the adoption of IFRS 3 (Business 
Combinations) on financial reporting among a sample of Swedish firms. Relative to prior Swedish 
GAAP, IFRS 3 abandons the amortization of capitalized goodwill and instead requires regular testing 
of goodwill for impairment. They find that firms recognize smaller goodwill impairments under IFRS 
compared with the combined value of goodwill amortization and write-downs under Swedish GAAP, 
causing reported earnings to be higher after IFRS adoption. Furthermore, by comparing the returns of 
goodwill-intensive firms with those of firms with low levels of goodwill, they find that the stock 
market reacts positively to these higher earnings under IFRS. Their results suggest that stock market 
participants seem to find that the impairment model of goodwill better reflects underlying economic 
activities compared with the previous amortization cost model. Chalmers, Godfrey, and Webster 
(2011) substantiate this view for a sample of Australian firms.  
Focusing on recognition rules for intangible assets, Cheung, Evans, and Wright (2008) report 
that IFRS rules for intangible assets (IAS 38/AASB 138) are more stringent than previous Australian 
GAAP rules and that firms have consequently had to de-recognize a significant portion of intangible 
assets following IFRS adoption.  
Hsu and Pourjalali (2015) examine the effect of adopting IAS 27 (Consolidated and Separate 
Financial Statements) on stock markets’ ability to predict earnings. The authors argue that compared 
with local GAAP, IAS 27 decreases managers’ flexibility to hide losses and risks in unconsolidated 
investees, as it gives fewer choices to managers in terms of which investee-entities to consolidate. 
Using a sample of Taiwanese firms, the study shows that the adoption of IAS 27 led to an increase in 
forward earnings response coefficients (the proxy for the stock market’s ability to forecast earnings) 
for firms that were forced under IFRS to consolidate at least one investee entity.  
Finally, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) examine the effect of IAS 39 adoption on 
income smoothing and timely loss recognition among European banks. IAS 39 requires banks to 
recognize only “incurred” losses on balance sheets as opposed to recognizing “expected” losses in 
prior local GAAP. This incurred loss approach decreases the scope of judgment and discretion in 
determining the loan loss provision relative to the expected loss approach used in local GAAP. The 
authors find that the more restrictive IAS 39 impairment rules significantly decrease the income 
smoothing behavior and timely loss recognition of European banks.  
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10. Empirical research design of IFRS studies 
In this section, we synthesize the research design choices of IFRS studies with an aim to 
understanding the general trends in publications and research methodologies. This section is intended 
to be descriptive rather than normative, partly because there are no clear prescriptions for many of the 
econometric choices involved in IFRS studies. Such choices (e.g., the level at which standard errors 
must be clustered or what types of fixed effects to include) depend on econometric assumptions 
related to the unobserved properties of relevant variables. There are also no econometric tests known 
to us that adequately justify or refute these assumptions. Although one can make a conservative 
selection of research methods, such an approach comes at the cost of a loss of power in the tests and 
so is not necessarily preferable. Simulation-based evidence also suggests that seemingly conservative 
choices can sneak biases into analyses (e.g., Petersen 2011). 
Many IFRS studies currently discuss the sensitivity of their results to research choices. 
However, the discussions tend to be brief and limited in terms of the effect on the final inference. 
Very few studies tabulate results from these sensitivity checks. Tabulating such results (at least in an 
Internet appendix) may help other researchers obtain a deeper understanding of the drivers of the 
reported results, aid in the replication of results, and reconcile the differences in results across studies.  
As this section primarily focuses on documenting the empirical choices made by IFRS 
studies, we keep explanations and discussions of various econometric issues to a minimum and 
instead restrict our discussions to how studies address these econometric issues. As our analysis is 
intended to give an overview of trends in research choices rather than exhaustive analysis of all of the 
research methods adopted in the literature, we limit our focus to the same set of papers identified for 
this review from Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal 
of Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, and The Accounting Review from 1999 
through 2015. We exclude discussion papers, opinion pieces, theory papers, experiments, and surveys 
from analysis. Our final sample consists of 64 published articles. A majority of these studies consider 
IFRS/IAS adoption as the primary research objective or use it as the primary research setting. For 
these studies, our analysis focuses only on their main research designs. A few studies use the IFRS 
adoption setting not as part of their main analysis but as part of their robustness analysis. For these 
studies, our analysis focuses on their research design as it pertains to IFRS/IAS adoption. 
10.1. Sample distribution 
Table 1 lists the number of studies published by each journal and their years of publication.  
There has been a gradual increase in the number of publications, especially after 2007, probably due 
to the EU’s mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. Table 2 lists the number of publications by author 
country, which is determined by the location of an author’s affiliation. We count the total number of 
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articles with at least one co-author affiliation located in that country as shown on the publication. This 
table shows a wide geographic distribution. Although US researchers continue to dominate, over 50% 
(i.e., 35 out of 64) of the studies have at least one co-author with an affiliation outside the US. We 
suspect that no other research topic is likely to have such a large fraction of non-US researchers in 
studies published in the selected five journals. Researchers from the EU and Hong Kong dominate the 
list of non-US researchers publishing IFRS-related works. It is likely that these researchers have been 
stimulated by IFRS adoption in their home countries and have benefited from their proximity to 
country-specific information about the effects of IFRS. 
10.2. Data sources 
IFRS studies rely primarily on WorldScope as their primary source of firms’ financial 
information and Datastream as their source of stock market information. Of these 64 studies, 47 use 
Datastream/WorldScope (Table 3). Some of the studies also use Compustat Global for firm-level 
information, and many of the studies use both Datastream/WorldScope and Compustat Global. 
Although WorldScope has a larger coverage, especially for emerging markets in early years, its data 
were unavailable in a user-friendly format for researchers until recently. Compustat Global has been 
available longer through Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), and this has allowed researchers 
easier access to the dataset and made it easier to merge with other WRDS databases. Some early 
studies rely on Bloomberg as their data source for firm-level information (e.g., Ashbaugh and Pincus 
2001; Ashbaugh and Olsson 2002). 
Although it is not yet widely used by researchers, FactSet is a database for firm-level 
accounting information available through WRDS. FactSet purchased WorldScope in April 2008 and 
thus acquired its firm-level accounting information for over 43,000 firms globally starting from 1980. 
Since May 2010, FactSet has started collecting firm-level accounting information by itself.  
Some of the studies, particularly those analyzing US GAAP-IFRS reconciliations, use hand-
collected data. Such information is extracted from either the financial statements of global firms or the 
SEC’s Form 20-F filings of firms cross-listed in the US. 
10.3. Multi- versus single-country settings 
Most IFRS/IAS studies use an international sample of firms for their treatment samples.  Of 
the 64 studies analyzed here, 18 use a single-country treatment sample, and one uses a two-country 
setting.59 Of these 19 studies, the UK (seven studies) and Germany (four studies) are the most 
frequently examined countries.  
                                                            
59 Of the studies adopting a single-country research design, five focus on firms cross-listed in the US, and one 
uses firms cross-listed in the UK. We count these studies as using the US or UK as a single treatment country.  
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A major advantage of using a multi-country setting is that the results can typically be 
generalized to a wider variety of firms and a wider set of institutional and enforcement factors. Such 
studies also can conduct cross-country analysis of the role of country characteristics in influencing 
IFRS outcomes. The samples used in multi-country analysis are also typically larger, yielding greater 
power of tests. However, studies focusing on a single IFRS-adopting country have their own 
advantages. Single-country settings allow researchers to focus on a more homogenous sample of firms 
with broadly comparable ownership structures and capital market incentives. They also hold legal and 
regulatory factors constant and enable researchers to delve deeper into analysis of institutional details, 
adopt better identification strategies, and better control for potential confounding events. 
We discuss the unique features of a few individual countries that have been favored in single-
country settings as follows. 
10.3.1. Studies focusing on German firms 
Germany is a unique case in that before mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 German firms were 
reporting under a variety of accounting standards, including German GAAP, IAS, and US GAAP. 
This allows comparisons across firms that are largely similar except for their choices of accounting 
standards. This approach can help isolate the effects of accounting standards from the effects of legal, 
regulatory, and political factors. However, these samples generally suffer from self-selection 
problems associated with firms voluntarily choosing a specific accounting standard or include a 
nonrandom sample of firms, such as high-tech firms listed on the New Market. 
Another feature of the German setting is its stakeholder-oriented accounting system, which 
overlaps significantly with the country’s tax rules. German GAAP also allows only historical cost 
accounting. Examples of studies that use the German setting include those by Bartov et al. (2005), 
Christensen et al. (2015), Daske (2006), Hung and Subramanyam (2007), Leuz (2003), and Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005).   
10.3.2. Studies focusing on UK firms 
As the UK did not allow early adoption of IFRS, the setting allows researchers to clearly 
study the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption without contamination based on the influence of early 
voluntary adopters. Furthermore, outside of the US, the UK has the largest set of actively traded 
stocks, for which a relatively long history of accounting and stock market data are available. This 
makes it possible for a single IFRS-adopting country to produce a relatively large sample. Finally, the 
UK provides accounting data that are electronically readable for the largest sample of private firms.
60
 
                                                            
60 Horton and Serafeim (2010) provide a detailed discussion of the effects of IFRS relative to local UK GAAP 
for key accounting areas, i.e., leases, employee benefits, share-based payments, deferred taxes, goodwill and 
intangibles, and financial instruments. 
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Examples of studies that have used the UK setting are those by Brochet et al. (2013), Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2013), Liang and Riedl (2014), and Panaretou et al. (2013).       
10.3.3. Studies focusing on Australia 
Australia required all of its firms without exception to adopt IFRS for financial periods 
beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Thus, unlike many other jurisdictions, there was no staggered 
adoption. Although voluntary adoption was permitted, very few firms (less than 1%) chose to do so. A 
distinct feature of Australia’s adoption of IFRS is that all corporations in the country, both listed and 
unlisted, must report under IFRS. This removes incentives for Australian firms to delist to report 
under an alternative accounting standard. It also makes it a particularly interesting setting to test the 
effects of IFRS on private firms and the overall economy. Examples of studies that have used the 
Australian setting are those by Chalmers, Clinch, and Godfrey (2011), Cheung et al. (2008), De 
George et al. (2013), Jones and Higgins (2006), and Lai et al. (2013).     
10.3.4. Studies focusing on cross-listed firms 
Since 1982, the SEC has required foreign firms cross-listed in the US stock markets to 
reconcile their financial statement numbers based in local GAAP to US GAAP. Such reconciliations 
provide researchers with the opportunity to compare reported financial statement numbers across two 
different accounting regimes for the same firm and year. However, in November 2007, the SEC voted 
to allow foreign companies to file financial statements based on IFRS without having to reconcile the 
data to US GAAP, i.e., eliminate 20-F reconciliations. IFRS studies also investigate cross-listing in 
other countries, especially in the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations system of the International 
Equity Market of London, which allows firms to report under either IAS or US GAAP. This setting 
allows for the comparison of accounting standards for firms from a single equity market.  
The cross-listing setting presents a drawback: although these firms are traded in the same 
equity markets, they are incorporated in different countries and are therefore likely to face different 
domestic regulatory forces and reporting incentives. Another limitation of this type of research is the 
potential bias that arises from firms self-selecting to cross-list their shares. 
10.4. Empirical methodology 
In this subsection, we review the empirical methods adopted in our selected 64 IFRS studies.  
Although some studies rely on cross-sectional comparisons across firms reporting under IFRS and 
those reporting under other standards to investigate the properties of IFRS financial reports, IFRS 
studies and especially those evaluating the effects of IFRS adoption rely predominantly on a 
difference-in-differences approach. This approach compares changes in specific attributes around the 
event date for a treatment sample relative to a control sample. We review the crucial methodological 
elements involved in the empirical analysis approach of IFRS studies in general. Although many of 
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the issues discussed are relevant to both cross-sectional and difference-in-differences analyses, we pay 
special attention to the latter approach in Section 10.4.4, given its predominance in the IFRS 
literature. The subsequent subsections present issues pertaining to the following methodological 
choices: (i) event selection, (ii) event date identification, (iii) choice of event window, (iv) choice of 
treatment and control samples, (v) controls for fixed effects, (vi) adjustments for correlated 
observations, and (viii) measurement of control variables.  
10.4.1. Event selection 
9.3.1.1. Voluntary adoption and endogeneity concerns 
A key issue associated with voluntary adoption studies is the potential endogeneity that arises 
from firms self-selecting to adopt IAS/IFRS. That is, the unobserved factors driving firms to 
voluntarily adopt IAS/IFRS may drive the observed changes in the attributes examined, rather than 
the IAS/IFRS adoption itself. Studies use a variety of techniques to address this concern, the most 
prominent one being the use of a two-stage Heckman-type treatment effect model. In practice, this 
approach is often not entirely satisfactory to rule out self-selection concerns due to the absence of 
valid instrument variables in the first-stage regression that can be excluded from the second-stage 
regression with appropriate economic justifications (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
However, a few studies go beyond relying solely on the Heckman approach. For instance, 
Kim and Shi (2012) show that documented differences across voluntary adopters and non-adopters 
exist only after IFRS adoption and not before, indicating that the observed changes for voluntary 
adopters are likely to be attributable to the adoption itself. They also confirm that their results are 
driven only by changes occurring to treatment firms rather than by changes occurring in control firms. 
Furthermore, they present their results using the propensity-score matching and two-stage least 
squares approaches as alternative econometric techniques to address self-selection biases. Finally, 
they provide cross-sectional evidence that pre-adoption divergence between local GAAP and IFRS 
relates to the changes observed around IFRS adoption. Although none of these approaches can 
entirely rule out self-selection biases on its own, the robustness of the results to various econometric 
checks increases confidence that the documented changes around IFRS are unlikely to be driven by 
omitted correlated variables or unobserved factors that drive firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
Christensen (2012) raises an interesting point in the context of voluntary IFRS adoption. As 
several studies document significant benefits arising from voluntary IFRS adoption, he asks why so 
very few firms voluntarily adopt IFRS. Almost all of the firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS in the 
pre-2000 period were located in the EU, and, as the EC had outlined its strategy to eventually mandate 
IFRS, Christensen (2012) argues that these adoptions were not truly voluntary. He rules out the 
possibility that it was the high cost of voluntary IFRS adoption that discouraged firms. Although the 
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costs of IFRS compliance are likely to be low in weak enforcement countries, there is little evidence 
of voluntary IFRS adoption in such countries. Christensen (2012) concludes that the benefits observed 
from voluntary IFRS adoption must be driven by endogeneity problems or correlated omitted 
variables, suggesting that the controls for these biases in current studies are insufficient. Consistent 
with the concerns of Christensen (2012), Daske et al. (2013) find that the change in disclosure 
incentives for adopting firms drives the documented capital market benefits following voluntary IAS 
adoption. 
9.3.1.2. Mandatory adoption and contamination concerns 
Mandatory IFRS adoption is less subject to the endogeneity criticism, as adoption is 
performed at the country level and is beyond the choice of individual firms. From this perspective, 
mandatory adoption is naturally a preferred event for researchers. However, this setting presents its 
own empirical issues. First, as most countries mandated IFRS between 2005 and 2008, the IFRS 
adoption dates are clustered in time, raising contamination concerns from events that are entirely 
unrelated to IFRS adoption. Second, changes in regulation or enforcement bundled with IFRS 
adoption, such as the EU regulation that requires member states to introduce relevant enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms along with mandatory IFRS adoption, can also confound the direct effects of 
IFRS adoption. 
Christensen et al. (2013) illustrate the contamination concerns in the context of liquidity 
changes documented by prior studies around mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU. They find that 
previously observed improvements in liquidity are actually isolated within five EU countries that 
substantially changed their enforcement of financial reporting around the time IFRS became 
mandatory. They find no evidence of liquidity improvements surrounding the IFRS mandate in 
countries without concurrent changes in enforcement. Moreover, in additional analysis of voluntary 
adopters only, they continue to find significant liquidity improvements around the mandate event in 
countries with concurrent changes in enforcement. Given that these firms had already voluntarily 
adopted IFRS before the mandate, the findings suggest that liquidity improvements occurred absent a 
change in reporting standards. The authors conclude that changes in financial reporting enforcement 
play a crucial role in explaining liquidity changes around IFRS adoption and that IFRS adoption itself 
is unlikely to be a primary source of capital market benefits. 
Although the findings of Christensen et al. (2013) underscore the importance of addressing 
confounding effects, Barth and Israeli (2013) point out that the evidence presented by Christensen et 
al. (2013) is insufficient to completely rule out the effects of IFRS adoption. They specifically note 
the following, referring to Christensen et al. as “CHL.” 
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Importantly, the specifications in CHL Tables 3, 4, and 5 do not distinguish effects of 
changes in enforcement from effects of IFRS adoption. Although the findings in these tables 
allow CHL to rule out an effect of IFRS on liquidity for countries that did not adopt 
concurrent changes in enforcement, the findings do not rule out an effect of IFRS for 
countries that did adopt concurrent changes in enforcement. In other words, the findings in 
CHL Tables 3, 4, and 5 do not tell us the effect of changes in enforcement by themselves and, 
thus, we cannot compare the liquidity of IFRS adopters with changes in enforcement to that 
of non-adopters with changes in enforcement … This comparison is necessary if one is to rule 
out an effect of IFRS.61 
Recent research has aimed to address concerns about the confounding effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption by checking the robustness of results to (i) focusing only on IFRS-adopting countries 
that did not concurrently change their regulation or enforcement practices, (ii) using countries outside 
the EU that adopted IFRS at different periods (such as Canada), and (iii) relating the effects of IFRS 
to cross-sectional differences between IFRS and domestic GAAP. The logic behind the last set of 
analyses is that, if IFRS adoption produces certain benefits, these benefits should be larger in 
countries where IFRS adoption has a larger effect on reporting standards.   
Overall, the debate over whether the observed changes in financial reporting outcomes and 
capital market benefits are due to the IFRS mandate or changes in enforcement may never be settled 
empirically. Results in extant literature may need interpretation assuming that IFRS adoption 
represents the entirety of the changes to the financial reporting system, including the application of 
new accounting standards and the changes in enforcement and litigation. 
In addition to the contamination concern, Ramanna and Sletten (2014) show that mandatory 
IFRS adoption at the country level is not always entirely exogenous. They find that a country’s 
decision to adopt IFRS is an endogenous choice determined by the country’s perceived network 
benefits. That is, a country is likely to adopt IFRS if the other countries with which it has close 
economic ties have already adopted IFRS. 
9.3.1.3. Type of IFRS adoption investigated 
To provide some insights into researchers’ choice of adoption event to study, Figure 1 plots 
the number of articles classified by adoption type and publication year. Before the large-scale 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005, studies had little choice in exploring the adoption event, a point 
emphasized given that almost all studies until 2008 focused on voluntary IFRS adoption. In contrast, 
                                                            
61 Christensen et al. (2013) present a test in Table 6 of their study to separately identify the liquidity effects 
arising exclusively from enforcement changes. They investigate liquidity changes for Japanese firms around 
2004, when Japan changed its enforcement practices without changing its accounting standards. Although their 
analysis provides some evidence that supports the enforcement changes affecting stock liquidity, it is unclear 
whether these results can be generalized to other contexts or countries, as Japan saw large changes in the 
functioning of its banks and capital markets between 2001 and 2007, when regulators introduced new laws 
aimed at decreasing non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets.  
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since 2008, only a handful of published studies focus exclusively on voluntary adoption. Many studies 
after 2008 examine both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adopters. We surmise that the trend toward 
using both as alternative subsamples is at least partly driven by the econometric concerns related to 
each of these adoption types. Based on the presumption that econometric biases are independent for 
mandatory and voluntary adopters, researchers interpret a consistent set of results for both 
subsamples, providing greater confidence in the inferences drawn about the role of IFRS. 
10.4.2. Identification of event date 
A key issue in any event study is the accurate identification of the event date. For studies of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, the event date is relatively straightforward, as it is publicly released by the 
regulators in each country. However, even in this case, care is needed to identify the event date, as 
adoption dates may be staggered. Table 4 lists the country-level adoption dates with notable 
exceptions and carve-outs. When the EU initially mandated IFRS, firms that had their equity 
securities traded in major stock exchanges had to adopt IFRS for fiscal periods beginning on or after 
Jan. 1, 2005. However, companies that had only publicly traded debt securities or reported under US 
GAAP could delay adoption of IFRS to 2007 if the country allowed it. Moreover, some countries, 
such as Austria, Belgium, and Germany, allowed early adoption of IFRS, and other countries, such as 
France, Spain, and the UK, prohibited early adoption. Examining the actual adoption and compliance 
rate after the EU’s official mandate in 2005, Pownall and Wieczynska (2012) find that as much as 
35% of the firms did not adopt IFRS in 2005. Consistent with staggered adoption, they show that this 
figure subsequently dropped to 20% by 2007 and further to 17.8% by 2009.62 
The correct identification of IFRS adoption dates is more challenging for firms that voluntarily 
adopt IFRS. Most studies identify adoption dates through time-series comparisons of accounting 
standards listed in either the WorldScope (data field 07536) or Compustat Global (variable name: 
ASTD) databases. However, Daske et al. (2013, see appendix) point out significant differences in the 
coding of accounting standards across these two databases. When they classify accounting standards 
into three broad categories (IAS-IFRS, US GAAP, or local GAAP) and compare the coding of 
reporting standards across the two databases, they find classification differences for about 5% of the 
firm-year observations covered by both databases. However, when attention is restricted to the 
subsample of firm-year observations coded as IFRS followers by either database, this value jumps to 
nearly 30%. Even more worryingly, when they compare the accounting standards reported in these 
two databases against corresponding data hand-collected from annual reports, they find classification 
differences in about 25% of the observations for WorldScope and about 40% for Compustat Global. 
Although Daske et al. (2013) check the data for annual reports that are electronically downloadable 
                                                            
62 For details about the options available to EU member states in relation to mandatory IFRS adoption, see Table 
1 in a study by Pownall and Wieczynska (2012). 
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from Thomson Reuters, their hand-collected sample covers only about 15% of the firm-years covered 
by WorldScope and Compustat Global. Given the large discrepancies in reporting accounting 
standards observed in this subsample, further research is required to clearly understand these 
classification differences. Until such time, researchers should be better off using the data that Daske et 
al. (2013) make available online and acknowledging this data limitation. 
10.4.3. Selection of event window 
Researchers have chosen a variety of event windows, such as a fixed number of years around 
the event date or the entire sample period for which data are available. For example, DeFond et al. 
(2011) and Hong, Hung, and Lobo (2014) use 2003–2004 as the pre-adoption period and 2006–2007 
as the post-adoption period and exclude the adoption year, 2005. The former examine the effect of 
IFRS adoption on institutional ownership, and the latter examine the effect of IFRS adoption on IPOs.  
Meanwhile, Chen, Young, and Zhuang (2013) use a sample period between 2000 and 2009 to 
examine the cross-border spillover effects of the EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 on the 
investment efficiency of firms. Although their sample includes 10 years in total, they do not determine 
from the data whether the effects of IFRS occur immediately after adoption or take time to be 
observed. 
In general, a lack of consistency in empirical choices across IFRS studies makes it difficult to 
compare their results. Although a short window around the adoption date has the advantage of 
mitigating contamination concerns, such an approach may be affected by transitory changes (e.g., 
from learning) that occur around IFRS adoption and suffer from a lack of power in tests when a 
sufficient number of observations is unavailable in the short window. Studies should ideally focus on 
both shorter and longer event windows to show whether observed effects are persistent or temporary 
and provide useful evidence related to inter-temporal trends. (See Table 4 in a study by Hail et al. 
[2014] as an example.) This approach would also help researchers better link evidence across various 
studies. 
10.4.4. Estimation of the difference-in-differences model 
A typical approach used to measure the effects of IFRS adoption is to estimate a difference-in-
differences model, such as the following: 
 DV = β1 IFRS + β2 Post + β3 Post×IFRS+ Controls + ε, (1) 
where DV is the outcome variable of interest, IFRS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for 
IFRS-adopting firms (treatment firms) and 0 for control firms, and Post is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 for fiscal periods after the IFRS adoption date. β3, which captures the difference-
in-differences effect, is the main coefficient of interest. In the absence of control variables in Equation 
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(1), β3 can be interpreted as the change in DV for treatment firms relative to the change in DV for the 
control group. We discuss a few of the issues that frequently arise when estimating the preceding 
equation as follows. 
10.4.4.1. Sample of control or non-treated firms 
Studies of mandatory IFRS adoption often choose one of two sets of firms as the control (or 
non-treated) group: (i) firms reporting under local GAAP (including US GAAP) from non-IFRS-
mandating countries or (ii) voluntary adopters from countries that subsequently mandated IFRS. In 
contrast, studies of voluntary adoption use firms from the same country as the treatment sample and 
firms that do not report under IFRS as the control group. 
Almost all IFRS studies present a major concern about the comparability of firms in the treated 
and non-treated groups. Control and treatment groups should ideally be formed by randomly 
allocating firms to the two groups, so that the two groups do not differ in any dimension other than the 
treatment effect on average.  However, this is unlikely to be the case in almost all studies. A key 
assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that the average change in outcome is the same 
for both the non-treated firms and counterfactually for treated firms if they have not received the 
treatment. As such, whether observable or unobservable, the differences in characteristics across 
treatment and control groups in the pre-IFRS-adoption period always present a concern for the 
inferences drawn from Equation (1). 
In fact, the preceding concerns simply increase in severity as more and more countries mandate 
IFRS, leaving fewer countries and fewer firms for inclusion in the control group. As Table 4 indicates, 
only four major economies (namely, the US, Japan, China, and India) remained non-IFRS adopters at 
the end of 2013. However, IFRS have affected the local reporting of even these countries. For 
example, the Chinese Accounting Standards that have been mandatory since Jan. 1, 2007, have 
substantially converged with IFRS. US GAAP have been influenced through the Norwalk Agreement 
signed in September 2002 to achieve convergence between US GAAP and IFRS. Both India and 
Japan currently allow voluntary IFRS adoption. A related concern about using firms from non-IFRS-
adopting countries as control firms is the potential convergence of local GAAP with IFRS in 
anticipation of mandatory adoption. For instance, some of the countries included in control groups in 
studies of mandatory IFRS adoption subsequently adopted IFRS, e.g.,  Canada adopted IFRS in 2011 
but also allowed early adoption of IFRS. A Canadian firm might have started to prepare for this 
transition before actual adoption, contaminating its role as a control. 
Studies attempt to account for observable differences across treated and non-treated firms by 
including additional factors linearly into Equation (1). However, the success of this approach depends 
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on whether the control variables are correctly measured and specified in the model. Another approach 
that is adopted to deal with observable differences is the matched-firm approach, in which each 
treatment firm is matched to a control firm (or a set of control firms) along certain dimensions such as 
industry, size, or propensity score. The matched firm is particularly relevant if one believes that the 
true relationship between control and outcome variables is non-linear. After proper control or 
matching, one should observe no differences between the treatment and control groups in the pre-
IFRS-adoption period, i.e., an insignificant β1. However, as DeFond, Erkens, and Zhang (2015) point 
out, any conclusions drawn from propensity-score matching analysis may be very sensitive to the 
design choice, including the number of control firms matched to each treatment firm, the non-linear 
terms included in the propensity score construction, and whether the matching is done with or without 
replacement. They suggest an alternative matching procedure, i.e., coarsened exact matching, which 
matches control and treatment firms based on ranges rather than the exact covariate values. Even if 
the preceding approaches satisfactorily control for observable differences across treated and non-
treated groups, concerns remain in relation to unobserved differences across treated and non-treated 
firms.  
Considering all of the advantages and shortcomings of each control group, a relatively 
parsimonious approach would involve presenting the results using three different samples of firms for 
the control group, including (i) all non-adopting firms from non-IFRS-adopting countries, (ii) 
propensity-score-matched firms from non-IFRS-adopting countries, and (iii) voluntary adopters 
preferably from IFRS-adopting countries. DeFond et al. (2015) provide an example of such an 
approach and nicely summarize the pros and cons of each control group as follows. 
Each of the three benchmarks has its advantages and limitations. Voluntary adopters 
share economic and regulatory commonality with mandatory adopters, but they are often 
regarded as a non-random group subject to potential self-selection bias. Non-IFRS adopters or 
PSM non-IFRS adopters, on the other hand, control for contemporaneous effects that are 
unrelated to the introduction of IFRS, but are potentially influenced by unspecified cross-
country differences. In addition, while PSM non-IFRS adopters reduce differences between 
treatment and control firms, the theoretical underpinning of our PSM model is limited 
because we should be using country-level factors to model the choice of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in order to derive our propensity scores. However, because we need to match at the 
firm level, we necessarily use firm-level determinants. 
Because of the limitations of the benchmark groups, we draw our conclusions based 
on the results of all three benchmarks in our primary analysis. For parsimony, we present our 
subsequent partitioning and sensitivity analysis using just one of our benchmarks, the non-
IFRS adopters. Besides having the largest sample size, this benchmark avoids the self-
selection bias with the voluntary adopters, and the limited theoretical underpinning with the 
PSM non-IFRS adopters. 
Yet another concern related to difference-in-difference models is that estimated outcomes can 
reflect the effects of either IFRS adoption or contaminated events for the control sample. Unlike the 
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ideal setting, in which treatment firms differ from control firms only in terms of the treatment 
received, IFRS settings do not rule out the possibility that control firms are affected by contamination 
events that influence the outcome variables. In such a case, the estimated difference-in-differences 
coefficient may appear statistically significant even though the IFRS adoption itself has no significant 
effect on the treatment firms. Thus, in the context of Equation (1), a significant value of β3 may be 
interpreted to indicate a significant IFRS adoption effect for treated firms or alternatively that effects 
from a contamination event on the control firms are irrelevant for the treated firms. A few studies 
(e.g., Kim and Shi 2012; Ball et al. 2015) attempt to mitigate this concern by documenting that 
inferences are insensitive to dropping control firms from analyses.63 
Furthermore, IFRS adoption may cause sample attrition or enlargement. Such changes cause 
the firms included in the sample in the pre-IFRS period to differ from those included in the post-IFRS 
period. If IFRS adoption relates to the sample changes in the sense that IFRS adoption affects the 
probability of sample attrition/enlargement, then the coefficient estimates from the difference-in-
differences model are biased. For example, in the context of external financing, IFRS adoption may 
improve financial transparency and thereby increase investors’ willingness to invest in publicly traded 
securities. This would incentivize more firms to raise external financing in the post-IFRS period, 
potentially biasing the difference-in-differences estimates obtained from a sample of firms issuing 
debt or equity around IFRS adoption. Similar concerns arise when IFRS adoption causes sample 
attrition by affecting the probability of liquidation or acquisition. One approach that studies use to test 
the sensitivity of results to this sample bias is to focus on a constant sample of firms, i.e., include only 
firms for which outcome variables are available in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods. However, 
requiring firms to be present in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods may introduce its own data 
snooping biases, such as survivorship bias. 
10.4.4.2. Inclusion of fixed effects 
To control for firm-specific determinants of the outcome variable of interest, some studies 
include firm fixed effects in Equation (1). These fixed effects essentially ensure that the estimated 
difference-in-differences coefficient does not reflect differences in time-invariant characteristics 
across control and treatment firms. Studies alternatively include country fixed effects to control for 
unobservable country characteristics, industry fixed effects to control for unobservable industry 
characteristics, or both. In addition, IFRS studies also typically include period fixed effects (e.g., year 
or quarter) to control for unobservable time effects.  
                                                            
63 Although insignificant values for β1 and β2 in Equation (1) would provide some comfort that IFRS-adopting 
and control firms are comparable and that IFRS adoption does not affect control samples, the values for these 
coefficients are not often reported separately, as they are subsumed by the inclusion of fixed effects in the 
difference-in-differences model. 
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Figure 2 plots the percentage of the 64 publications using different dimensions of fixed effects 
in their main analysis. Before 2008, when most studies focused on voluntary IFRS adoption, fixed 
effects were rarely used in main analyses. Only 14% of the studies published before 2008 use fixed 
effects models. In contrast, all of the studies published in 2015 include at least one dimension of fixed 
effects. In all of the periods, firm fixed effects appear to be the least frequently used relative to either 
country or industry fixed effects. Only four of the sixty-four studies, including those by Daske et al. 
(2008); Horton, Serafeim, and Serafeim (2013); Chen, Young, and Zhuang (2013); and Lang and 
Stice-Lawrence (2015), include firm fixed effects in their main regression models. This is perhaps due 
to the large loss in degree of freedom that results when firm fixed effects are included, which lowers 
the power of tests. 
10.4.4.3. Clustering standard errors 
Figure 3 plots the percentage of the 64 publications, using different choices for standard error 
clustering. No IFRS study conducted before 2008 used clustered standard errors in their main 
analysis. However, this changed with the publication of a study by Petersen (2009), who shows that 
clustering of standard errors often results in better estimates of standard errors than a variety of 
alternative approaches, such as the Fama-MacBeth and Newey-West approaches. In theory, the level 
at which observations are clustered for the computation of standard errors is a choice that should 
depend on the covariance-variance matrix of the residuals. However, as the covariance-variance 
matrix is unobservable, researchers have to make relatively ad-hoc choices at the clustering level.   
As the majority of these studies conduct cross-country analyses, they suggest that standard 
errors should ideally be clustered at the country level to address within-country correlations in 
residuals. This preference to cluster at the country level is clearly noticeable in Figure 3, which shows 
a significant increase in the number of publications using country-level clustering in recent years. 
However, country-level clustering substantially limits the degrees of freedom to estimate standard 
errors. Moreover, Petersen (2009) shows that the estimates of clustered standard errors may be biased 
if the number of clusters is lower than 40. Thus the choice of clustering at the country level may yield 
biased standard errors unless there are enough countries in the sample.  
Researchers considering small samples may consider clustering using bootstrapped standard 
errors (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010). Given the lack of 
clear theoretical guidance at the clustering level and the advantages and disadvantages to clustering at 
different levels, it seems prudent to at least discuss the sensitivity of inferences to various clustering 
choices. 
10.4.4.4. Measurement of control variables 
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As discussed earlier, IFRS studies often include control variables in Equation (1) to account for 
heterogeneity in characteristics across treated and non-treated firms. These variables are often based 
on reported financial statements (such as total assets, book value of equity, book leverage, earnings), 
which themselves are altered by IFRS adoption. This may alter the quality of control variables 
between the pre- and post-IFRS periods and thereby influence the conclusions drawn from Equation 
(1). Although few studies explicitly discuss this concern, it seems reasonable to allow the coefficients 
of the accounting-based control variables in Equation (1) to vary between the pre- and post-adoption 
periods and to test the sensitivity of results to including controls from only the pre-IFRS periods. The 
latter approach would be problematic if the sample characteristics were to significantly change 
between before and after adoption. In such cases, a post-IFRS sample should ideally be restricted to 
the period immediately following IFRS adoption to mitigate the problem. 
10.5. Cross-sectional variation in the effects of IFRS 
To corroborate an identification strategy and attribute observed changes in outcomes to IFRS 
adoption, studies conduct cross-sectional tests that relate observed changes in outcomes to differences 
in accounting standards between IFRS and local GAAP. These tests are predicated on the notion that 
if observed changes in the dependent variable are caused by IFRS adoption, then the changes should 
be related to the degree to which IFRS adoption alters the country’s accounting standards. These tests 
typically use the Bae et al. (2008) index to measure the difference between local GAAP and IFRS.  
However, the Bae et al. (2008) index is a noisy measure of differences in accounting standards. 
First, it is based on Nobes’s (2001) GAAP survey, which compares local GAAP and IAS as of 2001.  
However, since 2001, the local GAAP in a variety of countries and IAS/IFRS have evolved, including 
in the years before the EU’s large-scale adoption of IFRS in 2005. For example, after the 2002 EU 
vote to adopt IFRS, several EU countries started modifying their domestic standards to both ease the 
transition to IFRS and make financial statements more comparable across listed firms mandated to 
report under IFRS and large unlisted firms using domestic GAAP. Therefore this measure may be a 
noisy measure of differences in accounting standards after 2001. Second, the GAAP survey ignores 
the differences that arise from alternative accounting choices available under one set of standards but 
not the other. If IAS allows multiple accounting choices but domestic rules allow only one of those 
alternatives or provide more detailed or restrictive standards, then these differences are not captured in 
the GAAP survey and consequently not captured in the Bae et al. (2008) index. Finally, the index is 
calculated as a simple aggregation of the differences in 21 accounting rules that deal with the 
measurement, recognition, and disclosure of financial numbers. However, not all of these accounting 
rules are necessarily relevant in every context examined by IFRS studies. Thus studies that are 
primarily focused on accounting recognition, for instance, may find disclosure differences reflected in 
the index to add noise. 
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Some studies examine an alternative cross-sectional prediction for the effects of IFRS: the 
effects should be stronger in countries with greater enforcement of IFRS rules. This logic follows 
from the work of Ball et al. (2003) and holds that accounting standards per se play a limited role in 
affecting firms’ financial reporting practices unless combined with proper enforcement. Studies 
generally confirm this relationship using the rule-of-law or security regulation indices (e.g., Byard et 
al. 2011; Daske et al. 2008) to measure the strength of enforcement. However, Ball et al. (2015), who 
study changes in debt covenants around IFRS adoption, are an exception and do not find evidence to 
support the observation that enforcement is related to the effects of IFRS. They interpret their finding 
as evidence that the limitations of IFRS for debt contracting, such as those resulting from the fair 
valuing of liabilities and the inclusion of transitory shocks in earnings, are not resolved by stronger 
enforcement. 
Most of the IFRS studies that evaluate the cross-sectional differences caused by enforcement 
tend to interact or partition their samples on the legal enforcement variable based on a study by La 
Porta et al. (1999) (e.g., Leuz 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Li 2010). This enforcement measure 
captures the efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption. These measures notably 
appear to neglect any dimension of financial reporting enforcement or auditing characteristics. 
Therefore it is unclear whether these enforcement variables are capturing enforcement and the 
incentives related to financial reporting outcomes. Another common measure of enforcement is the 
rule-of-law index compiled by Kaufman et al. (2007). Their measure is based on the views of private 
and public sector experts, citizens, and firms; the extent to which they have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society; and the likelihood of crime and violence. Although a dimension of this 
measure covers contract enforcement and property rights, it does not directly measure financial 
reporting regulatory strength or capital market protections. It is unclear whether this construct reflects 
the enforcement that many studies purport to capture. However, it has been shown to yield the 
strongest differential in IFRS benefits, adopted in studies such as those by Daske et al. (2008), 
DeFond et al. (2011), and Li (2010). 
Several studies use output measures of enforcement/implementation based on earnings quality 
scores before and after IFRS adoption. For instance, DeFond et al. (2011) measure credibility of 
implementation as an earnings quality score developed by Leuz et al. (2003), using outcomes to 
measure credibility that implicitly account for audit quality (given these are reported numbers). De 
George (2015) also calculates country-level changes in reporting quality scores as the post-IFRS-
adoption earnings quality less the pre-adoption period score as a measure of the strength of 
implementation.  
Kim et al. (2012) calculate country-level measures of regulatory reforms using data from the 
Annual Executive Opinion Survey conducted by the Institute for Management Development. 
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Although its primary purpose is to provide quantifiable measures of management practices, labor 
relations, and corruption, the survey explicitly asks respondents to evaluate the extent to which 
auditing and accounting practices are implemented in their firms adequately and the extent to which 
corporate boards supervise company management effectively. The authors measure changes in 
regulatory levels using the changes in these scores from the pre- to post-IFRS periods.   
Brown, Preiato, and Tarca (2014) argue that the current enforcement index used by the IFRS 
literature is deficient for capturing compliance with accounting standards. They instead propose an 
index measuring the quality of auditors’ working environment and the degree of accounting 
enforcement by independent enforcement bodies. They use data from the International Federation of 
Accounts, World Bank, and national securities regulators and calculate three new indices for 51 
countries for 2002, 2005, and 2008. Testing these new enforcement indices in the context of analyst 
forecasts, the authors find that they have incremental power over the rule-of-law index in explaining 
analyst forecast errors and dispersion. They conclude that their enforcement indices are better at 
capturing accounting enforcement than the traditionally used legal enforcement indices.   
Overall, although there are a variety of approaches are used to reflect the impact of IFRS 
adoption and changes in enforcement, no one measure dominates. The extent to which the broad rule-
of-law proxies considered by La Porta et al. (1999) and Kaufman et al. (2007) are relevant to 
understanding the enforcement of financial reports remains unclear. The evidence provided by Brown 
et al. (2014) suggests that these proxies are unlikely to sufficiently capture reporting enforcement. 
There are also concerns surrounding the current proxies for the accounting effects of IFRS adoption. 
Attempts to identify accounting-specific enforcement proxies and measures of the effects of IFRS on 
financial reports should provide a fruitful direction for future studies. 
 
11. Conclusion 
Since the large-scale mandatory adoption of IFRS over 10 years ago, a number of research 
studies have evaluated the effects of IFRS adoption. The early studies understandably focus on the 
direct effects of IFRS on reporting quality. In contrast to the findings reported based on voluntary 
IFRS adopters, studies of mandatory adopters provide, at best, mixed evidence that adoption improves 
the quality of accounting reports. However, this conclusion changes when one focuses on capital-
market-based proxies of reporting quality or the capital market outcomes of IFRS adoption, such as 
stock liquidity, trading volume, or price reactions to earnings announcements. There is strong 
evidence that capital market outcomes and proxies for reporting quality improve after IFRS adoption, 
at least for some countries. However, researchers do not agree on whether the observed outcomes are 
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attributable to IFRS adoption itself or to other institutional changes that occur concurrently with IFRS 
adoption.   
Although the evidence based on direct measures is mixed as to whether IFRS adoption 
increases comparability, studies based on capital market effects of comparability generally show that 
adoption improves comparability across countries. There is also convincing evidence that IFRS have 
triggered greater interest from foreign investors and foreign analysts, although whether such increased 
interest is of any benefit to domestic firms is unclear. Given that an oft-repeated objective of IFRS 
adoption by regulators has been the achievement of financial reporting comparability, researchers 
have begun paying more attention to better understanding and measuring comparability. That said, 
simply harmonizing accounting standards does not appear to achieve full comparability in financial 
reporting. 
Research into the effects of IFRS adoption on contracting, stewardship, decision-making, and 
auditing is still in its infancy. Very few studies conducted in these areas have been published, and 
even when one considers the evidence in working papers, there is no clear understanding of how IFRS 
matter to contracting or stewardship or how audit verification interacts with the use of IFRS numbers 
in contracts. For instance, although almost all of the debt contracting studies document a decline in 
accounting-based covenants following IFRS adoption, they offer contradictory interpretations. Some 
studies argue that the decline is caused by improved transparency under IFRS, whereas others suggest 
that it is a result of IFRS numbers being irrelevant for use in contracts. More research is required to 
determine the causal mechanisms underlying the link between IFRS numbers and their use for 
stewardship and contracting. Nevertheless, the observed differences in IFRS outcomes for stock and 
debt markets highlight the multidimensional effect of IFRS adoption on firms. An accounting 
standard that is developed to enhance the valuation role of accounting may not be optimal for 
stewardship or debt contracting purposes. A fruitful avenue for future research is to evaluate whether 
and how each attribute of IFRS affects valuation, stewardship, and contracting roles differently. 
One major obstacle to a proper cross-study comparison of IFRS results is the varied empirical 
choices made by researchers. Although some of these differences are driven by the nature of the 
questions examined, IFRS studies could do more to provide results that are based on a more consistent 
set of empirical methods. Discussions and online appendices related to the sensitivity of results to 
alternative empirical choices would be a step forward. Many IFRS studies are also hindered by a lack 
of reliable international data. Although some of these problems are institutional and cultural and 
require changes in the laws of many countries, we expect that some of these concerns will decrease 
over time as better computing techniques for data collection become available. 
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Finally, although IFRS is now required for listed firms in many countries, several countries 
permit or even require private companies also to adopt them. The need of private firms for financial 
reports differs vastly from that of listed firms, raising questions about whether requiring private firms 
to report under a relatively complex set of accounting standards passes the cost-benefit test. Overall, 
although the literature is making progress, research conducted across a variety of dimensions is 
required before researchers can claim to have a decent understanding of the mechanisms based on 
which IFRS affect the various facets of a business.  
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Table 1: Number of publications by year 
This table lists the number of articles on IFRS-adoption-related topics published in five accounting journals, 
Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR), Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), Journal of 
Accounting Research (JAR), Review of Accounting Studies (RAST), and The Accounting Review (TAR), between 
1999 and 2015. The list only includes studies that use an empirical archive research methodology and excludes 
studies on tax-related topics. Journals are listed in alphabetical order. 
      
Publication  
year 
CAR JAE JAR RAST TAR Total 
1999 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2000 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2001 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2002 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2003 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 1 1 0 2 
2008 1 0 2 0 1 4 
2009 0 0 1 0 1 2 
2010 0 0 0 1 2 3 
2011 0 1 3 1 0 5 
2012 1 3 1 1 3 9 
2013 5 1 1 1 5 13 
2014 0 0 2 1 5 8 
2015 1 1 2 3 6 13 
Total 8 7 16 9 24 64 
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Table 2: Number of publications by co-author affiliation country 
This table lists the number of articles included in Table 1 by the geographic location of the co-author affiliation. 
We count the total number of articles with at least one co-author affiliation located in a particular country at the 
time of publication.  
Co-author 
affiliation country 
CAR JAE JAR RAST TAR Total 
Australia 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Austria 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Canada 0 0 3 0 3 6 
China 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Germany 0 0 2 2 1 5 
Greece 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Hong Kong 1 0 4 2 6 13 
Israel 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 2 2 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Portugal 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Taiwan 1 0 0 0 0 1 
United Kingdom 2 0 4 3 3 12 
United States 6 7 13 4 16 46 
 
      
 
Table 3: Most commonly used data sources 
This table lists the most common data sources used by the 64 studies included in Table 1. Each study may use 
multiple data sources. The Thomson Ownership databases include the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum 
database, Thomson Financial Securities Mutual Fund database, and Thomson Financial Ownership database.   
    
Data sources 
No. of 
publications 
Datastream/Worldscope 47 
IBES 29 
Hand-collected 20 
Compustat Global 12 
Thomson Ownership databases 9 
Bloomberg 4 
SDC 4 
DealScan 4 
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TABLE 4 - IFRS adoption dates by country between 2001 and 2013 
This table presents the adoption dates by country for a broad sample of countries from 2001 through 2013. We report the date at which local regulators required the use of 
IFRS and the fiscal period end date at which the first annual reports were prepared in accordance with the IFRS mandate (based on the majority of firms' year-ends in a given 
country). We obtain information about IFRS adoption dates from multiple sources: PWC IFRS adoption reports (April 2013); the IASPlus website maintained by Deloitte; the 
IASB website; Adoptifrs.org, maintained by academics; and the websites of multiple local exchanges around the globe. Note that in the instances where the majority of firms 
within a country follow a non-December year-end (e.g., Australia), we try to take that into account in the dates used in the “First IFRS annual report dates” column.   
Country Current GAAP 
IFRS mandated 
for fiscal 
periods 
beginning: 
First IFRS 
annual report 
dates (FPE) Notes on country-level adoption (where relevant). 
IFRS adopting countries 
 
Albania IFRS (a) 01-Jan-08 31-Dec-08 
Requirement that all listed, large unlisted, and financial institutions prepare 
their legal entity and consolidated reports under IFRS.  
 
Argentina IFRS (a) 01-Jan-12 31-Dec-12 Requirement that all entities whose securities are listed and are regulated by the 
CNV adopt IFRS as adopted by IASB. Voluntary adoption allowable from Jan. 
1, 2011. Exception: Banks and Insurance Companies. On Feb. 12, 2014, the 
BCRA issued Communication A5541 announcing a plan to converge the BCRA 
accounting standards for banks with IFRS. The converged standards will 
become mandatory on Jan. 1, 2018. 
 
Australia IFRS 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Requirement that all listed and unlisted (private) firms adopt IFRS.  Given IFRS 
need to be incorporated into Australian law they are issued as “Australian 
Accounting Standards” although entities effectively adopt IFRS word-for-word. 
Note that virtually no voluntary adoption was allowable in Australia before the 
mandate. Researchers should also be aware that as the majority of Australian 
companies report June 30 year-ends (over 85% of listed firms). The first date at 
which the majority of annual IFRS compliant financial statements were issued 
is the fiscal period ending Jun. 30, 2006   
 
Austria IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 In addition to the requirements of the EU IFRS mandate (i.e., mandatory 
adoption for consolidated accounts of entities listed on EU regulated markets), 
Austria allowed voluntary IFRS adoption for firms not listed on regulated 
exchanges. In Austria, the two regulated exchanges are Wiener Boerse AG 
Amtlicher Handel and the Wiener Boerse AG Geregelter Freiverkehr 
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Bahamas IFRS (a) 01-Jan-06 31-Dec-06  
Belgium IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 In addition to the requirements of the EU IFRS mandate, Belgium required 
IFRS reporting for all listed and unlisted banks from Jan. 1, 2006, and all listed 
and unlisted insurance companies from Jan. 1, 2012. In addition, from Jan. 1, 
2007, IFRS was required for separate company financial statements of REITs.   
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Local IFRS (b) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 IFRS adopted locally, i.e. translated into local language by the national standard 
setting body. Note that a legal requirement was adopted in June 2005 that 
required all public and private firms to adopt IFRS.      
 
Brazil IFRS (b) and CPC 01-Jan-10 31-Dec-10 The IFRS mandate required listed firms to prepare financial statements under 
both IFRS and local GAAP (CPC). Note that unconsolidated (separate) 
financial statements still report under Brazilian GAAP (BR GAAP). However, 
BR GAAP have been fully converged with IFRS since 2010. Therefore both 
listed and private firms follow IFRS given the local GAAP convergence. 
Exception:  carve-out of revaluation requirements from IAS 16, as these are not 
permitted under Brazilian corporate law. 
Bulgaria IFRS (c) 01-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 Exception: Banks had already adopted IFRS in 1997. 
Canada IFRS  (and U.S. 
GAAP) 
01-Jan-11 31-Dec-11 Exceptions: Investment companies, life insurance companies, and entities 
subject to rate regulation do not follow IFRS. U.S. GAAP is still acceptable for 
US issuers.  
 
Chile IFRS (and SBIF) 01-Jan-09 31-Dec-09 Staggered IFRS adoption: Major listed open corporations (i.e., > 500 
shareholders) were required to prepare IFRS statements for financial periods 
beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2009, with smaller listed open corporations (i.e., 
<500 shareholders) to adopt IFRS from Jan. 1, 2010. All other entities were 
then permitted, but not required, to prepare IFRS financial statements from Jan. 
1, 2011.  
 
Costa Rica IFRS (a) 01-Jan-01 31-Dec-01 Adopted for both listed and unlisted firms. Exception: Banks, financial 
institutions, and government bodies do not follow IFRS. 
 
Cyprus IFRS (c) 01-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 Before 2003, Cyprus had adopted IAS (international standards that pre-date 
current IFRS requirements) from 1981 onward. 
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Czech Republic IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 In addition to the requirements of the EU IFRS mandate, firms listed on 
nonregulated (non-EU) markets and those with only public debt adopted IFRS 
from 2007 (i.e., delayed adoption).  
Denmark IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Ecuador IFRS (a) 01-Jan-10 31-Dec-10 Exception: Financial institutions not subject to IFRS 
El Salvador IFRS (a) 01-Jan-11 31-Dec-11 Exception: Banks, insurance, and other regulated financial institutions are not 
subject to IFRS. However, regulators require that these entities provide a 
summary of the differences between regulatory GAAP and IFRS. Note that 
IFRS is required for separate company financial statements of listed firms and 
that unlisted firms are required to apply IFRS to SMEs. 
Estonia IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Finland IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Exception: Firms listed on OMX First North (nonregulated non-EU market) 
not subject to IFRS. 
 
France IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 IFRS is also permitted for consolidated statements of private firms. 
Georgia IFRS (c) 01-Jan-00 31-Dec-00 IFRS was adopted locally, i.e., translated into the local language by the national 
standard setting body.  
Germany IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Following EU IFRS requirements, IFRS is required only for consolidated 
accounts of firms with debt or equity listed in regulated markets. German 
GAAP is permitted for separate financial statements. At the time of writing, 
Germany as no current plans to adopt IFRS for SMEs. Voluntary adoption was 
allowed from 1998 (IAS) 
Ghana IFRS (a) 01-Jan-07 31-Dec-07  
Greece IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Extended EU adoption requirement to stand-alone accounts too, i.e., IFRS 
required for separate unconsolidated financial statements.  
Greenland IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Hong Kong HKFRS (b) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Full convergence between local standards (HKFRS) and IFRS. However some 
additional disclosures were added. The transitional processes also differed 
relative to other countries. 
  
Hungary IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 IFRS also permitted (voluntary) for consolidated statements of unlisted/private 
companies. 
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Iceland IFRS (c) 01-Jan-07 31-Dec-07 Permitted (voluntary) from 2005, with mandatory adoption occurring from 2007 
onward.   
 
Ireland IFRS (c)  01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Irish GAAP and U.S. GAAP allowed for certain entities (i.e., U.S. issuers and 
parent entities not listed on EU-regulated markets) 
 
Israel IFRS (a) 01-Jan-08 31-Dec-08 Note that IFRS had been permitted (voluntary) since Jan. 1, 2006.  Exception: 
Banks report under US GAAP.  
Italy IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Jamaica IFRS (a) 01-Jul-02 30-Jun-03 IFRS requirement extends beyond listed firms to nonlisted firms. 
Latvia IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Lithuania IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Luxembourg IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Macedonia Macedonian IFRS (b) 01-Jan-10 31-Dec-10 Exceptions: IFRS 9 to IFRS 13 are not included in local harmonized GAAP, 
and there is no current timetable on their inclusion. 
 
Malaysia MFRS (b) 01-Jan-12 31-Dec-12 For the most part, Malaysian FRS are identical to IFRS. Exception: 
“Transitioning Entities” were not required to adopt until 2014. These are, in 
general, entities covered by IAS 41 (agriculture) and real-estate entities. 
Malta IFRS (c) 01-May-05 30-Apr-06  
Mexico IFRS (a) 01-Jan-12 31-Dec-12 Voluntary adoption allowed from Jan. 1, 2008, onward. 
Montenegro IFRS (a) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Exceptions: Banks follow other specific regulations prescribed by the Central 
Bank of Montenegro that differ from IFRS (e.g. specific rules about loan loss 
provisions). 
Netherlands IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
New Zealand NZ-IFRS (b) 01-Jan-07 31-Dec-07 Fully converged to IFRS with some additional disclosure requirements. 
Exception: Tier 2 firms, i.e., those with no public accountability apply a 
reduced disclosure version of NZ-IFRS. Note that voluntary adoption was 
allowed from Jan. 1, 2005.    
 
Norway IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 In addition to the EU IFRS mandate requiring adoption from 2005, Norway 
required IFRS adoption for standalone entities (i.e., unconsolidated reports) 
from 2011 onward.   
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Pakistan IFRS (a) 01-Jan-09 31-Dec-09 All IFRS are required to be approved by the ICAP and Pakistani SEC (SECP). 
Thus it is common for delays to arise in adopting new standards. The SECP and 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) have agreed, in 
principle, to take urgent necessary steps so as to ensure full compliance with 
IFRS, as far as the financial statements of the listed companies (other than 
banks and financial institutions) are concerned for the year ending Dec. 31, 
2009.   
 
Philippines PFRS (a) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 PFRS are based on IFRS as issued by the IASB. However, some notable 
differences exist.   
Poland IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Portugal IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Qatar IFRS (a) 01-Jan-02 31-Dec-02 IAS adopted since 1995. IFRS mandate required for consolidated and 
standalone/separate financial statements. Note that all listed companies are 
usually registered as limited liability companies in Qatar (joint stock company), 
and as such these companies are required to follow Commercial Law No. 5 of 
2002. As such, financial statements should be prepared in accordance with 
IFRS. Exception: Some financial institutions (mainly Islamic financial 
institutions) listed on the Qatar Exchange are allowed to file financial 
statements prepared under Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) issued by the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI). Otherwise, they should follow IFRS where AAOIFI guidance is not 
available. 
Romania IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Russian Federation IFRS (a) 01-Jan-12 31-Dec-12 Formally adopted IFRS beginning in 2012 for all publicly traded entities. Note 
that banks delayed adoption and were required to report under IFRS from 2007. 
Serbia Serbian IFRS (b) 01-Jan-04 31-Dec-04 Almost fully converged with only some minor differences that have yet to be 
updated. 
Singapore IFRS and Sing-FRS 
(b)
 01-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 Singapore closely models its Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) according to 
IFRS. Before a standard is enacted, consultations with the IASB are made to 
ensure consistency of core principles. IFRS as issued by the IASB is permitted 
if (i) the company is also listed in another stock exchange outside of Singapore 
and that exchange requires IFRS financial statements or (ii) an exemption is 
granted by the authority. Other listed companies are required to apply Singapore 
FRS (substantially converged).  
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Slovak Republic IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Slovenia IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
South Africa IFRS (a) 01-Jan-03 31-Dec-03 Since 2003, standard setters have issued IFRS as local SA GAAP without 
amendment, required by all firms (listed and unlisted). From Jan. 1, 2005, 
however, the Johannesburg stock exchange required all firms to use IFRS 
directly, as opposed to issued local SA GAAP. 
 
South Korea IFRS (a) 01-Jan-11 31-Dec-11 Voluntary adoption allowed since 2008.  Exception: Financial institutions. 
Spain IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
Sweden IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Exception: Local GAAP allowed for public firms in unregulated (non-EU) 
markets. 
 
Switzerland IFRS (c) or US GAAP 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Firms listed on “Main Standard” (i.e., attracting international investment) must 
use IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Firms listed on “Domestic Standard” (i.e., seeking 
capital only from Swiss domestic) use IFRS, U.S. GAAP, or Swiss GAAP. As 
of 2013, 138 of 266 firms use IFRS; 27 of 266 firms use U.S. GAAP; and 47 of 
266 firms use Swiss GAAP. 
 
Taiwan T-IFRS (b) 01-Jan-13 31-Dec-13 Firms currently follow T-IFRS, which is the 2010 version of IFRS as issued by 
the IASB. 
Turkey IFRS (c) 01-Jan-08 31-Dec-08 Note that a number of firms (voluntarily) followed the EU directive and issued 
IFRS statements from Jan. 1, 2005 
UK IFRS (c) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05 Stocks listed on the AIM exchange delayed adoption until 2007. 
Ukraine IFRS (a) and local 
GAAP 
01-Jan-12 31-Dec-12 Public firms and all banks and insurance companies required to adopt IFRS 
from Jan. 1, 2012.   
United Arab Emirates IFRS (a) 01-Jan-03 31-Dec-03  
Uruguay IFRS (a) 01-Jan-09 31-Dec-09 Exception: Banks and other financial institutions follow local GAAP (issued by 
CBU). 
Venezuela IFRS (a) 01-Jan-05 31-Dec-05  
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Non-adopting countries: 
Belarus Belarusian GAAP N/A Not mandatory Exception: Banks and selected state-owned companies are required to prepare 
IFRS financial statements in addition to their local Belarusian GAAP statements 
Bolivia Bolivian GAAP N/A Not mandatory  
China Chinese Accounting 
Standards 
N/A Not mandatory Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) that have been mandatory since Jan. 1, 
2007, have substantively converged with IFRS to the degree that IFRS 
principles form the base of CAS. However, enough differences exist (e.g., 
impairment of assets, related party disclosure provisions, and certain fair value 
provisions) that most studies do not see China as an IFRS adopter.   
Colombia Colombian GAAP N/A Not mandatory Mandatory adoption to occur from Jan. 1, 2015. 
Egypt Egyptian GAAP N/A Not mandatory Partial convergence occurred in 2007 with no timeline for further amendments. 
India Indian GAAP N/A Not mandatory Listed companies have the option of using IFRS or Indian GAAP, although in 
practice most Indian companies choose Indian GAAP. Plans are underway to 
converge to IFRS, called “Ind IAS,” but potentially with many carve-outs.  
Indonesia Indonesian GAAP N/A Not mandatory IFRS is neither required nor permitted. However, as of Jan. 1, 2012, the 
Indonesian GAAP is actually based on IFRS principles. 
Japan Japanese GAAP N/A Not mandatory Voluntary adoption for qualifying entities allowed for fiscal periods ending 
Mar. 31, 2010.   
Morocco IFRS N/A Not mandatory IFRS only required for banks and permitted (voluntarily) for all other entities 
Paraguay Paraguay GAAP N/A Not mandatory  
Saudi Arabia SOCPA local GAAP N/A Not mandatory Exception: Only banks are required to report under IFRS. 
Thailand Thai GAAP N/A Not mandatory Thai GAAP has slowly been converging to IFRS in two stages (2011 and 2015).  
Currently, TFRS is based on IFRS as issued at Jan. 1, 2009. 
United States US GAAP N/A Not mandatory  
Vietnam Viet GAAP N/A Not mandatory Vietnamese GAAP is based on now out-of-date IAS (not current IFRS).  
Exception: Only state-owned banks are required to use IFRS. 
     
    
 
(a) IFRS as issued by the IASB, translated into the local language where applicable. 
 
 
(b) Local equivalents to IFRS—effectively equates to adherence to IFRS as issued by the IASB, with additional disclosures or specific carve-outs. 
(c) IFRS as adopted by the E.U.  
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Figure 1: Number of publications by adoption type 
This figure plots the publications as listed in Table 1 by adoption type. “Voluntary Only” includes studies 
focusing on voluntary IAS adoption only. “Mandatory Only” includes studies focusing on mandatory IFRS 
adoption only. “Mandatory & Voluntary” includes studies focusing on mandatory IFRS adoption but using 
voluntary adoption as an alternative benchmark group. We first count the number of publications under each 
adoption type. We then divide this number by the total number of publications in that year to get the percentage.  
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Figure 2: Number of publications using fixed effects models 
This figure plots the publications as listed in Table 1, including the fixed effects in their main regression models. 
We first count the number of publications with industry, country, time, or firm fixed effects. We then divide this 
number by the total number of publications in that year to obtain the percentage. Time fixed effects include 
year, quarter, or month fixed effects. A paper may use a model with multiple fixed effects, i.e., country and year 
fixed effects, or with fixed effects in multiple dimensions, i.e., country-year fixed effects. In both cases, each 
paper is included in the country and time categories.       
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Figure 3: Number of publications using clustered standard errors 
This figure plots the publications as listed in Table 1 using clustered standard errors in their main empirical 
models. We first count the number of publications with standard errors clustered by industry, country, time, or 
firm. We then divide this number by the total number of publications in that year to obtain the percentage. Time 
includes year, quarter, or month. A paper may use a model in which standard errors are clustered in two ways, 
i.e., by country and year, or in which standard errors are clustered in one way but in two dimensions, i.e., 
clustering by country-year. In both cases, each paper is included in the country and time categories.       
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